Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST69
2007-01-17 14:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

COLD COMFORT: POLITICAL DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS

Tags:  PREL RU HU PGOV ECON 
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VZCZCXRO0240
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0069/01 0171423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171423Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0637
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000069 

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2017
TAGS: PREL RU HU PGOV ECON
SUBJECT: COLD COMFORT: POLITICAL DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS
HUNGARY'S AMBIVALENT DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000069

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2017
TAGS: PREL RU HU PGOV ECON
SUBJECT: COLD COMFORT: POLITICAL DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS
HUNGARY'S AMBIVALENT DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) The shut-off of the oil pipeline from Russia and
renewed sparring between the Gyurcsany government and the
opposition have placed Hungary's ambivalent relationship with
Moscow at center stage as the government returns from its
holiday break.

"THE MERRIEST BARRACKS IN GAZPROM"


2. (U) In a lengthy interview published in the weekly Magyar
Demokrata January 4 (during a long vacation that has made him
all but incommunicado),FIDESZ leader Viktor Orban reviewed a
host of issues (septel). In a rare foray into foreign
affairs, Orban denounced the Gyurcsany government's Russia
policy, charging that Gyurcsany's pursuit of "separate pacts"
with Russia risk turning Hungary into the "merriest barracks
in GAZPROM." (Note: This is particularly evocative phrase
which raises the specter of Communist times, when Hungary was
often referred to as "the merriest barracks in the Warsaw
Pact. End Note.)


3. (C) FM Goncz's immediate public response cast the
government's policy in the context of its "strategic
priority" of energy security, but was in turn rebutted by
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Zsolt Nemeth
(FIDESZ),who criticized the government for breaking with EU
solidarity and maintained that his objections to GAZPROM are
based not on nationality but on a lack of transparency and
reliability.


4. (C) The GoH found itself further undercut by Russia's
suspension of the pipeline flow January 8. Scrambling to
react, the MFA convoked both the Russian ambassador and the
Belorussian CDA, requesting responses from their capitals
within 24 hours. With Minister of Economy Koka serving as
the principal public spokesperson, the GoH authorized release
of supplies from Hungary's national reserves and, in a move
seemingly designed to project confidence, announced plans to
move forward with a previously planned price reduction
(Budapest Daily January 9).

OIL ON THE FLAMES


5. (C) The debate is a rare substantive exchange over
foreign policy, made rarer still in that both sides can claim
to be the realists. The Gyurcsany government rationalizes
that it is recognizing - and trying to reduce - Hungary's
unwelcome but obvious dependence on Russian energy. For its
part, the opposition can cast the government's policy as
appeasement (and ineffective appeasement at that) by casting
justifiable doubts on a "special" relationship with Moscow.


6. (C) Orban's attack on the Russian front is consistent
with his running campaign against the Gyurcsany government.
Although Orban still has work to do in restoring his own
transatlantic bona fides and explaining his frequently
alarmist attitude toward foreign corporations, few Hungarians
doubt his anti-Russian credentials. As always, many FIDESZ
members will follow wherever Orban leads, even when he has
few practical alternatives to offer.


7. (C) On this issue, however, others may follow as well.
At a minimum, they are listening. Orban has shrewdly
assessed the government's vulnerability on this issue. His
GAZPROM sound bite has deep resonance, and despite increased
exports to Russia, many Hungarians feel Gyurcsany is simply
"too close to Moscow." The Prime Minister's pre-election
invitation to Putin and his September visit to Sochi
disturbed even moderates who understand the economic
realities, and some see Gyurcsany going so far in his
relationship with Putin that he risks making a vice of a
necessity.

GUILT BY ASSOCIATION ... AND BY INACTION?


8. (C) FIDESZ's attempts to link Gyurcsany and Putin further
their goal of tarring the Prime Minister by association.
Their rhetoric increasingly portrays the PM as kleptocrat who
took advantage of the transition to make his fortune ... and
is now taking advantage of his fortune to cement his power.


9. (C) This is an uncomfortable charge for Gyurcsany, who
has long been hounded by the perception of ill-gotten gains.
It is also a charge even his practiced outline of present and
planned steps to reduce Hungary's energy dependence cannot
completely refute. Although Hungary may not have any
immediate alternatives to Russian energy, nor has it made
significant progress on diversification since last winter's
cut-off. With senior officials now admitting to "consistent

BUDAPEST 00000069 002 OF 002


threats from Moscow," the PM's private assurances that he has
"no illusions" regarding Russia remain subject to question -
even, reportedly, within his own cabinet. FM Goncz has
apparently advised the PM that Russian behavior has been
"unacceptable," and others in the MFA are awakening to the
realization that diversification is "not a question of
opinion about Russia" but a matter of "economic necessity."
Gyurcsany may well have to answer more questions on this
issue in the coming weeks, diverting attention from his
planned focus on domestic reform.

WE TOLD YOU SO ... BUT WE CAN'T TELL YOU HOW TO FIX IT


10. (C) Comment: By highlighting Hungary's relationship with
Russia, FIDESZ is also making a rare (and welcome) policy
argument. Although the brief cut-off underscored their point
about the perils of exclusive dependence on Russia, FIDESZ
has diagnosed the problem without offering realistic
prescriptions. Nemeth, for example, has expressed his desire
to find a solution ... but ruled out any bilateral course of
action. This makes for better politics than policy.
Although many of our contacts have informally expressed
concern over their perceptions of growing Russian investment
- and influence - in Hungary, their idea of a solution is too
often limited to asking "why doesn't America do something
about it?" It would be unfortunate if the opposition views a
chance to engage in a substantive and important debate as
merely another target of opportunity in its political
campaign. It will be irresponsible if the government does
not take this second warning seriously and redouble its
efforts to address Hungary's energy security priorities.
End Comment.



FOLEY