Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST570
2007-04-17 07:57:00
SECRET
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

FROM VICTIMHOOD TO VULNERABILITY: GYURCSANY'S

Tags:  PREL ECON ENRG HU 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUP #0570/01 1070757
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170757Z APR 07 ZDK UR SVC
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1091
INFO RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0089
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0583
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 1129
S E C R E T BUDAPEST 000570 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING; USEU FOR
SMITHAM - PLEASE PASS TO DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON ENRG HU
SUBJECT: FROM VICTIMHOOD TO VULNERABILITY: GYURCSANY'S
EVOLVING LINE ON ENERGY SECURITY

REF: BUDAPEST 521

Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T BUDAPEST 000570

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING; USEU FOR
SMITHAM - PLEASE PASS TO DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON ENRG HU
SUBJECT: FROM VICTIMHOOD TO VULNERABILITY: GYURCSANY'S
EVOLVING LINE ON ENERGY SECURITY

REF: BUDAPEST 521

Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Prime Minister Gyurcsany met with Ambassador Foley
for a one-on-one discussion April 16 to follow up on their
recent exchange re energy security.


2. (S) Gyurcsany noted that he had been personally upset by
the previous discussion and by the continuing focus on energy
security in the public domain. He had, however, realized
"after 3 marriages" that it would be "more productive to
focus on progress than on blame." He emphasized his
commitment to diversification but commented that Hungary's
dependence on Russia is such that overt pressure from Moscow
is rarely necessary. He must take a "prudent approach" in
his actions and even his public statements.


3. (S) What he will do, he continued, is send FM Goncz to
tour Central Asia later this spring to prepare for his own
visit to Central Asia next year. (Note: Although he
identified Azerbaijan as one destination, he was unclear
regarding the other potential stops. End Note.) In the
interim, he will meet with Croatian PM Sanader to discuss
cooperation on the LNG pipeline, and has conferred with
Ambassador Simonyi re an op-ed to help clarify GoH policy.
He will also meet with the diplomatic community here to help
correct "misperceptions" of Hungary's position and will move
forward with plans to hold a conference on Nabucco.


4. (S) The PM noted his interest in speaking to President
Bush in order to help correct "misunderstandings" in
Washington. The Ambassador responded that discussion at that
level should follow new - and positive - developments so that
it will have the result we both want. (Comment: We believe
that our response will buy us some time but we expect that
Gyurcsany will return to the issue of a POTUS call. We will
want to ensure that he has a clear and committed position in
preparation for any such conversation, and to prevent the PM
from claiming - as Hungarian officials are wont to do - that
the US "understands" their position as a result of high-level
contacts. End Comment.)


5. (S) Reviewing his recent trip to Moscow, Gyurcsany
assured us that he has signed "no new contracts" and reported
that Putin had not raised the energy issue. In response to
his inquiry re the prospects for Blue Stream transiting
Hungary, Putin had provided "little clarity" regarding
Russian plans. (Note: Gyurcsany's advisors tell us
separately that energy had been the raison d'etre for the
trip but that they had found Russian thinking on Blue Stream
"not much more advanced" than planning for Nabucco. End
Note.) Putin had agreed to "look into" Gyurcsany's complaint
that Hungary is paying markedly higher prices for its gas,
but had not responded as yet.


6. (S) Gyurcsany conceded that his staff had compounded the
problem through its failure to move information vertically or
laterally. He advised us that changes are likely in the near
term. Emphasizing the value he places on our bilateral
relationship, he urged us to remain in close touch with FM
Goncz and Foreign and Security Policy Council chief Laszlo
Valki.


7. (S) Comment: We believe the PM has talked himself through
his initial reaction to our candid discussion of last week.
That said, if he is no longer claiming victimhood he is still
coming to grips with his acute vulnerability. Gyurcsany's
dilemma is complicated by international media attention,
which reduces his room to maneuver in Hungary and raises his
exposure in Washington. He is acutely sensitive to both, and
may still harbor residual feelings that the issue is more
about partisan politics than strategic policy. He appealed
to us repeatedly to "trust me" ... and to help quell press
attention to the issue. We made clear that widespread
concern about Hungary's position goes far beyond what we
could create or control, and urged him to make his case on
energy security as aggressively as he did in responding to
the fall demonstrations. (Note: Whatever the PM's desires,
press coverage will not go away: an April 17 report analyzing
press coverage of the issue concludes that the media has been
slanted toward Blue Stream, missing key facts regarding
Nabucco financing and shying away from hard questions
regarding the disparity between the GoH and EU positions.
End Note.) The good news is that Gyurcsany is moving, and
that the steps he proposed are encouraging. It is vital that

we continue to provide him with information so that the
government makes informed decisions. It will also be crucial
that Gyurcsany see tangible progress from Azerbaijan and
others to warrant more dramatic steps. End Comment.

FOLEY