Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST518
2007-04-04 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

EXCESS BAGGAGE: FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC

Tags:  PREL PGOV HU 
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VZCZCXRO4652
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0518/01 0941503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041503Z APR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1042
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000518 

SIPDIS

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV HU
SUBJECT: EXCESS BAGGAGE: FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC
POLITICS

REF: BUDAPEST 506

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000518

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV HU
SUBJECT: EXCESS BAGGAGE: FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC
POLITICS

REF: BUDAPEST 506

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Foreign policy issues are playing an
increasingly prominent role in Hungary's political discourse,
with key questions highlighted by energy security challenging
domestic issues for attention. The opposition is dedicating
significant time, attention, and effort to its attacks on the
Gyurcsany government's foreign policy, where the Prime
Minister has done himself few favors of late with his
statements, his policy moves, or his personnel decisions.
There is a clear risk of drift toward Moscow, and we will
need to continue our aggressive engagement to change the
government's positions ... and give them the opportunity to
change our perception. End Summary.

MORE INTEREST; LESS SUPPORT?


2. (C) Recent visits by EUR DAS Bryza (septel) and Brigadier
General O'Reilly of the National Missile Defense Agency
(REFTEL) drew significant interest in Hungary, aided by the
energetic efforts of the opposition to challenge the
Gyurcsany government's constantly shifting position on the
vital issues of energy security and missile defense. For
FIDESZ, the benefits are obvious: with the convergence plan
making slow progress and the opposition's legal challenges
months away from a public referendum, opening yet another
front in its campaign against Gyurcsany helps maintain their
political momentum. By spotlighting Gyurcsany's recent trip
to Moscow and his mixed (at best) public statements, FIDESZ
is seeking to restore its own trans-Atlantic credentials as
it neatly complements their consistent attacks on Gyurcsany
as a "Communist kleptocrat."


3. (C) The Prime Minister has done little to dispell the
perception of drift toward Moscow. Even high-level officials
at the MFA and elsewhere continue to indicate the decisions
regarding energy security will be made by the Prime Minister,
who has never been more than neutral in his statements
regarding Blue Stream and Nabucco. Our colleagues in the
diplomatic community regard Hungary with mistrust, and even
political allies and personal friends, including SZDSZ

parliamentarian Matyas Eorsi, have taken the PM to task
publicly for a naive faith in a "special" relationship with
Moscow. Eorsi has also confronted the PM privately, but
confided to us his continuing frustration with Gyurcsany's
insistence on "going to Moscow - and Sochi - and saying
stupid things." By contrast, Eorsi continued, the government
continues to talk about the EU "as if we're not a member."

REAPING AS IT SOWS


4. (C) Pal Dunay, newly appointed head of the MFA-affiliated
Foreign Policy Institute, believes the current situation is
the logical result - if not the intended outcome - of the
PM's staffing decisions. By choosing Kinga Goncz to "receive
on-the-job-training as Foreign Minister," Dunay suggests,
"Gyurcsany is getting what he wants: a foreign policy run out
of the Prime Minister's Office." Though a participant in the
ongoing effort to develop Hungary's new foreign policy
strategy, Dunay believes the government is "focusing on the
questions no one will ever ask."


5. (C) Change may come, but it will likely come slowly.
Surveying the field after Minister of Economy Koka's victory
as SZDSZ party president, most observers believe the MFA will
not be included in a cabinet reshuffle in the near-term.
"Goncz is expendable," concludes Dunay, "and Gyurcsany will
fire her whenever it best suits his political needs."


6. (C) For the time being, the government appears to be
giving priority to reorganizing its communications operation.
The PMO has added several more "strategic advisors" to the
payroll even as the search continues for a new spokesperson
following their candidate's decision to withdraw in the face
of attacks by the opposition for her husband's alleged ties
to organized crime. An ad seriatim approach would be
consistent with Gyurcsany's evident preference for making
adjustments constantly but major changes only gradually. The
focus on communication, meanwhile, risks playing into the
opposition's hands by seemingly confirming their allegation
that Gyurcsany is more concerned with appearances than
reality and that he is prepared to "use tax dollars to spread
lies."

MIND THE GAP


7. (C) For its part, FIDESZ is working to exploit perceived
gaps between the Gyurcsany government and key Allies, hoping

BUDAPEST 00000518 002 OF 002


to help rehabilitate its own international standing in the
process. Orban and key party leaders have worked the energy
security issue aggressively - so aggressively that Orban has
apparently been warned by MOL officials not to go too far.
FIDESZ's script calls for more diversification, less
dependence, and stronger association with the EU position,
and their rising stars are putting time and effort into
mastering the substance of the issue. At the same time, they
have been careful to emphasize theiQ support for Hungary's
PRT in Afghanistan ... while keeping a close eye on the
government's record on civil reconstruction.

ADRIFT IN A LAND-LOCKED COUNTRY?


8. (C) Comment: Whatever the government's intentions, there
is clearly a heightened risk of Gyurcsany's gravitation
toward Moscow. On both energy security and missile defense,
we have seen mixed signals and mixed messages from the Prime
Minister. With V-4 solidarity largely a memory and his
political idol Tony Blair soon to leave office, Gyurcsany may
feel his moorings coming lose. FIDESZ officials are eager to
charge that Moscow has offered the PM easy money - including
through Russia's alleged support for the forint. On Blue
Stream and other issues, we see them offering him the
illusion of easy solutions. In response we can only offer
cold, hard truth. Continued high-level engagement will help
address the risk of his drift to the east, and we will make
every effort to answer his questions ... and get him to act
in order to address our concerns. End Comment.

FOLEY