Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST350
2007-03-07 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

DAS DI CARLO'S CONSULTATIONS IN HUNGARY

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0350/01 0661202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071202Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0894
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000350 

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING AND BERT
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS HU
SUBJECT: DAS DI CARLO'S CONSULTATIONS IN HUNGARY

REF: BUDAPEST 266 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000350

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING AND BERT
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS HU
SUBJECT: DAS DI CARLO'S CONSULTATIONS IN HUNGARY

REF: BUDAPEST 266 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI


1. (C) Summary: DAS Di Carlo's visit to Budapest March 1 - 2
updated key GoH decision-makers and opinion-leaders on our
Balkan agenda, highlighted by our commitment to moving
forward on final status for Kosovo to promote the entire
region's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.
Hungarian officials expressed concerns regarding potential
regional destabilization tempered by the fundamental
recognition that the International Community is moving toward
a decision in the near-term. We will keep a close eye on
daylight between members of the MFA's senior leadership. End
Summary.


2. (C) Throughout DAS Di Carlo's meetings, Hungarian
parliamentarians, senior MFA officials, and political
analysts across the political spectrum expressed broad
support for ongoing efforts to reach a final status
settlement in Kosovo. All echoed the themes laid out in PM
Gyurcsany's recent letter to the EU underscoring the
"indispensability" of securing a UNSCR to enshrine new status
arrangements and the importance of promoting Serbia's
integration.

CONCERN WITHOUT INFLUENCE


3. (C) Hungarian concerns over regional stability featured
prominently in discussion. MFA State Secretary Laszlo Szoke
echoed the concerns of many here regarding a prospective
exodus of Serbs from Kosovo to the Vojvodina, noting the
danger of depriving them of "everything but their grievances
and their guns." MP Agnes Vadai also saw prospects for a
"domino effect" of ethnic conflict, noting that the
International Community must focus on the economic and social
as well as the political arrangements in order to prevent
Kosovo from becoming a failed state.


4. (C) The GoH is quietly urging ethnic Hungarian
communities "not to cry wolf" in the months ahead but sees
little influence on neighboring governments. Responding to
DAS Di Carlo's strong press for EU unity in moving forward,
MFA State Secretary Szoke expressed concern over Slovak and -

to a lesser extent - Romanian attitudes. He described recent
Slovak statements as driven by domestic political
considerations, adding that Hungary will remain in close
contact with MFA counterparts but predicting that they would
have little impact on "childish hysteria" in Bratislava or on
"eerily similar positions" in Bucharest.

"WE WANT SERBIA TO NEGOTIATE" BUT "WE WON'T HELP THEM
PROCRASTINATE"


5. (C) Following recent discussions between PM Gyurcsany and
Serbian President Tadic, MFA officials believe Tadic has "his
eyes on a European future" ... but fear he should keep an eye
on his back given the "fragile dynamic" in Belgrade. Tadic
had lamented that he is trapped in a "tragic" situation, with
"only the Russians defending Serbia" as he tried to move
toward EU accession. Gyurcsany urged Tadic to "represent
Serbia's interests" by participating constructively in the
negotiation process, also reinforcing the importance of ICTY
cooperation. Although the MFA is hopeful that Tadic will
engage to find "the least bad solution," they "will not help
Belgrade procrastinate." Many suspect that "Tadic knows what
is coming," but believe Belgrade will ultimately find an
imposed solution easier to accept for domestic political
consumption.


6. (C) Budapest is actively pressing other EU member-states
for integration incentives for Belgrade. As MFA State
Secretary Ivan Udvardi commented, "the EU must do what NATO

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did with its decision on PfP" despite significant enlargement
fatigue. MOD DAS-equivalent Peter Siklosi agreed, commenting
that "the EU needs to be a pain-killer for Serbia and a
steroid for Kosovo." At a minimum, Udvardi would like to see
a strong statement from the German EU Presidency affirming
Serbia's future within the Union to offset the impact of the
Ahtisaari plan.


7. (C) Both Parliamentary Speaker Katalin Szili and
Parliamentary European Affairs Committe Chair Matyas Eorsi
specifically endorsed broader contacts with the Serbian
public, including a more flexible visa regime. MFA State
Secretary Udvardi indicated that the GoH will quietly

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coordinate with the new government on these issues. State
Secretary Szoke conceded that Hungary remains at the leading

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edge of the EU re outreach to Serbia, commenting that "our
position differs ... but then again so does our geography."

BUDAPEST 00000350 002 OF 002


Both political scientist Tamas Magyarics and our diplomatic
colleagues here believe that geography is driving the GoH's
insistence on an UNSCR, so that it will be able to avoid any
difficult decisions re recognition of Kosovo and "hide behind
the United Nations."

WILLING TO DO MORE ...


8. (C) Hungarian officials regard a continued American
presence in the region as essential. The MOD's Siklosi
pledged that Hungary will be "the penultimate country to
leave" the international security force, and MFA State
Secretary Udvardi emphasized that Hungary would increase its

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troop presence in Kosovo if necessary despite the strain of
deployments elsewhere. Interestingly, there was no offer to
carry a message to Moscow, and officials in and out of
government had more questions than answers regarding Moscow's
ultimate intentions.

BUT FIRST DO NO HARM


9. (C) Comment: Although Hungarian officials clearly
recognize both the depth of our commitment to a settlement in
the near-term as well as the limits on their own influence,
there is still a degree of dissonance at senior levels of the
MFA. A critic of Ahtisaari, State Secretary Udvardi
expressed far more sympathy for a protracted (and even
potentially alternative) process than did State Secretary
Szoke. Although Udvardi's bureaucratic maneuvering within
the Ministry may explain his divergent views, we will watch
this space closely as we keep GoH officials fully briefed in
order to keep them fully on board. DAS Di Carlo's visit
helped these efforts enormously, and we have encouraged
Hungarian officials to view the issue in a strategic and not
just an ethnic context. End Comment.


10. (U) DAS Di Carlo has cleared on this message.

FOLEY