Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST266
2007-02-23 10:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

SCENE-SETTER FOR DAS DI CARLO'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST

Tags:  PREL PGOV HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUP #0266/01 0541000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231000Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0807
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000266 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS DICARLO AND EUR/SCE JOSHUA BLACK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV HU
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR DAS DI CARLO'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST

REF: A) BUDAPEST 175 B) BUDAPEST 76

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000266

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS DICARLO AND EUR/SCE JOSHUA BLACK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV HU
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR DAS DI CARLO'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST

REF: A) BUDAPEST 175 B) BUDAPEST 76

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI


1. (C) The integration of the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic
community remains an issue of bipartisan consensus despite
Hungary,s fractious domestic political dynamic. All parties
supported NATO and EU accession and see the International
Community's presence as key to stability in the Balkans and
thus to their own long-term security. You should hear a
consistent message of support for our engagement from
officials in the government and in the opposition, who may
agree about little else.


2. (C) Translating Hungary,s interest into constructive
engagement is the key. Pressing for activism remains an
uphill battle in a country where interest in foreign policy
is neither broad nor deep, but the former Yugoslavia remains
an area of vital national interest. Hungary,s first real
foray into Balkan policy in 2005, on behalf of Croatia,s EU
accession, ended in a stinging rebuke from London (and from
Washington) over ICTY conditionality. Although most of its
attention is still very much focused on internal politics,
Budapest is beginning to seek a diplomatic role commensurate
with its troop deployments in the region. (Note: Hungary has
approximately 500 troops throughout the Balkans - half their
legally mandated limit - with a commitment made to increase
their contribution to EU missions. End note.)


3. (C) Kosovo status will be the first real test of their
readiness to do so. Though the impact of any settlement on
the ethnic Hungarian community in the Vojvodina (a key issue
and potential political weapon for the opposition) will
remain of paramount importance to Budapest, the GoH
recognizes that the costs of inaction outweigh the
consequences of a decision now.


4. (C) They will want to proceed in a way that integrates
rather than isolates Serbia. NATO's decision on PfP was
widely hailed here and privately acknowleged as a decision
"made in America ... and announced in Riga." We suspect they
also see our decision as one influenced by their engagement.
We are working hard to identify synergies between the Ohio

National Guard's State Partnership Program with Hungary and
their new relationship with Serbia. This will help Budapest
take on a supportive role and potentially give Serbia
selective access to more engagement opportunities. As
Hungarian officials have pointed out, one potential advantage
to this relationship may come in Afghanistan, as Hungary is
encouraging neighboring states to contribute to its
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan Province. Croatia
is already doing so, and the GoH has also had informal
discussions with Belgrade (and we suspect Podgorica)
regarding further contributions.


5. (C) In a recent letter circulated within the EU, Prime
Minister Gyurcsany underscored the importance of Serbia's
full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and emphasized
Budapest's two redlines re future status (ref a):

- That the timing of the decision allow for a "reasonable
period" to pass following the Serbian elections (based on FM
Goncz's comments to Ambassador Foley, the GoH seems to regard
the convention of the Parliament - rather than the formation
of a new government - to suffice in this regard); and,

- That the IC pursue a Security Council Resolution to endorse
status arrangements.

Hungarian officials have privately signaled to us their
eagerness to serve as a channel of communication to Belgrade
and their expressed willingness to underscore our points with
the Russians, with whom PM Gyurcsany maintains a close
relationship. We have encouraged the GoH to represent its
views actively within the EU, and to seek out opportunities
to expand its commitment to the EU's civilian efforts on the
ground, and your visit can help provide them with specific
recommendations. We have also laid down our informal marker
re Hungary's occasional expressions of interest in applying
any provisions for the protection of the Serbian minority in
Kosovo to Hungarian minorities in Serbia proper. Although
this suggestion has not reared its head of late, you may need
to tamp down any expectations as one variable too many in any
already complex equation.


6. (C) We are developing your schedule to maximize
opportunities to promote Hungary's support for the way
forward in Kosovo. We have requested the following meetings:

MFA State Secretary Laszlo Szoke: Although division of
responsibility for the Balkans is not always precise, and
Szoke's responsibility for European Affairs (including
International Organizations and Human Rights) make him one of
the Ministry's key players on the issue. A former Ambassador
to Sweden with prior service in Washington and Baghdad, Szoke
will warmly welcome your visit as a chance to hear our latest
thinking. MFA officials will likely underscore Hungarian
concerns regarding a "perfect storm" that leaves Serbia
"without Kosovo and the chance of European integration" and
may reiterate concerns re Russia. They may also repeat their
private assessment opinion that Ahtisaari missed an
opportunity by declining offers of support from Hungary and
other new Allies (ref b).

The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee: Chaired by
opposition MP Zsolt Nemeth, with whom you met in Washington
last year, the committee is working to maintain the spirit of
bipartisanship as it establishes an independent voice on
foreign policy issues. Although Zsolt will be at a political
event in Romania, we are putting together a session with
other committee members and staff. We have also contacted
Parliamentary Speaker Katalin Szili's office about a meeting,
given her interest in the region. Szili has also worked to
raise her profile in foreign affairs through frequent travel,
and has invited Speaker Pelosi to attend a meeting of Balkan
parliamentarians in Budapest in June.

The Ministry of Defense: Time permitting, we will work to set
an appointment with MOD officials interested in our views
regarding the long-term international presence in the region.
This will also present an opportunity to discuss ways to use
the State Partnership Program as a vehicle to promote reform
in the Serbian military.

Lunch: Ambassador Foley will host a lunch at the residence in
your honor, with invitees including MFA and MOD
representatives, foreign policy and security experts, and
parliamentarians. All will welcome our assessment on Kosovo
and also news from your meetings in Brussels.

Dinner: DCM Reeker and Political Counselor Gaudiosi would be
delighted to arrange an informal dinner, potentially to
include opinion leaders for an off-the record discussion.


7. (C) We look forward to welcoming you in person.

REEKER