MR. KOSTUNICA GOES TO BUDAPEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 001850

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE AND EUR/SCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR
ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2012
TAGS: PREL HU SR KO
SUBJECT: MR. KOSTUNICA GOES TO BUDAPEST

Classified By: P/E Counselor Eric Gaudiosi; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a visit described as "neither as bad as
we feared or as positive as we hoped," Serbian Prime Minister
Kostunica met with Hungarian officials in Budapest November

13. Prime Minister Gyurcsany encouraged Kostunica to engage
fully in finding a diplomatic solution to the question of
Kosovo status, underscoring that the IC will ultimately move
forward with or without Serbian input. Gyurcsany emphasized
Hungary's desire to actively support the entire region's
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and be "a good
friend to Serbia," but made clear that there will be no
Hungarian departure from the NATO/EU consensus. End Summary.



2. (C) According to Ambassador Karoly Banai, Foreign and
Security Policy Advisor to the PM, Gyurcsany and Kostunica
spent more than two hours together November 13. Gyurcsany
urged Belgrade to negotiate in earnest with the Kosovars and
to cooperate with the Troika, lest Serbia be "left out" of
final decisions which the International Community will take.


3. (C) Gyurcsany emphasized Hungary's commitment to be "a
good friend" to Serbia within NATO and the EU, highlighting
the prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration for Belgrade and
the protections for ethnic Serbs offered by the Ahtisaari
Plan. Serbia, he concluded, had the opportunity to shape the
diplomatic process but could not stop a status decision.
Nor, he warned, should it contemplate a military solution.


4. (C) According to Banai, Kostunica made no reference to
Russia or to the question of the ethnic Hungarian minority in
the Vojvodina. (Note: Kostunica was accompanied by a
representative of the Vojvodina and Gyurcsany by a
representative of Hungary's ethnic Serb population. End
note.) Banai's overall assessment is that there will be no
Serbian action "until the last minute ... if then" given
concerns regarding the domestic political dynamic.


5. (C) Banai described Kostunica's response as "not happy
but not hostile," his arguments as legalistic and
"backward-looking," - longing for the Serbian boundaries of a
pre-WWI past - and his overall demeanor as unemotional and
"unwell."


6. (C) In a subsequent meeting with FIDESZ Parliamentary
Faction Leader Tibor Navracsics, Kostunica made reference to
ongoing discussions with Kosovar Albanian reps to discuss a
"Hong Kong solution" that would grant "independence in all
but name." Navracsics believes, however, that Kostunica
recognizes the inevitability of independence even though he
made reference to the prospect of instability caused by "two
- or more - Albanian states in the region."


7. (C) Kostunica took a conciliatory line regarding the
Vojvodina, assuring Navracsics that his government will
provide all legal protections to the Hungarian communities
there, including continued cultural autonomy. Navracsics
reports that Kostunica emphasized his party's membership in
the European People's Party (EPP) as a point in common with
FIDESZ, and pledged to continue outreach efforts to Belgrade
to make clear Hungary's support for Serbia's Euro-Atlantic
integration.


8. (C) Kostunica's softer line on the Vojvodina contrasts
with the approach taken by FM Jeremic. Sources on the staff
of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee describe his
meetings in Budapest last month as "subtle blackmail."
Jeremic reportedly told opposition representatives that
"independence in Kosovo means war in the Balkans...and war in
the Balkans means refugees in Hungary and in ethnic Hungarian
areas in Serbia.
FOLEY