Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST1468
2007-09-09 08:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

WAKE ME WHEN SEPTEMBER ENDS: PARLIAMENT RETURNS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM ECON ENRG HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2030
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #1468/01 2520804
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090804Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1866
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001468 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NSC; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ECON ENRG HU
SUBJECT: WAKE ME WHEN SEPTEMBER ENDS: PARLIAMENT RETURNS

REF: A) BUDAPEST 1422 B) BUDAPEST 1414

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001468

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NSC; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ECON ENRG HU
SUBJECT: WAKE ME WHEN SEPTEMBER ENDS: PARLIAMENT RETURNS

REF: A) BUDAPEST 1422 B) BUDAPEST 1414

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The running debate over the Magyar Garda has
generated more heat than light as Parliament prepares to
return to session September 10 (ref a). This issue remains a
potential flashpoint, but members on both sides of the aisle
are pledging cooperation on key issues even as they expect a
season of continued conflict between the government and the
opposition. The government is likely to pursue limited
initiatives and to prioritize continued deficit reduction
over deeper structural reforms. Opposition leaders have
pledged to engage constructively, but feel their base expects
them to respond to what they perceive as the PM's attempts to
create "hysteria" and to "criminalize opposition." Both
sides will likely keep a close eye on the spring referendum,
on the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, and on polling
showing record frustration with the political elite. End
Summary.

LIMITED REFORM, UNRESTRAINED RHETORIC?


2. (C) Both the government and the opposition continue to
regard 2007-08 as a critical year. For Prime Minister
Gyurcsany, the coming months represent the arrival of EU
assistance and the (hoped-for) reversal of recent economic
indicators. Talk of broader reforms, once jokingly described
by Minister for Development Gordan Bajnai as "changing
everything all at once," is an increasingly distant memory as
the government focuses on modest initiatives on the margins.
With recent reforms criticized as "the government's war
against the people," major initiatives such as health care
reform the subject of debate even within the coalition
(septel),and his own party restive, Gyurcsany will likely
want to avoid further budget cuts even while he pursues
further deficit reduction. The likely result: further )
albeit fitful ) revenue enhancement without significant
progress on fundamental structural change.



3. (C) Although the PM will likely set only modest goals for
this season, his rhetoric may continue to veer toward the
extreme. As it did during the demonstrations of 2006, the
government may seek to focus the national debate not on its
decisions but on the opposition's alleged threat to Hungarian
democracy.


4. (C) Former FM Janos Martonyi believes that the PM has
"already overstepped all boundaries" by "playing the fascist
card," and other moderates within FIDESZ believe the PM is
attempting to create "hysteria" by exaggerating extremist
sentiment. Indeed, Martonyi and others argue that this has
only fanned the flames, giving the Garda "priceless
publicity." They assert Gyurcsany will attempt to
"criminalize all opposition" in the months ahead.

CONTINUED RESISTANCE (


5. (C) For FIDESZ, 2007-08 represents not an economic
turning point but a political tipping point. As the 2009
European Parliamentary Elections approach, the opposition
will focus on a spring referendum both as a means to continue
attacking the government and as a vehicle to mobilize its
political base. In a meeting with the diplomatic corps
September 5, Orban described the referendum as "a
supplementary constitutional process ( but the last avenue
open to the people to discuss the government's policies." An
air of uncertainty hangs over the referendum, however, as the
law is vague as to the consequences of the vote. In
practical terms, many in FIDESZ ) and perhaps some in the
MSZP ) see the referendum as a way to force Gyurcsany from
office by handing his rivals a convenient pretext to demand
his departure from within.


6. (C) As FIDESZ faction leader Tibor Navracsics tells us,
the opposition will play a careful balancing act. With
Orban's statement to the diplomatic corps September 5
denouncing the Garda as "a stupid answer to Hungary's
problems," the party has worked hard ) and come far ) in
distancing itself from the extreme right. Though sensitive
to pressure from the International Community - and especially
from the US - FIDESZ is also under pressure to make sure that
it does not lose the rhetorical contest in front of
supporters who Tibor Navracsics believes "see attacks as
decisiveness and restraint as weakness." While Orban has
pledged "lawful and peaceful resistance," FIDESZ's rhetoric
will likely continue to cast Gyurcsany as illegitimate, his
government as incompetent, and protests as the unavoidable
result.

WITH ISOLATED POCKETS OF COOPERATION

BUDAPEST 00001468 002 OF 002




7. (C) There are still some areas of agreement despite the
discord. Although the most visible symbol of gridlock ) the
opposition's departure during the PM's addresses in
Parliament ) will continue, Orban has pledged that FIDESZ
will be "constructive and cooperative" by "supporting ideas
that are good for Hungary."


8. (C) We understand that legislation to protect key
industries from foreign take-over will be put on a fast-track
for approval, with initial entry into force expected by
October 1. This will be an important tangible result of
bipartisan cooperation to protect MOL from a hostile
take-over, an issue which has helped underscore the
importance of energy security to the public and the body
politic.


9. (C) Following five-party talks hosted by President
Solyom, an agreement on budget oversight also seems within
reach. Although FIDESZ is pressing for a small independent
oversight body and the MSZP reportedly proposing a larger
bureaucracy, both are working toward a compromise that will
make budgetary data more credible and accessible. More
important, it will help Hungary break its cycle of
pre-election spending sprees followed by austerity programs.


10. (C) The parties are also in open competition to
establish their bona fides on Cuba, with an uneasy truce in
place between the government and FIDESZ as both work to
support a democratic transition (septel). FIDESZ officials
have also expressed broad support for the PM's outreach to
China (ref b).


11. (C) Comment: While small, these steps could play well
with a public that is increasingly disenchanted with the
political leadership writ large. Polling shows respect for
the political elite hovering at only one-third of the
population, and Orban himself believes that this reflects
"frustration with a government that can't govern and an
opposition that has been too weak to remove it." End Comment.



FOLEY