Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST1377
2007-08-27 14:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

SHADES OF ORANGE: DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN

Tags:  PGOV KDEM HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0958
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #1377/01 2391447
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271447Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1789
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 001377 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HU
SUBJECT: SHADES OF ORANGE: DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN
THE FIDESZ LEADERSHIP?


Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI: REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 001377

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HU
SUBJECT: SHADES OF ORANGE: DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN
THE FIDESZ LEADERSHIP?


Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI: REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: FIDESZ Party Vice-Presidents Mihalj Varga
and Zoltan Pokorni voiced sharply divergent views on issues
ranging from the upcoming referendum to the party's
leadership structure in separate meetings with Ambassador
Foley. As Orban's deputy, Varga largely voiced the party
line; Pokorni, however, openly expressed his support for
"more leadership choices" within the party. Their
differences reflect the often-discussed (but rarely revealed)
division between FIDESZ officials who remain loyal to Orban
and those who believe the party may be outgrowing its
founder. End Summary.

TALKING OUT OF SCHOOL


2. (C) A professor and former Minister of Education, FIDESZ
Party Vice-President Zoltan Pokorni challenged conventional
wisdom on a broad range of issues in a candid exchange with
Ambassador Foley August 23. His comments contrasted sharply
with remarks made by fellow party VP (and Orban Deputy)
Mihaly Varga, who offered a more conventional take on issues
he described as ¬ well understood by foreign experts and
observers8 the following day.

THE REFERENDUM: ORBAN'S WAR (BUT NOT POKORNI'S FIGHT


3. (C) Discussing the upcoming referendum, Pokorni commented
that the issue presented a dilemma for FIDESZ in general and
for Orban in particular. With objectivity bordering on
detachment, he commented that if Orban "shies away from a
fight" FIDESZ could lose what they have made the centerpiece
of their political agenda; if he engages and the referendum
fails, then "he cannot be a Prime Ministerial candidate."
Pokorni remarked that Orban will likely look for others to
lead the referendum effort in order to distance himself from
the campaign and thus avoid the "risk of losing," contrasting
this prospect with what he expects to be an active effort by
PM Gyurcsany to contest the referendum. (Note: At one point
reportedly in "negotiations" with Orban to lead the
referendum effort, Pokorni made clear that he is not
interested ( and predicted that popular Debrecen Mayor Lajos
Kosa would be similarly disposed. End Note.)



4. (C) Pokorni believes the MSZP will attempt to complicate
the issues in the referendum in order to confuse the
electorate. Conceding that the issues are "complicated
enough already," Pokorni criticized his own party for "not
deciding what game we are playing ) politics or policy."
Having built up the referendum as a means to remove the PM,
he now sees FIDESZ backing down and casting the ballot as a
means to mobilize its base and to highlight key issues. Even
this presents risks in his view, as "only 5 ) 10 percent of
Hungarian voters can be swayed," and FIDESZ "could lose as
many as we gain." Meanwhile, he believes that the MSZP still
holds the initiative, as it can decide whether to contest the
substance of the referendum questions or merely work to
prevent the requisite 50 percent turn-out required to make
the results official. He predicts that the government will
"paint the referendum as a power-grab," once again using
Orban to rally its supporters.


5. (C) In response to our question, he commented that using
the referendum as a means to "hand the MSZP a reason to
remove Gyurcsany" would be "wise." He indicated that many in
the MSZP share FIDESZ's opposition to the government's
current health care proposals.

BAD COP, NOW COMES GOOD COP


6. (C) In contrast, Varga has high hopes and did not view
the referendum as a political dilemma for FIDESZ but rather
an issue of &democracy8 and a &fundamental question of
whether the government can do exactly the opposite of what it
promised earlier.8 He said the referendum is not against
the economic reforms, affirming his view that (unspecified)
reforms are needed to restructure the economy. Moving
forward, he said the party plans to start collecting
signatures in the fall and is looking to hold the referendum
in late winter 2007 or early spring 2008. Varga
acknowledged, however, that the party did go &too far on the
questions8 and that &we also make mistakes and sometimes
choose the easier way.8 In doing so, he echoed previous
comments made by FIDESZ faction leader Tibor Navracsics, who
has expressed concern that "so many questions" will undermine
the impact of the referendum.

FRIENDS DON,T LET FRIENDS FORM GUARDS


7. (C) Turning briefly to the Magyar Garda (septel),Pokorni

BUDAPEST 00001377 002 OF 003


commented that Gyurcsany "could not have asked for a better
issue to sustain him" than the "specter" of the Garda. "This
is a political trap," he continued, "and we've fallen into
it." "We must," he concluded, "find our way out as soon as
possible." Varga commented that sometimes it is &easier to
fight our enemies than to have friends (Jobbik party) who
sometimes are more difficult.8 He described the Garda as an
&unfortunate initiative8 and said they reached out to the
original founders of the Jobbik party to tell them not to do
this but were unsuccessful. Varga believes it &would be
much better if the whole situation never happened8 but so
long as Jobbik follows the laws and regulations, they &can
file whatever they want8. He said the government is
&calling attention to fake problems8 and that extreme right
groups received only 1.5% support in the last election and so
this initiative poses no threat to society. Lamenting that
the government is using the issue to distract the public from
focusing on the country,s economic reforms, Varga views the
government,s reaction as &more dangerous8.

TIRED OF LYING IN THE BED ORBAN MADE?


8. (C) Pokorni's antipathy toward Orban ) who he referred
to consistently by title rather than by name - was evident
throughout the conversation. He emphasized repeatedly that
the party's best interests would be served by "having more
leadership choices," noting that the MSZP has been "far more
flexible" in its leadership decisions and commenting flatly
that Orban could not expect to "completely centralize the
party and escape responsibility for the consequences of his
actions."


9. (C) That said, Pokorni was adamant ) and in our view
credible ) in denying his own interest in higher office.
Dead-panning that he "isn't qualified to be PM because I
don't speak English, he also remarked that "you have to want
the job ) and love conflict ) to be Prime Minister ( and I
don't."

BIOGRAPHIC NOTES


10. (C) Candid and cerebral, Pokorni is perhaps best known
for his resignation as FIDESZ party president and withdrawal
from the national stage in 2002, when allegations emerged
regarding his father's role as a Communist informer. He has
slowly worked his way back as an MP, Mayor of Budapest's
exclusive twelfth district, and party VP, but the experience
may explain his particular emotion as he noted that "we must
find a way to do more than call each other fascists and
communists." Remembered for his popularity with his students
during his teaching career, Pokorni was frequently funny in
his comments (he commented, for example, that anti-American
sentiment is driven by the fact that "no one likes a smart
beauty queen") but appeared almost completely stoic in
conversation.


11. (C) While Pokorni withdrew from the national stage, Varga
continued to rise in power as an MP from Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok
County eastern Hungary, serving currently Deputy Faction head
in Parliament and Chairman of the Budget, Finance, and
Auditing Committee. In the last FIDESZ Congress, Varga said
he received the same number of votes as Orban and it &scared
Orban so much he appointed him Deputy.8 Despite this
comment, Varga is regarded as close to Orban, and rarely
strays from the party line. He is not fluent in English but
he still tries to converse, even when the result is less than
comprehensible. Meeting in his office around a small table
with just a close aide, he appeared earnest and thoughtful in
explaining his party,s positions. As FIDESZ,s leading
voice on economic issues, he appears level-headed and
recognizes that reforms are needed to restructure the
economy. However, he provided no further details on what
that would look like, and we are still left to wonder what
alternative economic reform package FIDESZ has to offer.

COMMENT: BIPOLAR DISORDER


12. (C) Both observers and party insiders have long
maintained that FIDESZ is more diverse than it appears from
the outside. Even Orban has moved to increase at least the
appearance that the party is based on broad input rather than
the imposition of his views, and the emergence of new voices
including Faction Leader Tibor Navracsics and Foreign Affairs
Committee Chair Zsolt Nemeth attests to his willingness to
let others take center stage on selected issues. That said,
the ultimate question within FIDESZ is of proximity to Orban.
Key moderates, Pokorni and Kosa among them, appear to remain
on Orban's periphery. As the fall political season
approaches, they may be waiting for Orban to test the party's
patience so that they can test the waters. End Comment.

BUDAPEST 00001377 003 OF 003



FOLEY