Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST1341
2007-08-16 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

FROM SIMONYI TO SOMOGYI: CHANGES AT THE HUNGARIAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM ENRG ECON 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUP #1341/01 2280955
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160955Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1755
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 001341 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ENRG ECON
SUBJECT: FROM SIMONYI TO SOMOGYI: CHANGES AT THE HUNGARIAN
EMBASSY AND BEYOND

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 001341

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ENRG ECON
SUBJECT: FROM SIMONYI TO SOMOGYI: CHANGES AT THE HUNGARIAN
EMBASSY AND BEYOND

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) In a brief meeting with Ambassador Foley August 15,
Hungarian Ambassador-designate Ferenc Somogyi outlined his
priorities for his upcoming tour.

Visa Waiver: A Milestone ) Not a Finish Line


2. (C) Welcoming recent progress on the Visa Waiver front,
Somogyi accentuated the positive while underscoring his
commitment to continue working the issue. "There is no quick
fix," he concluded, but we have passed "an important
milestone" and he will make continued progress a priority.

Continued Focus on Cuba


3. (C) Similarly, he will continue the focus on Cuba. He
affirmed the GoH's political commitment to promote a
democratic transition through a "gradual, controlled process"
capitalizing on the strong personal ties between Hungary and
Cuba. He particularly welcomed the prospect of the upcoming
visit by Codel Sires, expressing his intention to contact the
members of the delegation upon his arrival in Washington.

Finding a Niche


4. (C) Turning to the potential meeting between Secretary
Rice and FM Goncz in September, Somogyi welcomed the
opportunity to reaffirm Hungary's commitment to make an
active contribution to the Transatlantic relationship. Even
within its current budgetary constraints, he believes Hungary
can still "find a valuable niche."


5. (C) He believes there is bipartisan support for this
"unprecedented" activism, confiding that FIDESZ had gone
through the motions of opposing his nomination but privately
assured him that there will be "no problems" working
together. Despite this entente, Somogyi commented that it
is difficult for most outside observers ) and for many
Hungarians ) to see through the present "political clashes"
or to understand the prevailing attitude that "if I lose the
game it must be fixed."

A Failure to Communicate?


6. (C) Acknowledging concerns re the direction of Hungarian

policy, Somogyi affirmed his confidence in PM Gyurcsany's
fundamental commitment on issues including transparency and
energy security but commented that "our communication has not
been equal to the task." By "ignoring what should be
obvious," Somogyi concluded, "we have invited
misunderstanding." (Note: Somogyi has gone further in
previous statements, criticizing "Gyurcsany's stupid remarks"
on the margins of the PM's July 30 speech on foreign policy.
End Note.)

Wheels-up


6. (C) Somogyi's arrival will be welcome to many in Budapest
who have grown increasingly tired with Ambassador Simonyi's
bureaucratic brinksmanship.


7. (C) It is not that MFA officials are unmindful of
Ambassador Simonyi's many successes. They know he has raised
Hungary's "Q" well beyond a level commensurate with its
strategic importance. They fear, however, that he has also
raised USG expectations to a level that they are often unable
to meet. After years of what some see as extending their
policy to meet Simonyi's promises, there is little patience
left in the Ministry. In sum, many in the GoH feel they are
getting too much attention from the U.S., too much
unsolicited advice from their embassy, and too little
understanding from both.


8. (C) Simonyi's widely-perceived attempts to inject his
name into the debate over high-level personnel decisions -
including both the Foreign Minister's position and a key slot
in the Prime Minister's Office - have also drained the
reservoir of good will. Even those who regard his return to
Budapest with some trepidation confess a certain relief in
his departure from Washington.


9. (C) All our contacts expect a dramatic change with
Simonyi's departure and Somogyi's arrival. Following an
acrimonious visit to Washington earlier this year, unofficial
envoys from the Prime Minister's Office concluded that the
Hungarian embassy in Washington had ceased reporting on what
one official called "anything but Simonyi's public
appearances," leaving the GoH badly exposed as perceptions of

Russia shifted (reftel). As Pal Dunai, Director the
MFA-affiliated Foreign Policy Institute, observed, "with
Somogyi at least we'll be able to trust that our embassy is
following its guidance and reporting the truth." In sum, he
concluded, "our embassy will begin to live in a fact-based
universe."

Enough Excitement


10. (C) Comment: A former Foreign Minister with broad
experience in multilateral affairs, Somogyi is widely
regarded as a safe - if unexciting - choice to manage the
embassy and the bilateral relationship. Courteous and
soft-spoken, he is recalled for his professional stewardship
of the MFA more than any particular policy initiatives, but
has a reputation for getting things done patiently,
persistently, and productively. We understand from sources
in the MFA that he is approaching the task of replacing
Ambassador Simonyi with some concern given their different
personal styles, but he has made clear that he will return
the embassy to "reporting the news rather than making the
news." End Comment.
FOLEY