LASZLO TOKES CHALLENGES UDMR LEADERSHIP AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000911

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KJUS PREL RO
SUBJECT: LASZLO TOKES CHALLENGES UDMR LEADERSHIP AND
STRUCTURE

REF: BUCHAREST 0777

Classified By: Polcouns Theodore Tanoue for 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (C) Summary: Romania's ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR),the
Liberals' coalition partner government, risks failing to meet
the five percent electoral threshold in upcoming elections,
starting with this fall's European Parliamentary race. The
candidacy of controversial Bishop Laszlo Tokes could divide
the ethnic Hungarian vote if he runs as an independent in the
Euro-Parliamentary elections. The UDMR leadership is seeking
to maintain its presence on the political scene by attempting
to co-opt Tokes and other rival voices and by attempting to
convince ethnic Hungarians that UDMR remains the only party
that can advance ethnic Hungarian interests on the national
stage. End summary.


2. (C) Reformed Bishop Laszlo Tokes, a controversial figure
who played a key role in the 1989 uprising in Timisoara
against Ceausescu, is emerging as a serious challenger to the
leadership of Romania's minority Hungarian party (UDMR).
Tokes collected 137,000 signatures early this year to become
Romania's only independent candidate in the upcoming European
Parliamentary elections. By mounting an independent
campaign, Tokes may split the ethnic Hungarian vote,
confronting the UDMR with the likelihood of falling short of
the five percent electoral threshold and of possibly removing
all ethnic Hungarian representation should his own campaign
falter.


3. (C) Tokes' campaign manager, Zsolt Szilagyi, told PolCouns
August 2 that the big question was whether Tokes should
accept UDMR leader Bela Marko's July 30 offer of a place on
the UDMR's list or campaign independently. He said Marko had
refused Tokes' earlier proposal for a joint list last
October, but that following corruption investigations against
prominent UDMR politicians (including Marko) and the failed
referendum to impeach President Basescu, a weakened UDMR now
needed all of the ethnic Hungarian votes it could gather.
Recent opinion surveys suggest that the party's support rate
has fallen to only 3 percent of likely voters. He argued
that the UDMR needed greater internal competition if the
concept of a single ethnic Hungarian party was to work.

Views From Within the UDMR
--------------


4. (C) Marko resigned as Deputy Prime Minister on July 3,
fulfilling a vow to take responsibility for the failed May 19
referendum President Basescu. Exit polls had indicated that
a majority of UDMR voters had ignored Marko's urgings to vote
against Basescu (reftel). Marko's foreign policy advisor,
Kinga Tontsch, admitted that Senators Attila Verestoy and
Peter Eckstein-Kovacs were developing separate factions
within the UDMR. Tontsch described an embattled Marko as
relying on a small group of loyalists including former IT
Minister Zsolt Nagy, Minister of Public Works Laszlo Borbely,
and the UDMR's new Executive President Hunor Kelemen, but
added that Marko "likes to be the one who makes the decisions
in the party." She said that Hunor Kelemen is the first
person that Marko has supported as a possible successor, and
remarked that Kelemen is a "perfect copy" of Marko, sharing
his opinions and even mannerisms.


5. (C) In a separate June 26 meeting, Senator Kovacs admitted
that the minority government's collaboration with the Social
Democrats was problematic. Every draft law was discussed
with PNL and PSD and the PSD now had a chance to promote its
laws, even at the cost of blowing the budget. Kovacs
dismissed Marko as being a "symbolic vice premier" adding
that the real problems were within the UDMR: "Marko is the
old generation -- worn out." Eckstein said that Marko, along
with Verestoy and Nagy, had problems with corruption and that
the UDMR had not helped its public image by resisting
anticorruption measures.


6. (C) Kovacs argued that Marko had "lost control" of his
political base and predicted that if Tokes runs for European
Parliament outside of the UDMR, the party would "lose the 5%
threshold." He cited polls suggesting the UDMR would receive
only 39% of votes from its traditional electoral base, while
Tokes would get 22%, with 39% undecided. Kovacs said he
preferred to see the UDMR's Executive Bureau opened up to
political competition within the party, as currently, "there
is no debate in the UDMR." He also argued that the party
should open its doors for the people who left the UDMR.

Next Steps
--------------


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7. (C) Szilagyi said negotiations will continue August 9,
headed by the two campaign managers, Keleman and himself.
Szilagyi said he would press the UDMR to change the law on
local elections that currently requires political parties not
in parliament to gather 25,000 signatures in order to
compete. This law prevented the Hungarian Civic Union (UCM)
from competing in local elections in 2004 even though it had
collected 8,500 signatures in one town that only had a
population of 40,000 -- enough to win possibly half the seats
on the town council. Szilagyi said a common candidate list
was possible, but only if the UDMR took measures to open
itself to internal competition, or at least agreed to a
positive campaign aimed at mobilizing Hungarian voters to
turn out for the election. He said that if there was no
agreement on a common list, Tokes could throw his support
behind Eckstein in the battle to succeed Marko.


8. (C) Regarding attempts by other political actors to affect
internal UDMR dynamics, Szilagyi said that six ethnic
Hungarian organizations had been active in campaigning
against Basescu's impeachment and enjoyed good relations with
the Democratic Party (PD). He opined that the PD's interest
was in creating a more "democratic" UDMR rather than in
supplanting the UDMR as the ethnic Hungarian party. Szilagyi
also accused the Social Democrats (PSD),Liberals (PNL),and
even the Greater Romania Party (PRM) of supporting the status
quo within the UDMR.


9. (C) Szilagyi insisted that Tokes' campaign would focus on
Szekeler autonomy, but insisted that it would not be
"politically radical" -- i.e., that the focus would be on
governance and the democratic process, rather than on
sensitive matters such as the integrity of Romania's borders.
Other issues included education and restitution matters. He
noted that the ethnic Hungarian community could disappear
from the Romanian scene, as it had shunk in the past 15 years
by 250,000 to 1.4 million. Szilagyi, who recently returned
from the U.S. on an international visitor grant focused on
civic education, concluded that now was a good time for
greater dialogue on ethnic issues, given the more stable
external environment provided by NATO and EU membership.


10. (C) Comment: A combination of factors--including
demographic pressures and Marko's failed attempt to remove
Basescu, as well as the re-emergence of the charismatic Tokes
as an alternate locus of ethnic Hungarian support--now
provides a unique challenge to the tight grip that Marko and
his circle have exercised over ethnic Hungarian politics in
Romania. The cards remain stacked in Marko's favor given the
significant barriers to entry of new voices in ethnic
politics. Another factor will be whether President Basescu
will be willing to resist the temptation to meddle in ethnic
politics, as he has done in the past. Basescu recently made a
very public tour of majority ethnic Hungarian areas, pointing
to the underdevelopment in health care, transportation, and
other infrastructure areas. These remarks were widely
interpeted as a pointed criticism of poor governance under
Marko's leadership of the UDMR. End Comment.
TAPLIN