Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUCHAREST79
2007-01-24 16:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH FM UNGUREANU

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR NATO SB RO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBM #0079/01 0241624
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241624Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5889
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000079 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, AND EUR/SCE. PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO SB RO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH FM UNGUREANU

REF: A. SECSTATE 7434


B. SECSTATE 5652

C. SECSTATE 4834

D. ELLIS-MAGSAMEN E-MAIL 01-18-07

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Taplin for Reasons 1.4(b
) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000079

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, AND EUR/SCE. PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO SB RO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH FM UNGUREANU

REF: A. SECSTATE 7434


B. SECSTATE 5652

C. SECSTATE 4834

D. ELLIS-MAGSAMEN E-MAIL 01-18-07

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Taplin for Reasons 1.4(b
) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On January 23, Ambassador and Foreign
Minister Ungureanu discussed the upcoming NATO Informal
Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Kosovo, and Romania's bid for
the 2008 NATO Summit. Ungureanu has become increasingly
involved in promoting Romania's offer to host the NATO Summit
in 2008, and will lobby select allies in Brussels during the
upcoming NATO informal. He reaffirmed that Romania's
position towards Kosovo was based "on principle," was
unchanged, urging that Ahtisaari's report not be released
until after Belgrade forms a new government. Dampening any
expectations of new support, Ungureanu emphasized that
Romania would be stretched to do much more beyond its ongoing
contributions in Afghanistan. Finally, Ungureanu floated the
idea of several senior level bilateral visits between
Bucharest and Washington, and requested a pull aside with
Secretary Rice. End Summary

SIPDIS

Romania and the 2008 NATO Summit


2. (C) Ambassador accompanied by Acting Polcons shared an
informal headcount of support for Romania (ref d),and
encouraged Ungureanu to use any opportunity to promote
Romania's interest in hosting the 2008 NATO Summit. The
Ambassador noted that the U.S. will do what it can to
support, but Romania would need to take the lead. The
Ambassador mentioned that he would be encouraging President
Basescu to make phone calls himself in pursuit of Romania's
2008 candidacy, and asked the FM to take advantage of the
January Ministerial to press the Romanian case. Ungureanu
confirmed he would be speaking to counterparts and impress
upon them the importance of registering with the Private
Office. Ungureanu confirmed what President Basescu had
reported earlier to the Ambassador -- namely, that Italy's

Prodi supports Romania for the 2008 Summit venue. Ungureanu
expressed surprise to see Bulgaria listed on the pro-Romania
side. Polcons noted that informally the private office
counted Sofia in that category.
.
Help Serb moderates but nothing new on Kosovo
.

3. (C) The Ambassador followed up on earlier conversations on
Kosovo with Ungureanu, underscoring the importance of U.S.
and EU unity, and requesting Romania's vocal support for UN
Special Envoy Ahtisaari's report and conclusions on Kosovo's
status (Ref b). Ungureanu expressed concern that the Romanian
position was perhaps not fully understood, and elaborated
that the Romanian argument was based on the principles of
inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and no
special collective rights, all of which were inscribed, he
stressed, in the Helsinki Final Act. The FM noted that
Romania was sensitive to the issues in Kosovo, would stick
with the EU consensus, and would not oppose a UN Security
Council Resolution. He invited the Ambassador to raise this
issue directly with President Basescu at their upcoming
meeting. Ungureanu described the January 18 conversation
Basescu had with Serbia's President Tadic and Prime Minister
Kostunica, reporting that the Romanian President had
emphasized to the two Serbian leaders the necessity of
accepting a Kosovo solution that would help Belgrade join the
Euro-Atlantic family, including compliance with ICTY.
Ungureanu noted that Basescu prior to the elections asked
both Tadic and Kostunica to move past their personal disputes
and work together.


4. (C) Commenting on the recent Serbian elections, Ungureanu
asserted that, from Romania's perspective, the Serbian
democratic reformers had done much better than in 2003.
Ungureanu argued that Kostunica was the "axis" for forming a
new government coalition, and Romania would not want anything
to jeopardize his formation of a coalition government with
Tadic and G-17. Alternatively, the least desirable option, a
coalition government between Kostunica and the SRS, would
damage Serbian chances for EU membership. Ungureanu briefed
the Ambassador on the conclusion's of the EU Foreign
Ministers' recent GAERC meeting. The FM said that a
two-stage strategy by UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari to release
the non-controversial elements of his final report on Kosovo
by February 2, would be straightforward and not touch the
core of his recommendations. The most important elements of
Ahtisaari's report, which would be released possibly in
March, would give Belgrade some time to form a government.
But if the Ahtisaari's conclusions advocating an independent
Kosovo should come out before Belgrade forms a government, it
would strengthen the position of the radicals, and delay
Serbia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In an
effort to encourage Belgrade, Ungureanu noted that both the
EU Troika and the EU General Directions Council Commission
intended to visit Serbia before Ahtisaari airs his
conclusions. Ungureanu said that "in any case, the
technicalities of Kosovo are more important than Romania's
position."
.
January 26 NATO Ministerial
.

5. (C) Ambassador raised with Ungureanu U.S. objectives for
the Informal Ministerial and noted the priority requests for
additional commitments that the US is asking of all Allies
(Refs a and c). Ungureanu acknowledged he had seen the U.S.
objectives for the Ministerial, and noted the specific
priorities. He said that Romania was one among a handful of
NATO Allies fully engaged in Afghanistan, and is already
pulling its weight in ISAF.
.
Other Requests
.

6. (C) Before concluding the meeting, Ungureanu requested a
pull aside with Secretary Rice at the January 26 Ministerial.
He said foremost on his mind was to raise U.S. support for
Romania to become a member of OECD. Second, he said that
President Basescu would like to visit Washington in 2007.
Third, Ungureanu would also like a Washington visit in early
spring. Finally, he asked the Ambassador to convey an
invitation for Vice President Cheney to come to Bucharest.

7.(C) Comment: Ungureanu told the Ambassador - off the
record -- that the current political turmoil between Basescu
and Prime Minister Tariceanu was no big deal; both would
complete their normal mandate and continue to work together
in spite of the current drama in the press. When the
Ambassador suggested that the running feud between the
President and Prime Minister hurts Romania's international
image, the FM simply smiled and said, "tell people it just
makes Romania exotic." End Comment.
TAUBMAN