CFE: ROMANIA'S VIEWS ON JUNE 12 EXTRAORDINARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000656

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM LAURENDEAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017
TAGS: KCFE PREL PARM OSCE RU RO
SUBJECT: CFE: ROMANIA'S VIEWS ON JUNE 12 EXTRAORDINARY
CONFERENCE

REF: A. STATE 75293

B. USOSCE 232

C. BUCHAREST 628

Classified By: POL Counsellor Ted Tanoue for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Polmiloff discussed contents of ref a on June 1 with
HLTF Rep and Director for Non-Proliferation, Arms Control,
and Combating Terrorism, Mihaela Vasiu and with CFE action
officer Dana Marca, and followed up on June 4 after they had
an opportunity to consult with GOR inter-agency contacts.
The view in the MFA is that the Russians intend to withdraw
completely from CFE, or else Moscow would not have gone to
the trouble of requesting an extraordinary conference to
exchange well-known arguments and positions. Since the MFA
knows that the Russian case is unfounded, it concluded that
Russia wants to achieve some other objectives, like breaking
the consensus on NATO,s common position on the Istanbul
Commitments.


2. (C) Our MFA interlocutors stressed that the CFE Treaty is
the cornerstone for European security, especially for the
former Warsaw Pact states. Russian complaints over the NATO
Baltic state,s absence from the Treaty are not compelling,
nor are they incidental to Russia,s reaction to the
interface between NATO and CFE. On the other hand, because
the Baltic countries are contiguous to Russia, Moscow
actually has more options in dealing with them than in the
greater Black Sea-Caucasus region. While the absence of the
Baltic States from the CFE Treaty is more of an addendum,
Russia appears to be reacting more assertively to the
evolving U.S. presence in the former Warsaw Pact members
within NATO, whether that includes Missile Defense (in Poland
and Czech Republic) or JTF-East (in Romania and Bulgaria).
The details are less important than the political context of
how the relationship between the US and Russia has changed
(Kosovo, Black Sea bases, ABM Treaty, frozen conflicts, etc.).


3. (C) Our interlocutors also noted that continued adherence
to the CFE Treaty impacts Russia,s military presence (and
thus its leverage and interests) in Moldova and Georgia for
example, and complicates Russia,s ability to pressure those
states (possibly with an eye towards Ukraine) for greater
political concessions, including on their aspirations for
NATO membership. Moscow views the current Treaty as having
apparently handcuffed Russian options in the southern flank
to such an extent that Russia has calculated that no CFE
treaty is preferable to fulfillment of the Istanbul
commitments. Otherwise, the call for an extraordinary
conference makes no sense, because Russia cannot expect now
to get out of NATO any more concessions on implementing the
adapted CFE Treaty than it could have earlier.


4. (C) Comment: Our MFA interlocutors concluded that the move
to hold a CFE extraordinary conference can be viewed either
as an attempt to break the NATO common position on Istanbul
and/or clear a path for Russia to use intimidation and scare
tactics to stop eastern expansion by NATO. In either case,
Romania is concerned that the results of the extraordinary
conference will benefit Russia,s interests over NATO's.
They have argued that changing the calculus for the
Extraordinary Conference is essential if Allies do not want
to appear either weak or non-committed to the Common Position
and the Istanbul Commitments, and that there can be no
suggestion that NATO might bargain away Moldova or Georgia in
exchange for continued Russian adherence to the CFE Treaty.
Finally, while they acknowledge that Allies might discuss the
possibility of holding a separate discussion with Russia to
address the range of their security issues with NATO, this
should not occur in the CFE framework. Their bottom line
position is that CFE itself must remain sacrosanct. End
Comment.
TAUBMAN