Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUCHAREST477
2007-04-27 17:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

ON ROMANIA,S PARTICIPATION IN THE IRAQ COALITION

Tags:  MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ RO 
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DE RUEHBM #0477/01 1171706
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O 271706Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6527
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000477 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE AND PM GLANCY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ RO
SUBJECT: ON ROMANIA,S PARTICIPATION IN THE IRAQ COALITION

REF: STATE 54925

Classified By: CDA Mark Taplin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000477

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE AND PM GLANCY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ RO
SUBJECT: ON ROMANIA,S PARTICIPATION IN THE IRAQ COALITION

REF: STATE 54925

Classified By: CDA Mark Taplin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu is
expected to push for a political decision by mid-May within
the Supreme Council on National Defense (CSAT) to withdraw
all Romanian troops from Iraq. The Prime Minister has asked
Foreign Minister Cioroianu and Defense Minister Melescanu to
take the lead in communicating a withdrawal decision to
coalition allies. While some senior leaders, including the
PM, might believe that simple press announcements constitute
"consultations," we (and the UK) are pressing the GOR to
engage in serious discussion at the command and operational
levels. There are still sufficient professionals in the
government to help steer a "soft landing" for Romania and
coalition allies in Iraq. We cannot discount, however,
additional moves to lock in a Romanian withdrawal. The PM
eagerly wants to further weaken or embarrass
suspended-President Basescu, who is the real target of
Tariceanu,s eagerness to change Romania's approach in Iraq.
End summary.


2. (C) POLMILOFF delivered reftel points to MFA on April 26,
and asked that they be shared widely with all the appropriate
offices which will be shaping their respective agencies,
policies prior to the CSAT,s discussion of Romania,s troop
commitments in Iraq.


3. (C) The government of Romania,s commitment to continue
in the Iraq coalition has weakened considerably with the
fashioning of the "ultra-minority" government of Prime
Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu. Nearly one year ago,
President Basescu blocked Tariceanu,s first call for Romania
to withdraw from Iraq. At that time, the PM did not have
political control of the CSAT chaired by Basescu and
dominated by his appointees. Since then, Tariceanu has
purged the government of Basescu loyalists, expelled
Basescu,s Democratic Party from the governing alliance, and

helped engineer a vote that suspended Basescu from office for
thirty days, with prospects he could be permanently removed
from office following a national referendum. Consequently,
the composition of the CSAT has shifted in Tariceanu,s
favor, and Parliament is scrambling to expel other
pro-Basescu elements in the government, including in the
intelligence services, agencies which for the moment are
still under direct presidential control. Sources in the MFA
tell us that FM Cioroianu will/will confirm at the NATO
Ministerial Conference in Oslo that Romania will keep its
troop commitments to ISAF and Kosovo.


4. (C) The new Minister of Defense, Teodor Melescanu has
advocated a thorough review of GOR overseas deployments,
citing the need to square GOR political ambitions with its
resource constraints. Melescanu has stated he wants to bring
down Romania's overseas troop contributions from the current
1700s down to as little as 700-800. In recent discussions
with Deputy Eucom commander Ward, MOD Melescanu acknowledged
that despite his skepticism regarding the efficacy of the
Romanian troop contributions on the ground, they ultimately
also constitute a strong political signal of GOR solidarity
with the alliance and with the US. He hinted that he may be
open to a significantly reduced Romanian presence in Iraq.
Whether that scenario would be consistent with the PM's
pledge to have Romanian troops home by Christmas remains to
be seen.


5. (C) Tariceanu on April 23 said he would propose at the
next meeting of the CSAT -- planned either for May 7 or for
the week of May 14 -- the withdrawal of Romania,s troops
from Iraq. Tariceanu added the CSAT would likely approve his
proposal but that the actual timetable would be based on
consultations with coalition partners. Only two weeks
earlier, Tariceanu referred to his proposal to withdraw
Romanian troops from Iraq as a government priority. On March
26, he claimed Romania had fulfilled its military mission in
Iraq, and that he would withdraw all Romanian military forces
from Iraq by Christmas 2007.


6. (C) Melescanu - following the purge of Basescu
supporters, including former Defense Minister Frunzaverde -
announced on April 10 following a surprise weekend visit to
Iraq, that he did not like what he saw in Iraq but troop
withdrawals only would occur following consultations with
coalition allies. Melescanu, too, added that Romania,s
withdrawal from Iraq was a priority.


7. (C) The Embassy has raised the question of Romania,s
commitment to MNF-I with all senior GOR officials, including
President Basescu (prior to his suspension),Prime Minister
Tariceanu, and the former and current Defense Ministers, as
well as with the leader of the main opposition party, former
Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party
(PSD) Mircea Geoana. Basescu and his then-Defense Minister
Frunzaverde recognized in March that a withdrawal of the
Romanian company with UNAMI in Basra was politically
necessary, in recognition of the change in the President's
political fortunes this year. Until now, Basescu,s strategy
had been to make incremental adjustments to Romanian forces
in Iraq, but not to dilute Romania's overall contribution to
the Iraq mission. For instance, the GOR reduction last
August was tied specifically to the UK announcement that it
was handing over Dhi Qar to Iraqi forces. Due to GOR troop
logistic dependency on the UK, especially in MND-SE, that
August 2006 decision was arguably operationally sound. This
time, however, the March 29 CSAT agreed to withdraw the
Romanian Army company from Basra only three days after PM
Tariceanu called for all Romanian troops out of Iraq.


8. (C) Tariceanu and his Liberal allies do not yet have all
their ducks lined up to "recalibrate" Romania,s troop
deployments. He still needs to hold parliamentary
consultations, including with the PSD headed by Geoana who
supports Tariceanu,s moves against Basescu, but who also is
ideologically closer to Basescu,s trans-Atlanticism, and who
might be concerned that Tariceanu is prepared to throw the
baby out with the bath water. Tariceanu also needs to secure
more politically reliable support within the CSAT, either by
isolating or removing the pre-suspension Basescu holdovers.
With the Parliament making moves to transfer Presidential
prerogative appointments to the legislature, the clock is
ticking on how quickly Tariceanu can consolidate control over
the CSAT before Basescu,s 30-day suspension ends (assuming
that Parliament is unable to find a formula to keep Basescu
suspended indefinitely).


9. (C) Another factor that may hinder Tariceanu,s plans for
complete withdrawal by Christmas, are the second tier
professionals in the Foreign and Defense Ministries. We have
been told that there was no prior consultation with either of
those ministries before the Prime Minister's March 26
announcement - underscoring its domestic political intent.
Some Foreign Ministry contacts referred to the situation as
"embarrassing and frustrating." One source said the Prime
Minister only consulted his inner circle within his National
Liberal Party before making the announcement. Whether the
professional bureaucracy will be able to steer the issue away
from the political drama, and on a more constructive course
is not clear. We can and will however continue to press for
a deliberate and comprehensive consultation at the command,
operational, and political levels.
TAPLIN