EXPERTS QUESTION NEW JUSTICE MINISTER'S COMMITMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000469

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - AARON JENSEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KJUS PREL RO
SUBJECT: EXPERTS QUESTION NEW JUSTICE MINISTER'S COMMITMENT
TO ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS

Classified By: Political Counselor Theodore Tanoue for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Embassy contacts working to advance
anticorruption and justice reform expressed doubts
concerning new Justice Minister Tudor Chiuariu's commitment
to reform. Two experts, one with the European Commission
Delegation in Romania and the other from the Ministry of
Justice, evinced near certainty that the new government's
anti-corruption efforts would be for the sake of image
alone. End Summary.


2. (C) Dragos Tudorache, the European Commission's Justice
and Anti-Corruption Task Manager told PolOff on April 19
that new Liberal Minister of Justice, 30-year-old Tudor
Chiuariu, "has no idea what he is running" and "has no
standing before the magistracy," adding "they would eat him
alive if he ever tried to open his mouth." The EC's local
expert on the subject, who has been involved in reshaping
and monitoring the progress in justice reform and
anticorruption, added that Chiuariu had "never dealt with
the justice system." He said that Chiuariu was an attorney
trainee in Iasi and then worked for 2-3 years as an
in-house attorney for the leader of the Liberal Party in
Iasi and local real estate baron Relu Fenechiu. He
speculated that Chiuariu received that job due to his
father-in-law, Mihail Vlasov, one of Fenechiu's more
prominent Iasi lawyers. Tudorache added that Chiuariu
worked mainly on Fenechiu's real estate deals "and all that
implies."

Europe Has No Stick to Use
--------------


3. (C) Five EU member states -- UK, Netherlands, France,
Sweden, and Finland -- are pressing the European
Commission to be tough on Romania, according to Tudorache,
and would try to raise the pressure by the time of the EC's
June consultation meeting with member states. However,
Tudorache commented that the EC "has no stick to use" on
Romania. He added that there was division within the EC
over the feasibility of activating the safeguard clause,
which would cause Romanian judgments not to be recognized
in the EU. Tudorache said it was never designed to be
used, but was "developed in support of Macovei for her to
use EC backing to get things done." Tudorache added that
there was "no real legal basis" even though "they tried to
invent it," and that "it could easily be challenged in the
European Court of Justice" and would not stand legal
challenge, especially since none of the EC's four
benchmarks concerned the functioning of the justice
system. He added that the only "real stick" the EC had was
"enormous"--e.g., states not in compliance might have their
voting rights in Council withdrawn, but there was no
appetite in the EC to use this stick against Romania. In
the end, he said, there was not anything the EC could do
beyond "talk and threaten."


4. (C) Tudorache predicted that the government would
reintroduce the draft law establishing a National Integrity
Agency (ANI) in a form that would please the EC "since they
know they are in trouble with us." Tudorache cited Minister
Chiuariu's willingness to reintroduce the agency's powers
to monitor conflicts of interest. Tudorache said the real
trouble would be in setting up the agency. He had no doubt
the anticorruption effort would be delayed and ultimately
stymied. He said that the government would "definitely put
it under control of Parliament -- something we will have no
basis on which to challenge" since there was nothing like
it in other EU member states. The effect, however, would
be to give parliamentarians power over the ANI to keep it
from threatening their financial interests.

Huge Carrots Might Not Even Work
--------------


5. (C) The real shame for the Romanian Government,
according to Tudorache, was its lack of vision for
Romania's development or role in Europe. He said Romania
would be a net contributor to the EU budget for at least
the first two years, as it would contribute about 1.4
billion euros this year alone and he has seen "no work
being done to absorb near that amount." The 30 billion
euros in post-accession matching funds have yet to be
touched even four months after accession. He said the
paying agencies were "all messed up, especially in
Agriculture" as the ministries were not applying for
matching funds to develop infrastructure, and few private
firms knew how to apply. He said that "in Romania,

BUCHAREST 00000469 002 OF 003


political turmoil at the top causes a whole ministry to
stop action until it is certain who is boss." Unlike
Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, who succeeded in developing
their infrastructures upon accession, Romania was wasting a
unique opportunity just so the "oligarchs" could "continue
to run things to their benefit."


6. (C) Tudorache added that he was beginning to believe
that the EU funds were actually unwanted, since they would
subject local economic players to an open tender process
and outside competition. One indicator, he said, was that
none of the fifty EC Delegation experts had been hired by
the government to help it apply for post-accession funds.
Claiming "there's not much room for independent
professionals" in Romania, Tudorache said he would instead
be moving to Brussels to work for the EC's Directorate
General for Justice.

Anticorruption Efforts: For the Sake of Image?
-------------- --


7. (C) Laura Stefan, the Anticorruption Director at the
Ministry of Justice, told PolOff and RLA in a separate
meeting that
her original meeting with "Tudor" when he was head of the
Prime Minister's Inspection Department in 2005 illustrated
that he did not really know what he was doing, but that he
was open to help, and although preoccupied with his image,
he was able to do a good job and achieve a good mark for
his department with Brussels. However, she noted that
European Commission Vice President Franco Frattini's recent
private comment was that Romania seemed to be back in the
days of Justice Minister Diaconescu, when there was a
likeable, though not wholly competent, Justice Minister who
would say the right things, but was controlled by people
behind him and therefore ultimately ineffective. Stefan
said the mood in the ministry was one of concern that those
working on justice reforms would be slowly removed or kept
just to keep up a charade of anticorruption efforts.


8. (C) Stefan said she had just been in Brussels to
present Romania's progress on anti-corruption before the EU
peer review on Justice and Home Affairs arrived in
Bucharest. In response to a Commissioner's question of why
the Justice Minister was replaced if everything was going
so well with anti-corruption efforts, Stefan said she
quipped, "I guess we were too effective."


9. (C) Stefan said the chances for the National Integrity
Agency (ANI),her "baby," to be adopted now were higher and
noted that Chiuariu had intervened at her request to gain
more time before the law's review in parliament in order to
reintroduce the revisions Brussels wanted, including the
ability to confiscate officials' unjustified wealth and
monitor their conflicts of interests. Later, however, she
said Chiuariu told her it was a "secret" that he was
preparing such measures and, when he reintroduced them on
April 22, even parliamentarians from his Liberal Party
reacted strongly against the toughened law.


10. (C) Stefan also noted with discouragement that
parliament's February decriminalization of certain types of
bank fraud and Morar's recent comment that it could result
in acquittals in some fifty-five cases under DNA
investigation. Stefan said Chiuariu was upset with Morar
for stating that publicly, saying to her "who would have
known?" Stefan wondered whether she should stay in the
ministry and commented that she would have to consider
emigrating if she resigned since job prospects for
anti-corruption advocates appeared slim in Romania. (note:
Former Justice Minister Macovei also admitted to a Dutch
newspaper that she was considering emigrating when the
Democratic Party approached her to help President Basescu's
campaign to be restored to office.)


11. (C) Stefan said she would resign if the Minister
dismissed the Chief Prosecutor of the National
Anticorruption Department, Daniel Morar, as that would
remove from all prosecutors the feeling of prosecutorial
independence to pursue major cases of corruption.
Tudorache believed DNA Chief Prosecutor Morar's days were
numbered within the month that the interim Romanian
President could sign off on his dismissal. In response to
Frattini's public stand by Morar, Minister Chiuariu pledged
on April 24 not to replace the head of DNA or the
Prosecutor General.


12. (C) Comment: Tudorache claimed he had "already heard"
from people within the justice system that Chiuariu was

BUCHAREST 00000469 003 OF 003


"sticking his nose into files" -- referring to DNA's files
on high corruption. However, Stefan told us that she saw
no evidence of Chiuariu looking in that direction and
discounted any possibility that those with the files would
ever show anything to him. These dossiers have always been
the hard currency of power politics in post-communist
Romania, and we do not wholly exclude that possibility. We
believe Minister Chiuariu was likely chosen more for his
loyalty than his competence. A charitable interpretation
of his appointment is that he will at best be a sincere if
wholly inexperienced hard worker whose efforts will be
unlikely to threaten the interests of Romania's hidden
oligarchs -- including Fenechiu, the PNL Iasi baron who
reportedly helped secure Chiariu's and Interior Minister
Cristian David's positions. End comment.
TAUBMAN