PSD HEAD MIRCEA GEOANA ON THE PRESIDENTIAL

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/FO, EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: PSD HEAD MIRCEA GEOANA ON THE PRESIDENTIAL
SUSPENSION: "I'M NUMBER ONE IN ROMANIA TODAY"


Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas Taubman for 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Ambassador accompanied by Polcouns met with PSD head
Mircea Geoana April 20. The meeting was at Geoana's request.
Geoana began by stating that he had tried his utmost to find
an amicable solution short of suspending President Basescu.
He had met with Basescu twice, and had undertaken these
secret meetings at personal risk, since people in his party

SIPDIS
would "kill me" if they knew about the meetings. According
to Geoana, the negotiations had focused on three broad
themes, including an agreement from the PSD to pull back from
suspending the President in exchange for the President's
public apology stating that--while being
well-intentioned--his actions perhaps "crossed the line"; the
President would have also have had to "guarantee" that he had
heard the message from Parliament and pledge to engage
Parliament in a "positive" way. Geoana said there was a
clearcut understanding that Parliament would continue to
monitor the President's future actions closely and would not
hesitate to reopen impeachment proceedings if the President
crossed the line again.


2. (C) Geoana said that the second part of the proposed
agreement had been recognition from the President that the
PSD constituted the "majority" party in parliament (note: the
PSD actually holds 150 out of 459 seats in Parliament, or 32
percent) and that Basescu would announce that he had agreed
to letting the PSD form a new government. In exchange,
Basescu would cease his call for early parliamentary
elections.


3. (C) The final part of the package, according to Geoana,
was agreement of a "Grand National Project" including an
effort to revise the constitution including proceeding with
plans to introduce a uninominal vote; decentralization of
government functions; and an accelerated plan to invest more
in highways, infrastructure, and to increase Romania's
capacity to absorb EU funding. The goal, he said, was to
depoliticize public administration and to turn the "negative
energy" of the suspension process into something positive.


4. (C) Geoana claimed that Basescu had agreed to the package
but had reneged after the Constitutional Court decision
(e.g., which stated that Basescu had not violated the
constitution). He complained that he had made an effort to
strike a deal with the President when the easier course would
have been to "get his ass" politically. Geoana concluded
that he had done his best and his conscience was clear.
Geoana added that he had strong proof that Basescu had
manipulated the internal intelligence service (SRI) to get
information on the judges in the Constitutional Court. This
was a criminal offense. He cautioned, however, that he was
not saying that Basescu used this information, but that
Basescu had asked to see it. Geoana also evinced suspicion
that George Maior, Director of the domestic intelligence
service (SRI),was also "involved".


5. (C) Geoana also dismissed as a "burlesque" the
pro-Basescu demonstration that took place the previous
evening in University Square, boasting that he could easily
mobilize 60,000 PSD supporters who would outnumber any
demonstration in support of Basescu. He asserted that the
rally had shown Basescu was "desperate," and that he was
finished politically. Geoana predicted that Basescu would
use these demonstrations as a pretext not to honor his pledge
to resign from office if he were suspended, noting that
Basescu would likely try to organize another rally this
coming Monday.


6. (C) Ambassador thanked Geoana for his information, and
noted in connection with Geoana's planned visit to Washington
that perception was key: we didn't want to create the
impression that Washington had a hand in what had just taken
place; that we were choosing sides; or that we were
"anointing" any victors. Geoana replied that he well
understood any "sensitivities" regarding the visit; he was
"not rushing" to go to Washington; he had just wanted to have
his friends and allies hear his message directly. He said
that his message for Washington was that Basescu had weakened
himself and no longer able to rally any political forces to
his side. He added that if Basescu "came to his senses," he
would he have no problem with cooperating with Basescu on a
"Grand National Project." He concluded--albeit with some
evident disappointment--"I'll give up on the visit--I can
pick up the phone and call JD and Dan Fried, any time..."


7. (C) Geoana added that he was "far stronger" an expert on
foreign policy issues than anybody in the Tariceanu cabinet,
and he wanted to put this expertise in service of Romania.

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Geoana also hinted obliquely that "if you feel more
comfortable with a different team in the government in order
to see that the transatlantic project continues" then he was
ready to respond, "even if it is not in my interest." He
noted that it would be far easier to "lay back with a remote
control of the government as I do today". Finally, Geoana
remarked that that he shouldn't be treated as the "bad boy"
of Romania, adding, "I'm number one in Romania today, and I'm
entitled to use my strength."
TAUBMAN