Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUCHAREST385
2007-04-04 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

SENIOR PSD OFFICIAL ON NEW CABINET, IRAQ, BASESCU

Tags:  PGOV PREL RO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4522
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0385/01 0941437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041437Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6381
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000385 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE JENSEN AND KOSTELANCIK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: SENIOR PSD OFFICIAL ON NEW CABINET, IRAQ, BASESCU
IMPEACHMENT, GEOANA VISIT TO US

Classified By: Polcouns Theodore Tanoue for 1.4 (b) and (d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000385

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE JENSEN AND KOSTELANCIK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: SENIOR PSD OFFICIAL ON NEW CABINET, IRAQ, BASESCU
IMPEACHMENT, GEOANA VISIT TO US

Classified By: Polcouns Theodore Tanoue for 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (C) Summary: PSD Vice President Diaconescu predicted easy
parliamentary approval of the new Cabinet line-up proposed by
Prime Minister Tariceanu. He also predicted that the
Constitutional Court would rule against President Basescu,
adding further substance to efforts to remove him.
Diaconescu also confirmed that the PSD would continue to
press for Basescu's suspension, and evinced confidence that
once out of office, Basescu as a "common citizen" would
quickly lose his aura of invincibility and would lose the
referendum on his permanent removal. On the foreign policy
front, Diaconescu said that PSD President Geoana wanted to
reassure US policymakers during his upcoming Washington visit
that the PSD would be a good partner of the USG. On Iraq,
his message will be that "we shall stay". End Summary.


2. (C) At a meeting with Polcouns 4/3 Social Democratic Party
(PSD) Vice President Cristian Diaconescu remarked that the
new Cabinet unveiled by Prime Minister Tariceanu the previous
day was noticeably weak compared to the previous one,
including in Foreign Affairs, Economics/Finance, Education,
and the Ministry of Justice. He described Foreign
Minister-designate Adrian Cioroianu as a policy lightweight,
adding that he had a superficial grasp of foreign policy and
little experience managing a large bureaucracy; Justice
Minister-designate Tudor Chiuariu, on the other hand was a
"disastrous choice." He argued that Theodor Melescanu's
appointment as Defense Minister was "not bad"; Melescanu
would try to "bridge" the gap between the "populist" wing of
the PNL that was calling for the immediate withdrawal of
Romanian forces from Iraq, and military professionals who
sought to protect Romania's reputation for reliability and
its good relations with the US. Diaconescu said that the new
cabinet will be approved by Parliament with little problem,
and evinced confidence that all of the nominees would be
sworn in soon by President Basescu. (note: Basescu has moved
slowly on the nomination, and reportedly plans to defer a

decision on swearing in the new cabinet until after he hears
the decision from the Constitutional Court on the Cioroianu
case.)


3. (C) Diaconescu said that the Constitutional Court would
also render its decision April 4 on the Cioroianu case, which
would decide the issue of whether President Basescu had the
authority to reject individual Cabinet nominations. He
predicted that the court would rule against Basescu, adding
yet more substance to charges that he had overstepped his
constitutional role as President. When queried as to what
was the legitimate role of a Romanian President, Diaconescu
responded that it was better state what a President should
not do: he should not be "violent"; should not abuse the
limits of his authority; should not trample on the
institutional prerogatives of other branches of government;
and should not abuse his own powers in the areas of foreign
affairs, security, and the intelligence services.


4. (C) Diaconescu also confirmed that the PSD would continue
to push for Basescu's suspension, irrespective of how the
Constitutional Court ruled on the charges brought against the
President by the Voiculescu Commission. He acknowledged that
recent opinion polls revealed a substantial majority (more
than 60 percent) of Romanian citizens opposed removal of the
President. However, he predicted (with barely concealed
glee) that when Basescu became a "common citizen" during his
suspension, he would "disappear" from the public eye.
Diaconescu predicted that the PD would turn on Basescu and
that "new skeletons would appear" out of Basescu's closet.
In addition to Basescu's losing all of his "instruments of
power" during his suspension period, Diaconescu predicted
that the government would take "necessary measures" to assure
that Basescu lost the referendum vote on his removal, noting
that it would be an Interior Minister from the PNL who would
be responsible for organizing the referendum vote.


5. (C) Diaconescu predicted that Basescu could
counterattack by bringing up allegations of misdeeds by his
political enemies, warning that the PD could use the
intelligence services and other government organs to "throw
dirt" on Tariceanu. He also said it was not impossible to
forsee a scenario where both the President and the Prime
Minister were removed for their misdeeds. Diaconescu had
little comment regarding the non-participation of the
Conservative Party's in the next Cabinet, except to say that
the decision had been Prime Minister Tariceanu's. (note: the
meeting with Diaconescu predated by several hours the news
that the Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) is investigating
charges of money laundering by Voiculescu and his daughter.)

BUCHAREST 00000385 002 OF 002




6. (C) Diaconescu also predicted continued political
turmoil, musing that it might continue for "two or three,
maybe as long as six or eight months." While the best way to
achieve a new political balance was through elections, the
PSD was still too weak to contest elections, and supporting a
minority PNL-UDMR government was the "next best" way to
achieve stability. He added that one continuing dilemma for
the opposition was that there was no clearcut opponent to
Traian Basescu for President, perhaps with the exception of
an "even worse" alternative--Gigi Bacali. He said that
Geoana had his eyes on the Prime Ministership, not the
Presidency. Asked about whether the PSD would nominate
candidates for sub-cabinet positions in the new government,
Diaconescu insisted that the party would not participate in
governance. He added that while the PSD "formally" supported
the new Tariceanu cabinet, it was likely that the PSD would
attack the government "daily."


7. (C) Asked about the upcoming Washington visit by PSD
President Mircea Geoana, Diaconescu replied that Geoana
wanted to present the PSD's point of view directly to
Washington policymakers and to underscore that there was no
change in the PSD's pro-US, pro-Atlanticist posture in
2003-04, when the party was in power. Another message was
reassurance that the PSD was going to be a "normal, positive,
and responsible" party capable of restoring political
stability to Romania. Geoana also wanted to provide
reassurance to Washington that the PSD will have nothing to
do with Vadim Tudor's PRM. He acknowledged that Tudor had
sought the Presidency of the Romanian Senate in exchange for
the PRM's political support, but insisted that the PSD would
"not deal" with the PRM.


8. (C) Diaconescu also noted that Geoana wanted to convey
the message that the PSD would be a reliable partner to the
US on the foreign policy front. Asked about Iraq, he
responded that the PSD position was that "we shall stay". He
later mused that the party needed to "figure out some way" to
explain to the public the necessity for keeping Romanian
forces deployed in Iraq, although part of the price might be
the withdrawal of some troops whose missions were clearly
accomplished. On Kosovo, Diaconescu said that the PSD
wanted to "make itself useful" including disabusing the Serbs
of the idea that Romania would somehow break with NATO or the
EU and to join the Russians in opposing the Ahtisaari plan.
Diaconescu added that Russia was another major foreign policy
preoccupation for the PSD. Russia was making a "serious
effort" to break into the Romanian market and to buy Romanian
enterprises. This was coupled with the traditional Russian
paternalism towards Romania, which Moscow viewed as a
prodigal child; "you'll come back" is the Russian view of
Romania, he noted. Diaconescu added that Russia's main
concern was with NATO, not the EU. While the Russians saw
the EU as an opportunity, they saw NATO as a problem, he
concluded.
TAUBMAN