AMBASSADOR TO TARICEANU, BASESCU, AND GEOANA: PUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 000373

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/FO, EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TO TARICEANU, BASESCU, AND GEOANA: PUT
A FIREWALL AROUND THE EURO-ATLANTIC AGENDA


Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas Taubman for 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with the Prime
Minister, President, and the head of the opposition PSD, the
Ambassador expressed concern about the current political
turmoil spilling over into governance, investment, and
Romania's trans-atlantic equities. He also warned that
questions were being raised as to whether Bucharest was still
the right venue for the next NATO summit, and asked that they
signal their support for NATO and the Euro-Atlantic agenda at
an early opportunity. All three agreed, with varying degrees
of enthusiasm. Tariceanu also used the meeting to revisit
his grievances against President Basescu, and defend his
recent call for Romanian forces to withdraw from Iraq by
Christmas. Basescu predicted that the political standoff was
reaching a decisive point, and remarked that in the event of
unfavorable constitutional court decisions, he might be left
with "zero power". Geoana used his session with the
Ambassador to highlight his past atlanticist credentials,
insisting that the summit was be a "consecration" of the
efforts of the entire post-1989 generation. He warned,
however, that it might take 1-2 more months to create a "new
balance" in Romanian politics. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador told all three interlocutors in
successive meetings on March 29 and 30 that the U.S. was
concerned about the current political crisis spilling over
into other areas. It was affecting governance, investment
and even the outlook of Romanians towards their future. It
was making it harder for Romania's friends in the U.S., in
Europe and beyond to support Romania's agenda as a NATO and
EU member. The Ambassador underlined that Romania risked
losing out on important opportunities at a critical time.
The Euro-Atlantic agenda was worth protecting, he stressed,
and should not be a "political plaything." If in fact we
shared the same views and values concerning the North
Atlantic alliance and Romania's role in NATO, it was time to
draw a line and wall off our common agenda from the
day-to-day political infighting in Bucharest. Washington
sought reassurance, the Ambassador went on, that Bucharest
was in fact the right venue for the next NATO summit in 2008
in advance of the upcoming Oslo ministerial. The Ambassador
emphasized that the U.S. did not want to proceed forward
under a shadow of doubt and uncertainty over Bucharest's
readiness to carry out -- enthusiastically and energetically
-- its responsibilities as the host country. He explained
that he had made the same request of all the leading actors
-- namely, that they signal their support for NATO and the
Euro-Atlantic agenda at an early opportunity, perhaps on the
occasion of the upcoming NATO anniversary on April 4. A
strong public message would underscore that Romania's
political actors could carry out a vigorous political debate
at home while keeping solidarity with the Alliance intact.


3. (C) PM Tariceanu replied that Romania was facing a
political situation that had "hugely deteriorated" because
President Basescu had failed to observe the Constitution.
The President was in conflict with all of the other major
actors: the government, the Parliament, the media, the
magistrates' council and so on. Tariceanu stated that he had
avoided any clash with Basescu until the beginning of this
year "for the sake of Romania joining the EU in 2007."
Otherwise, he insisted, his attitude would have been
"completely different," and he would have pushed back
strongly in order to "clearly delineate constitutional
authorities." Basescu, the PM insisted, had destroyed the
majority in the government, had fostered a split within the
Liberal Party by backing the breakaway Stolojan Liberal
Democratic group, and had otherwise created political havoc.
"Now he is paying the price for what he has done," Tariceanu
commented. Until now, the PM went on, he had held back from
endorsing the impeachment motion. However, if the President
continued to create political problems, "I will be in a
position to support the impeachment," Tariceanu concluded.


4. (C) Recalling that Basescu had refused to ratify the PM's
nomination of Adrian Ciorianu as the new Foreign Minister,
Tariceanu complained that Basescu "gets involved in
everything." "His role as President is as a mediator, not a
'player,'" the Prime Minister went on. "The problem is that
he hasn't even taken the time to read the Constitution."
Tariceanu stated that he had conducted "thorough
consultations with all the political parties," and had "found
a recipe for political stability." For the past three
months, he continued, he could not work on the government's
business because he was involved every day in "nonsense

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political fights." Next week, he claimed, he would go to
Parliament with a new government line-up that he would submit
to a confidence vote.


5. (C) Switching gears, Tariceanu observed that the
Ambassador had been "very delicate" in not stating explicitly
what he thought was the main issue -- namely, the Prime
Minister's speech advocating an Iraq withdrawal. He reminded
the Ambassador that he had made the same call last year.
Today, all the Europeans had announced they would leave Iraq,
just as had the U.S. Senate. "The time has come for us to do
the same," the PM insisted, adding however that Romania would
do so only "based on consultations with you to establish a
calendar before the end of the year." Romanian public
opinion, he claimed, was strongly in favor of a withdrawal.
President Basescu, the PM observed, had a "different opinion"
about the Romanian deployment in Iraq. He suggested,
however, that even the President was "rethinking" the issue
because he realized a withdrawal needed to be carried out.
Tariceanu said he advocated accomplishing the withdrawal
calmly and smoothly, but that if the President opposed a
withdrawal "loudly, in public," there would be a "huge risk"
of open confrontation.


6. (C) The Ambassador told the PM that while the political
situation was something for Romanians to resolve, it also
affected the climate of our relationship. The U.S. did not
want to move forward with a NATO summit in Bucharest if there
were not a stable government situation or a strong commitment
to make the event a success. The Ambassador reiterated that
a strong declaration of support for NATO and the
transatlantic agenda would help address these doubts.
Tariceanu said that he would "without a doubt" make a
favorable statement, to help make it clear that Romania was
"highly interested" in hosting the summit. On Iraq, the
Ambassador reminded the PM of our position, stressing that
the U.S. valued Romania's contribution to the coalition and
that it was "more than a question of numbers, and the boots
on the ground," it was a political affirmation of our close
partnership. The Romanian deployment to Afghanistan, under
NATO auspices, was different, he observed; the Prime Minister
immediately agreed. The Ambassador acknowledged that "the
disagreement on Iraq continues."


7. (C) President Basescu, too, had his mind on the internal
political dynamic. He began the session by commenting that
the decisive moment in the stand-off was close, was
potentially "explosive," but would also serve "to clarify the
relations between the branches of power." He said that the
Constitutional Court would resolve two key issues on April 4,
namely on the constitutionality of the suspension charges
outlined in the Voiculescu Report and on the question of
whether the President is "obliged to accept" the PM's
appointment of Foreign Minister designate Adrian Ciorianu.
On the latter point, Basescu observed, if the Constitutional
Court were to rule that he was obliged to sign off on the
nomination, Romania would be "automatically" transformed into
a "parliamentary republic." It would mean, in practice, that
the President would also have to accept any other nomination,
for instance for a new Procurator-General or an Army
Chief-of-Staff that would come forward from the Prime
Minister. Until now, he added, the issue had been left
"inconclusive" in the Constitution; an unfavorable decision,
he stressed, would mean "a President with zero power." Once
the Court had taken its decisions, Basescu stated, he would
make a public statement concerning the state of Romanian
society and politics, pointing to the fact that the Romanian
elite's economic and political interests remain too close,
acting together in "an untransparent way." He would clarify
his views on what the current situation meant and what needed
to be changed, in this address to the Romanian public.


8. (C) In response to our question about the future shape of
the Prime Minister's government, Basescu said the Prime
Minister was facing "a difficult moment." There were two
groups advising him differently, one which wanted to force
the Democrat Party (PD) ministers out of the government,
another which favored keeping the current Alliance government
intact. The Prime Minister's "American" political advisors
were recommending that Tariceanu not push the Democrats out
because the advisors believed it would make the Liberals too
dependent on the opposition, according to the President.
This, Basescu said, was why the Prime Minister continued to
delay making a decision. The pressure on Tariceanu to remove
the Democrats, however, was very strong. Dinu Patriciu and
Liberal Party Vice-President Crin Antonescu were determined

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to drive the Liberals towards an alliance with the Social
Democrats (PSD). According to the President, the Prime
Minister had presided over a stormy but still inconclusive
political meeting on the evening of March 29 at Victoria
Palace. What was vital, Basescu stressed, was that the Prime
Minister make a decision, one way or the other, about the
shape of his government. "The dispute between me and the
Prime Minister is one thing," Basescu said, but the current
political muddle, in which lines between the government and
opposition were so blurred, was particularly damaging.
Basescu claimed that he had not put pressure on the PD to
leave the government; it had been the dispute over delaying
the date of the Euro-parliamentary elections, from spring to
fall 2007, that had led to the falling-out between the two
parties.


9. (C) Once the Ambassador had made his remarks, Basescu
immediately committed to speaking out in favor of NATO and
the Euro-Atlantic relationship on the NATO anniversary date
of April 4, exclaiming that the timing was "perfect." He
said he would immediately task his advisors to prepare a
statement and asked for the Embassy's input on content.
Basescu expressed pride at having kept the question of
Romania's Iraq deployment out of the Supreme Defense Council
(CSAT) meeting on March 29. At the same time, he told the
Ambassador that retaining the Romanian company in Basrah in
Iraq longer was not viable. He explained that he had
purposely held back in publicly announcing the withdrawal of
the Basrah contingent "in order not to create confusion" in
the wake of the PM's call for a complete withdrawal. He did
not want Romania's overall commitment as an Iraq coalition
partner to be questioned. He indicated he would address the
Basrah situation directly during his April 4 address to the
Romanian people.


10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's comments, Geoana
response was that he "got it", adding that all of Romania
wanted the 2008 NATO summit. He said he hoped the next
generation understood and shared the same appreciation of the
importance that NATO and the strategic partnership with the
USA had with him. His desire not to jeopardize the
relationship was a matter of personal conviction - he had
worked the past 15 years to achieve this and it was the work
of an entire generation. He had come to the United States in
1996 when Romania was in the same league as North Korea, and
had seen Romania progress since then. The summit was a
"consecration" of Romania's progress and a strong signal for
the entire region.


11. (C) Geoana also pledged to "immerse" himself in making
the NATO summit in Bucharest a reality, including inserting
comments favoring the summit and the transatlantic link in
his upcoming speech in Parliament. He added that "if you
want this to be the policy position of the party, consider it
done." When the Ambassador asked Geoana to "wall off" the
transatlantic relationship from politics and not to use as a
"football", Geoana replied, "We'll stabilize the situation
somehow, even if the relationship with President Basescu is
not cordial." Geoana said, however, that it might take 1-2
months to "find a new balance" in Romanian politics, but
added that "we'll play by democratic rules."


12. (C) Comment: This was a timely intervention, following
on the heels of the Ambassador's strong Chamber of Commerce
speech two days ago, which was widely reported in the
domestic press as well as in the International Herald
Tribune. Our message to Romania's warring parties has been
that they must be able to prosecute a vigorous--even
unruly--political debate while keeping their solidarity with
the Alliance and the bilateral relationship still intact. We
have also continued to tell our interlocutors that we are
attentive to any backsliding in the rule of law and the fight
against corruption. Our message was heard to varying degrees
by our three interlocutors. Tariceanu was clearly the least
enthusiastic about reiterating publicly his commitment to the
transatlantic agenda. Basescu still seems determined to keep
Romania's security commitments (including the Iraqi troop
deployment) from becoming a political football. While Geoana
also clearly "gets" the importance of the Euro-Atlantic link,
he has also bet his political future on this challenge to
Basescu and the PNL-PD alliance, and it will be awkward for
him to back down now. Still, after a week of expectation
that the political terms of reference in Bucharest were about
to change dramatically -- including the Prime Minister's
declaration on Monday that the alliance was "dead," it is
clear that things remain in play still. Basescu, however

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bloodied politically, still seems to have plenty of fight in
him. "I'm convinced in the end I will succeed in convincing
the Romanian people that we can't go on like this," he said.
As the Ambassador got up to leave, Basescu added: "And I
will complete my term as President, for sure." End Comment.
TAUBMAN