Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUCHAREST314
2007-03-16 16:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

COMPARING NOTES ON MOLDOVA: AMB. KIRBY VISITS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS RO MD 
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VZCZCXRO7921
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0314/01 0751643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161643Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6273
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 1250
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 000314 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE FOR (JENSEN) AND EUR/UMB (FURST)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS RO MD
SUBJECT: COMPARING NOTES ON MOLDOVA: AMB. KIRBY VISITS
BUCHAREST


Classified By: Polcouns Theodore Tanoue for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 000314

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE FOR (JENSEN) AND EUR/UMB (FURST)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS RO MD
SUBJECT: COMPARING NOTES ON MOLDOVA: AMB. KIRBY VISITS
BUCHAREST


Classified By: Polcouns Theodore Tanoue for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Romanian frustrations in dealing with Moldova
were a leitmotif during Ambassador Kirby,s visit to
Bucharest March 7-8, which included calls on senior Basescu
advisors, the PM's Chief of Staff, the MFA State Secretary,
and exchanges with MFA Moldova experts and representatives of
local think-tanks and NGOs. Kirby also gave a well-received
briefing for local NATO and EU Ambassadors. Kirby counseled
Romanian forbearance and patience towards prickly Moldovan
behavior. He also advocated that Bucharest make an effort to
counter the perception that a new "Iron Curtain" had
descended across the Prut River because of new visa
requirements for Moldovan citizens. Romanian officials
described the quandary they face with the prospect of many
hundreds of thousands of Moldovan citizens seeking Romanian
citizenship, and their effort to calibrate their approach to
responding to the Moldovan demand in ways that are consonant
with broader EU interests. USG efforts in Moldova, including
MCA projects focused on reform and fighting corruption, were
received positively by Kirby's Romanian hosts, who
highlighted their own emphasis on engaging Moldovan civil
society, the Moldovan business community along with the next
generation of Moldovan politicians. Ambassador Kirby said
that he was also struck by the fact that informally, many of
his Romanian interlocutors seemed to feel that Moldova would
eventually reunite with Romania, and tended to be sceptical
of the notion of a separate Moldovan "identity." We hope his
visit will help reinforce the more careful and measured
approach to Moldova that had already begun to take shape in
Bucharest. End Summary.

Cotroceni: Frustration and the Long View
--------------


2. (C) Basescu's chief political advisor at the Romanian
Presidency, Teodor Baconschi -- who seemed somewhat
distracted by the fact that President Basescu was staging a
press conference just outside the meeting room -- said he

would like to see Moldova rejoin Romania someday but admitted
it was not a realistic option. In light of Voronin's
increasingly hostile stance, Romania's focus thus was on
supporting "the people of Moldova" through concrete actions
now, rather than waiting for another mood swing in Chisinau.
Baconschi observed that Moldovan citizens desired EU
membership, adding that Moldovans see the EU as an escape
from poverty and a "source of prosperity for their dreams."
This sentiment was echoed by Ambassador Kirby who added the
Moldovan Parliament would vote overwhelmingly in favor of EU
entry today if it could. Baconschi remarked that the
Moldovans are too poor to be Euro-skeptics, and that even
President Voronin tacitly acknowledged this with his ironic
comment that "Moldova may be the first place where the people
join the EU before their country does."


3. (C) Baconschi stressed that the USG needed to press for a
resolution of the Transnistria problem, since Romania had
little leverage bilaterally. While expressing the broad
aspiration of President Basescu for a reunion of Moldova with
Romania someday within the European Union, Baconschi
acknowledged that the average Romanian citizen had little
interest in reunification. Ambassador Kirby responded that
Russia and Ukraine shared a common interest in seeing that
borders didn't change. Baconschi concluded that President
Basescu's hopes to work more closely with President Voronin
had been dashed, and that the Romanians had concluded that it
was better to focus on the citizens (especially the youth) of
Moldova as a way to prepare for a more amicable future in the
post-Voronin era.


4. (C) Presidential chief Foreign Policy Advisor Anca
Ilinoiu, who accompanied Basescu to Chisinau in January, and
who follows Moldovan issues closely, likewise expressed
frustration and disappointment with the state of play in the
Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relationship. She highlighted
the fact that the Romanian MFA had been totally unprepared
for the influx of Moldovan requests for Romanian citizenship,
much less the sharply increased volume of visa requests
Romanian consuls have seen both in Chisinau and in other
capitals in Europe where Moldovans live and work. Ilinoiu
cited a figure of 530,000 citizenship requests filed with the
Romanian government, requests which are filed on a family
rather than individual basis. (An Austrian diplomat at
Kirby's NATO/EU briefing subsequently claimed he had been
given a figure of "only" 300,000, but either way the numbers
are very substantial.) Ilinoiu said Moldovan "duplicity" in
its diplomatic dealings was reflective of the current
government,s true character. She confirmed that the
Romanian approach had shifted to a less active, more

BUCHAREST 00000314 002 OF 004


pessimistic one last fall, when Voronin's negative statements
about the relationship made it clear to the GOR that
President Basescu's efforts to build a better relationship
with Voronin had failed. Ilinoiu echoed Baconschi in stating
that Romania was looking beyond the current political
configuration towards the future leaders, and that Romania
was promoting projects to strengthen Moldovan civil society,
the rule of law, and scholarships and educational
opportunities. She said that the Romanian approach would be
measured and restrained; Bucharest would not respond in kind
to the aggressive rhetoric emanating from Chisinau.

MFA: Treaty Headaches
--------------


5. (C) MFA interlocutors, including Director-General for
Wider Europe Razvan Rusu, provided a detailed chronology of
the state of play on bilateral negotiations on a Basic Treaty
and a Border Regime Treaty. They noted that the border
treaty text was substantially agreed except for matters
involving nomenclature, format, and language. The Moldovans
had insisted on reference to the 1947 Paris Treaty, and on
attaching all previous treaties as appendices to the Border
Treaty, which our interlocutors insisted would result in a
treaty containing over a cubic meter of supplemental annexes.
Moldova also insisted on language underscoring that "both
texts were equally authentic", implying that the treaty was
drafted in two different languages -- "Moldovan" and
Romanian.


6. (C) On the Basic Treaty, our MFA contacts said that their
intention was to offer a very "European" document focused on
creating a European Partnership Agreement in order to share
Romania's experience in meeting EU membership standards.
This document would be similar to partnership agreements
concluded with Georgia, Croatia, and Macedonia. One
departure was that the Romanians could offer to the Moldovans
documents already translated into Romanian. They added that
Romania could also offer its expertise in such areas as
energy, wine exports, justice and home affairs. In response,
the Moldovans had insisted on a 1950s style Basic Treaty,
focusing on mutual legitimization and endorsement of a new
post-Cold War relationship.


7. (C) In response to the Romanian MFA plaint of "What should
we do?," Ambassador Kirby cited the biblical story of Job,
and counseled patiently taking the high road. He noted that
domestic political factors helped explain Moldovan behavior:
the Communist Party was seized by the upcoming local
elections in May. Much of the rhetoric directed against
Romania was actually aimed at mobilizing older voters in the
Party's base. He added that younger, reform oriented voters
were not a significant part of the equation, given that many
have already voted with their feet and left the country.

Lunch with Acting FM: Kirby Counsels Patience
-------------- -


8. (C) MFA State Secretary (and de facto acting FM) Adrian
Vierita prefaced his remarks by thanking Ambassador Kirby for
the visit. He took note of the GOR's goals of obtaining
closer cooperation in the larger Black Sea region (through
such vehicles as the Black Sea Trust Fund, the Marshall Fund,
and the Black Sea Forum) and dealing with "unfinished
business" in the region stemming from the Soviet period.
Moldova was part of this agenda, as Romanian diplomacy was
directed towards connecting Moldova to positive trends in the
region and to the EU. Vierita added that the Romanian focus
was increasingly turning towards fostering the development of
civil society in Moldova, and creating a new generation of
leaders not linked to Soviet-period "old thinking". He also
compared the rapid development of Romanian-Ukrainian
relations with the slow pace of improvement in Romanian -
Moldovan ties. For example, Basescu and Yushchenko had
created a framework to resolve a number of tough issues,
including a cross-border roundtable. They had focused on
deliverables, positive on-the-ground results, and
confidence-building measures underpinned by an implicit
agreement not to touch on "sensitive" problems.


9. (C) Ambassador Kirby reiterated his themes regarding the
domestic and external context for Moldovan behavior. Last
year had been a miserable one, including, inter alia, gas and
electricity shortages; the failure of the 5 2 talks; the
Russian ban on Moldovan wine imports; the suspension of rail
connections between Chisinau and Moscow; the loss by the
communists in the Gagauz elections; and other factors. The
communists also feared losing the upcoming May elections.
This meant the leadership was currently fixated on short-term

BUCHAREST 00000314 003 OF 004


matters. Finally, Voronin wanted a solution to Transnistria
as his legacy and needed Russian cooperation. Ambassador
Kirby also noted that the January 2007 imposition of new EU
travel restrictions was a major shock to Moldova, creating
the perception that a new "Iron Curtain" had descended across
the Prut River. He noted, too, the potential impact of the
hundreds of thousands of Moldovans applying for Romanian
nationality and departing the country. Vierita responded
that Romanian citizenship law was not specifically aimed at
Moldovans and was in fact one of the toughest laws in the EU.
Finally, Ambassador Kirby underscored the need for more
effective public diplomacy on the Romanian side to make their
position better known in Moldova.


10. (C) Ambassador Kirby also suggested better leveraging the
argument of meeting "EU norms" in order to get to an
agreement with Chisinau on the border treaty. Vierita
responded that it was a good idea and Romania would follow up
on the suggestion. He added that Romania wanted a resumption
of negotiations under the 5 2 format. Asked about how
Romania should behave, Ambassador repeated his admonition for
patience. It was difficult not to respond to provocative
language from Chisinau, but restraint was the best response.

PM's Chief of Staff: Using the Delete Key
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador Kirby stressed similar themes at an
afternoon session with PM's Chief of Staff, Mihnea
Constantinescu and State Secretary for Moldova Dan Dumitru.
He said that the "delete" key was often his most-used word
processing function when composing responses to Moldovan
leaders. Constantinescu agreed, remarking that Romania had
no intention of conducting cross-border relations through
angry press statements. The goal was to persuade the
Moldovan side through diplomatic means that they should act
in ways consonant with the best interests of Moldovan
citizens. He added that Barroso's restrained but firm
response to Moldovan demands regarding the EU visa regime was
a "model" for a future EU "code of conduct" in handling
Moldova. The Romanian message to Chisinau was that it was
subsuming its Moldova policy under the overall EU umbrella.
He concluded that "we are part of the EU now" and Romania
needed to abandon the line that "Moldova is something special
to us."


12. (C) Ambassador Kirby said that he met regularly with EU
Ambassadors and with World Bank and IMF representatives in
Chisinau. This helped create a common effort on the ground
in Chisinau to encourage Moldova to continue political and
economic reforms as well as to continue to improve the rule
of law. He said that he had counseled Moldovan leaders not
to take the current "never" from the EU to mean "never
forever" but rather as "never for now." He added that the
Moldovan political class understands what is required of
them, but are not fully willing to pay the price.
Constantinescu agreed, noting that the "Leninist" background
of Moldova's current leaders coupled with their vested
interests would make a quick evolution on the Romanian model
unlikely. He said, however, that he was optimistic that a
"critical mass" for reform would be achieved in a decade.


13. (C) Ambassador Kirby also noted USG efforts on other
fronts, including Millennium Challenge Corporation projects
on corruption, judicial reform, and health sector reform,
backed with significant (USD 200-300 million) funding.
Constantinescu welcomed the U.S. approach, noting the past
success of economic and social incentives in other areas of
the Balkans. He said he was pleased to hear that of U.S.
efforts to create a "catalyst" for reforms, an effort that
was consonant with Romania's new emphasis on grassroots
efforts. In closing, Constantinescu expressed the hope that
Kirby would encourage Moldovan authorities to try to look at
Bucharest as a source of practical solutions for bringing
Moldova closer to the EU. He insisted that Romania had no
"hidden interests" and its goal was to benefit the citizens
of Moldova and to create a greater sense of "normality" and
"good neighborly" relations in the region.


14. (C) Comment: Romanians welcomed the opportunity to meet
with Ambassador Kirby and to compare notes on Moldova.
Kirby's briefing of EU and NATO member mission heads was also
well-received. His recommendation that Bucharest play it
cool despite the heated rhetoric emanating from Chisinau was
treated seriously by our interlocutors. Whether or not the
current approach in Bucharest of turning the other cheek is
sustainable remains to be seen, but Romanian officials by and
large seem to recognize that their ability to warm up the
bilateral relationship will be quite limited for the rest of

BUCHAREST 00000314 004 OF 004


Voronin's tenure. Whatever "big brother" overhang there is
in Romanian policy towards Moldova, there are signs Bucharest
will proceed cautiously in the months ahead, being careful to
consult Brussels as it steers a lower-key bilateral course.
One remaining wild card: the fact that hundreds of thousands
of Moldovans are seeking Romanian citizenship, their ticket,
they believe, to a brighter future. End Comment.


15. (U) Embassy Chisinau cleared a draft version of this
message.
TAUBMAN