ROMANIA: RESPONSE TO IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 001244

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE A.JENSEN; NEA/I-PM S.EPSTEIN; AND PM/RSAT
C.DOWLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2032
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IZ RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: RESPONSE TO IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
SURVEY

REF: STATE 150164

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Taplin; Reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary: For Romania, the more specific the
international mandate for Iraq, the better the outcome in
terms of continued engagement in Iraq. President Basescu is
committed to maintaining Romania's military commitments
overseas, but the imprecisions within Romania's overlapping
constitutional and legal authorities will ensure that any
change in the status quo could trigger a politicized--and
public--debate over these authorities themselves, as part of
the bitter personal and institutional rivalries between the
President, Prime Minister, and Parliament over these issues.
There are also financial pressures against continued
deployments given the strains on the defense budget. The
bottom line, however, is that we still have the strong
backing of President Basescu and with the proper preparation,
Romania should be able to maintain its military commitments
in Iraq. End summary.


2. (C) The EU,s orientation towards developments in Iraq
will play a significant part of Romania's calculation on its
continued support for coalition military operations. That
said, in terms of the best outcome among the scenarios put
forward by reftel, scenario A (the U.S. concludes an
agreement with Iraq that troop-contributing countries could
join as parties) is more solid than scenario B (the U.S.
concludes a bilateral agreement with Iraq that allows
troop-contributing countries to sign up for "third-party"
rights and obligations without joining as parties). Scenario
C (the U.S. concludes a bilateral agreement with Iraq, and
assists troop-contributing countries to draft and negotiate
simpler, "generic" bilateral agreements with Iraq) is one
which could also provide Romania with a &work-around8 for
maintaining its troops in Iraq. Scenario D (Romania commits
its forces under U.S. command) can be done militarily, but
would raise critical eyebrows politically.


3. (C) MFA and MOD officials reassured us repeatedly of
their commitment to maintain current troop levels in Iraq,
even if the coalition dissolves, and have mentioned the
possibility of negotiating their own bilateral arrangement
with the Iraqis. Some of this may have been intended to
increase our confidence in Romania's military commitments
following statements in the summer of 2006 from the Prime
Minister and then-Defense Minister favoring a precipitous
withdrawal from Iraq--a statement which both the government
and leading members of the Prime Minister's Liberal Party
have since recanted. MFA officials have pointed to Romanian
interest in expanding economic and commercial ties with Iraq
as another motive for remaining engaged in Iraq and the
region. MOD officials also see deployment alongside U.S.
forces as an accelerant in the transformation of their
military forces, and consider their involvement in MNF-I as
the most effective way to create an expeditionary military
that can be an effective and positive contributor to the NATO
alliance.


4. (C) Answers to specific questions:

-- Which of the above scenarios will require only an
executive decision? Which will require legislative approval
or ratification?

Answer: Depends on domestic political situation at the time.
In general the Supreme Council for National Defense (CSAT),
which is chaired by the President, will make the call, but
deployment of forces abroad will also require parliamentary
concurrence.

-- Are you aware of examples of similar actions taken by your
host country, or are there scenarios which would be novel?

Answer: This would be unprecedented in recent Romanian
history, and thus could become a political "football"
precisely because it would be seen as setting a precedent.

--What is the estimated time frame for the required action -
Weeks? Months? Years? Are you confident in these
assessments, or would you need to engage Foreign Ministry
lawyers to be comfortable giving an authoritative answer?

Answer: Weeks to months. If the issue becomes embroiled in
constitutional questions over who--the CSAT or
parliament--has the authority to dispatch forces abroad, this

could result in extended debate. Any issues put forward first
to the MFA lawyers could easily delay an assessment, since
the law is ambiguous on this point.


5. (C) In addition to legal challenges, posts should also
assess the domestic political requirements or challenges host
governments / organizations might face in agreeing to a
post-UN MNF-I mandate deployment to Iraq. Would an UNSCR of
some kind be necessary? If so, would it need to authorize
military action (Chapter VII),or would a generic
(non-Chapter VII) call to support Iraq suffice?

Answer: A UNSCR, especially one that authorized military
action would make the political process smoother. A generic
call to support Iraq would probably lead to some political
discussion, but it would also provide sufficient cover to
support Romania's continued deployment. The bottom line is
the more specific the international mandate for Iraq, then
the better the outcome for Romania's engagement.

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Background
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6. (C) The Armed Forces are constitutionally mandated to
contribute to &the collective defense in military alliance
systems, and participate in peacekeeping or peace restoring
missions.8 This provision has been interpreted to be
sufficient broad to cover Romania's military roles in Iraq,
Afghanistan (NATO) and the other deployments. Also, under
the Romanian Constitution, the president is
Commander-in-Chief and presides over Romania's Supreme
Council for National Defense (CSAT),which operates by
consensus to coordinate and decide Romania's participation in
international security, peacekeeping and peace-restoring
missions.


7. (C) The President may mobilize in part or in whole the
armed forces, but only with prior approval from Parliament.
In exceptional (undefined) circumstances the president can
submit a decision for parliamentary approval within five days
of a mobilization. In all cases, a Presidential decision
which requires parliamentary approval can be challenged
within the Supreme Court of Magistrates if there is
disagreement President and Parliament disagree on the
prerogatives of their respective powers.


8. (C) It is an annual requirement for the government to
decide the terms for any overseas deployments for the
subsequent year, 2009. For example, the CSAT on June 29,
2007 set the terms for deployment of Romanian troops abroad
for the subsequent year. That decision remains valid through
December 2008, but it does not mean a subsequent CSAT
decision, a Parliamentary emergency decree, or a Presidential
determination could not amend that CSAT decision.


9. (C) The current complicated political situation in
Romania could affect negatively its ability to continue to
deploy troops overseas in the absence of a mandate from a
competent international or multinational authority, such as
the UN, NATO, EU, or even the OSCE. Part of the complication
is that the Romanian constitution and laws do not clearly
demarcate the authority of the Presidency, the government,
and the Parliament on this issue. Prime Minister Tariceanu
seeks to shift decision-making authority over the deployment
of Romanian troops away from President Basescu so that the
CSAT would take decisions by vote and not by consensus, which
would shift power towards Tariceanu,s appointees. For its

part, Parliament is eager to expand its powers by giving
itself decision-making authority over the deployment (and
withdrawal) of military forces sent overseas.
TAUBMAN