Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS3501
2007-12-13 20:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR SCHWEICH DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN RULE OF

Tags:  KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1278
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #3501/01 3472004
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 132004Z DEC 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 003501 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/AP, INL/PC, EUR/ERA, L/LEI;
DIR ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR (JOHN WALTERS),OSR (JAMES O'GARA);
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SCHWEICH DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN RULE OF
LAW AND COUNTER-DRUG ISSUES WITH EUROPEAN UNION COUNTERPARTS


Classified By: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS COUNSELOR JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS IN
SECTIONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 003501

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/AP, INL/PC, EUR/ERA, L/LEI;
DIR ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR (JOHN WALTERS),OSR (JAMES O'GARA);
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SCHWEICH DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN RULE OF
LAW AND COUNTER-DRUG ISSUES WITH EUROPEAN UNION COUNTERPARTS


Classified By: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS COUNSELOR JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS IN
SECTIONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The U.S. Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice
Reform in Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas Schweich, discussed
police training and counter-drug issues with several European
Union (EU) officials at a November 28 meeting in Brussels.
Officials on both sides agreed on virtually all policies
related to rule of law and counter-drug efforts in
Afghanistan, with the notable exception of the potential role
of aerial eradication. Schweich explained that the U.S. did
not plan to push for aerial eradication this year, given the
opposition of the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and lack of
consensus by governments of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) for this measure. Political will is
the key -- and often missing factor -- for success in
Afghanistan. Unfortunately some Afghan leaders use
perceived disunity wihin the international community as an
excuse for inaction. Participants agreed that progress on
stemming opium cultivation in the relatively secure northern
provinces of Afghanistan has been more than offset by
dramatically increased production in the south. Ambassador
Schweich pledged to seek appropriate U.S. support for the
European Police Training Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) after
his return to Washington. END SUMMARY.

--------------
STATUS OF EUPOL MISSION
--------------


2. (C) U.S. Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice
Reform in Afghanistan Schweich, accompanied by Mission INL
Counselor James McAnulty, Justice Counselor Mary Lee Warren,
and INL Special Assistant Daniel Weisfield, met with
Political Advisor Olivia Holdsworth of the Council
Secretariat's Civilian Crisis Management Office, Pakistan,


SIPDIS
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives Head of Unit
Helen Campbell of the European Commission, Policy Advisor Tim
Eestermans of the Council Secretariat, and Afghanistan Desk
Officer Bettina Muscheidt of the Commission at a November 28
luncheon hosted at the Mission by INL Counselor to discuss
police training and counter-drug issues in Afghanistan.
Holdsworth asserted that "significant progress" had occurred
during the previous six weeks in establishing the EUPOL
Mission. She described the new EUPOL Commander, General
Jorgen Sholtz of Germany, as "less introspective" than his
predecessor and reaching out more widely to colleagues in
Kabul. She characterized relations with the U.S. military
and Police Reform Director David Dobrotka of the Combined
Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) as "very
good," while admitting that EUPOL elicited greater skepticism
among U.S. officials at the Embassy in Kabul. That said,
EUPOL wanted to gain the trust of others and to be seen as a
credible partner in complementing U.S. police reform efforts
in Afghanistan.


3. (C) Political Advisor Holdsworth noted that, at the
strategic level, EUPOL has begun to conduct assessments and
design training programs to meet the needs of Afghanistan
police units. EUPOL personnel were working closely with the
international coordinating body for police reform efforts and
hoped to station up to 20 police officials at Kunduz. To
date, the U.S. side had agreed to accommodate 12 persons.
She acknowledged that EUPOL was under "intense pressure" to
deploy to the provinces and regions. EU Member States would
only provide additional "boots on the ground" for the
mission, if they viewed EUPOL as providing "value added" in
Afghanistan. The planned presence of EUPOL personnel in the
provinces and regions, however, would depend upon cooperation
from international colleagues at Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, regional commands, and regional training centers.
Holdsworth indicated that EUPOL wanted to sign "technical
arrangements" for support of EUPOL personnel in the provinces
and regions, including at the Regional Training Center in
Kandahar.

--------------
SIGNING OF TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS

BRUSSELS 00003501 002 OF 004


--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Schweich indicated that the technical
arrangement with the Regional Training Center at Kandahar
could be signed -- after addressing a technical issue
involving development of cost estimates for support services,
against which EUPOL would provide reimbursements to INL. He
understood that the Regional Training Center at Kandahar had
agreed in principle to accommodate 10 to 12 EUPOL personnel.
Schweich acknowledged that negotiation of support to EUPOL at
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams would be more
"problematic," reiterating the U.S. position which stipulated
that negotiation of such agreements would occur only through
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He planned to
discuss this policy with colleagues upon his return to
Washington to try to arrive at "practical possibilities" for
provision of support to EUPOL. Ambassador Schweich noted
that he had read the draft technical arrangements proposed by
EUPOL, which stipulated in most cases that support be
provided "within available means." He remarked that, as a
lawyer, he viewed such language as reasonable. He remained
optimistic that officials could address most support issues
once they resolved the overall policy issue. Holdsworth
expressed appreciation for whatever help Ambassador Schweich
could provide.


5. (C) Holdsworth noted that EUPOL had already signed
technical arrangements with other countries, including
Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Lithuania. Most
reportedly involved "in-kind" contributions, and she
understood that the UK would host EUPOL without cost.
Ambassador Schweich understood that, for the agreement with
INL, direct costs would have to be calculated and credited to
a particular account. Commission Official Campbell agreed
with the need for strict accountability, noting that the
European Court of Auditors and the European Parliament
expected as much from the EU side.


--------------
USE OF PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS
--------------


6. (C) Schweich inquired about security arrangements,
including the possible use of Personal Security Details.
Campbell noted that EU personnel could not call upon military
support in every situation. So, they had no choice but to
arrange for private contractors to provide security, but
overall force protection must nevertheless come from the
national contingents of the ISAF.

--------------
JUSTICE REFORM PROGRAMS
--------------


7. (C) Campbell noted the Commission's involvement in justice
reform programs in Afghanistan. To date, the Commission has
allocated 40 million Euros for this project. The Commission
had become involved in institutional reforms including the
proper grading of justice-sector positions and selection of
personnel for such positions.

--------------
BLEAK PICTURE FOR ANTI-DRUG SECTOR?
--------------


8. (C) Policy Unit official Eestermans painted a bleak
picture regarding counter-drug efforts, for which the UK
served as the de-facto lead nation within the international
community. He saw no prospect for improvement in Kandahar
this spring, and noted that the insurgency had become even
more linked to the drug trade, which has caused considerable
concern. In addition to the insurgency, drug proceeds fueled
"normal" criminal activities -- creating an even greater
sense of insecurity among local populations. Muscheidt noted
that even Nangarhar Province, which officials had viewed
earlier as a success story, had slipped backwards on
anti-drug efforts, with the insurgency gaining more footholds
there.

--------------
POLITICAL WILL IS KEY TO SUCCESS
--------------

BRUSSELS 00003501 003 OF 004




9. (C) Ambassador Schweich emphasized political will as the
key -- and often missing -- factor for success. Poorer Tajik
and Uzbek regions in the north have largely halted poppy
cultivation, while wealthier Pashtun regions in the south
continue to grown increasing amounts of poppy. UNODC
officials have asserted that opium cultivation can no longer
be associated with poverty. Rather, it is associated with
insecurity and insurgency. Campbell added that Afghan
leaders needed more credibility. Schweich agreed, and noted
that the international community could not wait for the GOA
to take action against drugs until after the upcoming
presidential elections. We must continue to raise our
concerns with the Afghan leadership and speak with a unified
voice on the need to interdict high-value targets and
eradicate poppy crops through non-negotiated means.

-------------- --------------
U.S. WILL NOT PURSUE AERIAL ERADICATION AS OPTION THIS YEAR
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Schweich stressed that Afghanistan needs to take
tougher action against opium farmers who have licit
alternatives. Interdiction is not enough, capturing only one
percent of production within the country and thirty percent
in countries beyond Afghanistan's borders. Authorities must
interject a "down side" to opium cultivation by going after
those who grow drugs. The U.S. inter-agency recently came to
a consensus in favor of aerial eradication, but the U.S.
Government has agreed to forego this option for one year,
given the lack of support from President Karzai and ISAF
allies. Nonetheless, Ambassador Schweich warned burgeoning
opium cultivation in Afghanistan threatens to undermine all
our other efforts there, and the U.S. decision to take aerial
spray off the table this season should be accompanied by a
strong allied push for force-protected manual eradication.
.


11. (C) Campbell agreed that the international community had
complete agreement on rule of law and counter-narcotics
policies, except for one area -- the means by which to
eradicate. She lamented that Afghan leaders have used this
one point of difference as an excuse for inaction.

--------------
RESOLUTION ON USE OF OPIUM FOR MEDICAL USES
--------------


12. (C) Eestemans also noted approval earlier this year by
the European Parliament of an unhelpful resolution calling on
the international community to buy up Afghanistan's opium
poppy to convert it into medical uses to alleviate pain and
suffering in developing countries. According to Eestemans,
Commissioner for Foreign Relations and European Neighborhood
Policy Benita Ferraro-Waldner intervened personally with
Parliamentarians to try to beat back this idea promoted by
the Senlis Council. Muscheidt noted, nonetheless, that it
gained approval largely for domestic political reasons in
various Member States, including Italy, where the idea seemed
to resonate well with the public. INL Counselor remarked
that the idea kept popping up in public circles. He noted
the resolution's non-binding nature, but acknowledged that
its approval had caused damage to public attitudes on drug
cultivation in Afghanistan. Muscheidt even noted that Afghan
Parliamentarians visiting Brussels about the same time had
opposed the idea.

--------------
HELMAND IS MAJOR RECIPIENT OF AID
--------------


13. (C) Near the end of the meeting, INL Counselor
re-emphasized U.S. support for promotion of alternative
development in Afghanistan. He recalled a speech by the U.S.
Ambassador to Afghanistan in which the Ambassador had pointed
out that, if Helmand Province were considered a separate
entity from the rest of Afghanistan, it would be the sixth
largest recipient of U.S. foreign development assistance.
Yet, farmers there abused such help, even using irrigation
systems built by the international community to boost illicit
production. Justice Counselor also noted international road
building efforts intended to allow farmers there to transport
their agricultural products more easily to markets.

BRUSSELS 00003501 004 OF 004



--------------
COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) This meeting by Ambassador Schweich with EU officials
proved valuable in clarifying U.S. and EU views on
counter-drug and rule of law issues in Afghanistan. U.S. and
EU officials agreed on virtually all policies in these
important sectors, with the notable exception of the means by
which to eradicate. Ambassador Schweich pledged as well to
do what he could to gain appropriate U.S. support for
deployments of EUPOL personnel to provinces and regions
outside Kabul. END COMMENT.


15. (U) Ambassador Schweich has cleared on this telegram.

MURRAY
.