Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS3465
2007-12-06 18:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

FRIED AND EU POLDIR ON BOSNIA, KOSOVO, IRAN, OTHER

Tags:  PREL BK IR KV SR EP EUN 
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VZCZCXRO5575
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3465/01 3401821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061821Z DEC 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003465 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: PREL BK IR KV SR EP EUN
SUBJECT: FRIED AND EU POLDIR ON BOSNIA, KOSOVO, IRAN, OTHER
ISSUES

Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d).

SUMMARY
- - - -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003465

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: PREL BK IR KV SR EP EUN
SUBJECT: FRIED AND EU POLDIR ON BOSNIA, KOSOVO, IRAN, OTHER
ISSUES

Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d).

SUMMARY
- - - -


1. (C) EUR A/S Dan Fried briefed EU Director General for
External and Politico-Military Affairs Robert Cooper December
6 on his talks with leaders in BiH, noting that we must
continue to support HR Lajcak, and build on the recent
progress (the Mostar Agreement and SAA initialing),but also
prepare strategy, including more carrots and sticks, for
addressing underlying problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).
Fried stressed the need to move forward quickly on Kosovo,
noting the need for unity in action rather than paralysis.
Cooper noted that the Dutch are a "surprise problem" on
Kosovo. A/S Fried and Cooper also discussed Iran, Georgia,
Ukraine, and the need to strategize on energy. End summary.


BiH: Bought Time
- - - - - - - - -


2. (C) A/S Fried briefed Cooper on his Dec. 4-5 talks in
Sarajevo. He noted improvement in the situation given
Dodik's and Silajdzic's backing down, in part because of the
threat of sanctions and the atmosphere of public panic.
Simultaneous crises over BiH and Kosovo may have been
averted, but fundamental problems in BiH remain and will
resurface. A/S Fried reported that Dodik committed to
behave, including publicly stating that the RS would not
secede. He also undertook to tell Kosovo Serbs to remain in
Kosovo and avoid provocations. Cooper said Dodik's
brinkmanship might have worked -- "there was not much we
could have done about it and it would have paralyzed Bosnian
institutions." Fried reiterated that Dodik and Silajdzic had
backed down in part because of the threat of sanctions and
underscored the need for a strategy on BiH to address key
problems that will resurface. Cooper observed that the
Commission, when finalizing negotiations over police reform
and the initialing of the SAA, found the BiH leaders
"palpably relieved" that a crisis had been averted. He noted
that Dodik should understand that the EU is an answer to his
problem; A/S Fried called for the EU to specify what the EU

accession process requires of Dodik and other leaders.
Cooper also questioned the timing of Lacjak's initial
decision in October.

Kosovo: Unity in Action, not Paralysis
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (C) Turning to Kosovo, Cooper noted that PM Prodi and
President Sarkozy had apparently agreed to shift the Kosovo
timetable to take Serbia's presidential elections into
account. A/S Fried emphasized that the Troika process had
provided a 120-day delay as requested by Europeans and that
Kostunica would manipulate the electoral calendar for his own
purposes. While the U.S. might be able to consider the issue
if the first-round truly were held on January 20 and the
second-round two weeks thereafter, any subsequent calls for
delay would risk splitting the U.S. and the EU.


4. (C) Cooper listed some of the usual suspects who remain
unenthusiastic about recognition: Romania (Cooper said the
U.S. "could help us here with the Bucharest Summit coming"),
Cyprus ("whose foreign policy is often made in Moscow"),
Slovakia (given its parliamentary resolution),and "the
surprise problem" -- The Netherlands (due to enlargement
phobia, its history in the Balkans, and its legalistic
tradition). A/S Fried underlined that the U.S. has no more
patience for further hand-wringing by the Europeans; Kosovo
is not going to get better with time; rather, it will only
get worse. Pressed by A/S Fried if Solana would be helpful,
Cooper replied yes, but at his own moment, and when the gap
among member states has further narrowed, to preserve his
credibility within the EU. Fried noted that the EU will bear
responsibility if Kosovo is not resolved quickly. Cooper
said no one in the EU is asking for more time for
negotiations. A/S Fried repeated that now is the time for
unity in action, not unity in paralysis.


5. (C) Cooper said the U.S. and the EU should determine
timing and procedures to appoint the International Civilian
Representative (ICR) in Kosovo. The ICR should be appointed
within a day of a declaration of independence. The ICR would
need the backing of as much of the international community
(IC) as possible. Cooper said he viewed recognition of
Kosovo independence as a prerequisite for possible Steering
Board membership. A/S Fried agreed to consult very soon on
this.

BRUSSELS 00003465 002 OF 002



Georgia: Need to Isolate Russia on Abkhazia if Necessary
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) Asked about Georgia, A/S Fried noted the need to
maintain pressure on Tbilisi to respect democratic norms. A
sharp IC reaction should Russia recognize Abkhazia as
independent would help prevent Georgia from taking imprudent
measures.

Iran and NEI; Solana felt "blindsided"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C/NF) Stressing that he was speaking "off the record,"
Cooper noted that HR Solana had felt "blindsided" by the
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, particularly
given his talks November 30 with Jalili. Cooper
characterized the recent PSC discussion of the NIE "rather
sensible," with several member states concluding that it
reflected what the EU had believed. He asked if the U.S.
could share more of the NIE with the EU and noted that Iran
has "suspended" weaponization, but not given up this goal.
Solana's Non-Proliferation Envoy Giannella added it is key
for the EU to understand where the Iranians had left off as
well as what they had achieved. A/S Fried said we would
consider a briefing, either in Brussels or in Washington.

Ukraine: Remember its place in the world
- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) On Ukraine, A/S Fried noted the free and fair
elections and stressed the need to reach out to Ukrainian
leaders and remember Kiev's potential place in the world.
Cooper agreed, noting that the leadership needs to focus more
on issues and less on making money.

Need to Strategize on Energy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) A/S Fried raised energy and the need for the U.S. and
the EU to engage in strategic thinking, including on Caspian
pipelines.

Comment
- - - -


10. (C/NF) The main surprise in Cooper's remarks was his
concern over the Dutch position on Kosovo. While we look to
the Quint's EU members to take the lead on moving the EU
toward action, we should consider engaging The Hague
bilaterally as well on this. While our local contacts have
noted that only the Cypriots remain the sole hold-out (while
the "usual suspects," including Romania, remain
unenthusiastic but unwilling to block EU consensus),a
problem from the Dutch will only encourage further wobbliness
from key countries such as Italy. Cooper's questioning of
Lajcak's timing may indicate what another Council Secretariat
source working on BiH has told us -- that Solana's confidence
in Lajcak is a finite commodity. End comment.


11. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message.
GRAY
.