Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS3382
2007-11-21 18:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

EU FMS AND KOSOVO: GETTING TO A "GENUINE" DEBATE

Tags:  PREL EAID ZL EUN 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3382/01 3251837
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211837Z NOV 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003382 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: EU FMS AND KOSOVO: GETTING TO A "GENUINE" DEBATE

REF: BRUSSELS 3120

Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (B/D).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003382

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: EU FMS AND KOSOVO: GETTING TO A "GENUINE" DEBATE

REF: BRUSSELS 3120

Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (B/D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) EU FMs discusse Kosovo at their November 19 GAERC.
According to several contacts, various FMs want a "genuine
internal EU debate" on Kosovo, sometime after December 10,
before taking key decisions on recognition and the ESDP
mission. Some reportedly do not want to be seen as simply
rubber-stamping a Quint decision. Our contacts believe a
"critical mass" of member-states will recognize Kosovo
independence and see no member-state blocking the launch of
an ESDP mission; the question of timing, however, remains.
Greece proposed accelerating the accession process for all
countries in the region; Rehn's office apparently had not
been consulted on this beforehand. All 27 FMs are scheduled
to meet next at the December 10 GAERC and are expected to
meet on the margins of the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon
December 13 and the European Council December 14. Slovenia
may be preparing an "early" January special GAERC to focus on
Kosovo, but the Council Secretariat believes it will happen
one or two days after a UDI. Germany reportedly continues to
support conditioning recognition by member-states on the
promulgation of a Kosovo constitution enshrining the
Ahtisaari Plan. End summary

DESIRE FOR GENUINE, COMPREHENSIVE DEBATE
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2. (C) Several contacts have told us that some foreign
ministers want a "genuine" internal EU debate on Kosovo
before deliberating on the critical questions of recognition
and launching an ESDP mission. German PSC ambassador told
POL M/C Nov 21 that GAERC discussion had demonstrated that,
for all the notes of caution, most of the foreign ministers
now saw Kosovo as an EU responsibility, not "a problem for
the Quint". He credited this new attitude in large part to
the Troika process, especially Ishinger's frequent briefings
in Brussels, where he invariably described himself as the
"EU's representative." However, there was no question but

that the member states would want to be full participants in
subsequent EU decisions on Kosovo. This echoes what we have
heard from other contacts that some ministers want to ensure
that they not simply "rubber-stamp" a Quint proposal. UK
Mission Balkans watcher (protect) told us November 21 that
the GAERC demonstrated that FMs are finally starting to
acknowledge the need for detailed contingency planning.
While some member states are unenthusiastic about Kosovo
independence, they accept the need to make "tough" decisions,
our UK contact added.

BILDT: NEED TO TALK ABOUT REGION, NOT KOSOVO IN ISOLATION
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3. (C) According to the Council Secretariat and the British,
Swedish FM Bildt urged further discussion of Kosovo in a
wider context. While apparently not referring to his "soft
landing" line, Bildt stressed that Kosovo should not be seen
in isolation. Two contacts characterized Bildt's intervention
as "realistic." Council Secretariat Director for the W.
Balkans Stefan Lehne (protect) told us November 21 that a
Swedish delegation had told him earlier that day that there
should be some "accompanying measures" included in the
discussion, but that they had remained extremely vague over
specifics. The Portuguese Mission told us that planned
reactions to the possible expulsion of EU ambassadors from
Belgrade and a potential UDI from Banja Luka likely would be
included in such a discussion. Lehne stressed that Bildt
could prove important in moving the EU quickly on Kosovo and
urged that all consider engaging him more on how to achieve
this.


4. (C) Another Council Secretariat contact noted that Solana
is very concerned about both BiH and the Serbian presidential
elections, and the effect that Kosovo independence will have
on them. UK Mission noted that some FMs mentioned the
Serbian elections at the GAERC, but only to emphasize that
Belgrade would continue to change the election date to ensure
that it falls after a UDI from Pristina. Lehne told us that
there was "nothing new" in Solana's one-on-one meeting with
Tadic; Solana also met with Kostunica and the Serbian
delegation (there was no one-on-one),with Kostunica
predictably reiterating the need to respect international law
and Solana calling for flexibility.

ROMANIA AND CYPRUS THE HOLDOUTS

BRUSSELS 00003382 002 OF 003


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5. (C) Although misgivings may abound, the hard-core
opposition continues to shrink. Most contacts ascribe only
Romania and Cyprus to this hard-core. At the Monday GAERC,
the Romanian FM even submitted a written statement urging
that, if needed, more time after December 10 should be
devoted to negotiations. Nevertheless, our contacts do seem
sanguine that the opposition of just these two countries can
be managed. The Spanish and Slovaks reportedly did not voice
any concerns over Kosovo.

GREEKS PROPOSING ACCELERATED ACCESSION
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6. (C) The UK Mission confirmed that Greece had proposed
accelerating the accession process for all countries in the
region, with the intention of providing Serbia some degree of
a softer landing. The Slovenian Mission Balkans expert
(protect) told us November 21 that the Greeks proposed
immediate signing of the SAAs with Belgrade and Sarajevo,
with candidate status for Serbia by the end of 2008. The
Commission would be tasked with front-loading financial
assistance. Our UK contact noted that the Greek proposal
goes too far for London and several other capitals. Our
Slovenian contact, however, said that no member state
appeared opposed in principle to the Greek proposal.


7. (C) The proposal (the first to be formally tabled but not
the first to be floated, as the Slovenes have been making
similar noises in Brussels) apparently was not "pre-cooked"
well in advance -- Commissioner Rehn's Serbia/Kosovo advisor
had not even read it as of November 21. Lehne told us he
thought that the proposal was good "in principle," but
unlikely to gain much traction; rather, it demonstrates that
Greece will no longer seek to slow down the process regarding
Kosovo. He noted that Athens might also be demonstrating
greater flexibility in order to earn allies in its "name
dispute" with Macedonia in the run-up to the Bucharest
Summit.

HUNGARIAN ADVICE: AVOID THE "I" WORD
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8. (C) The Hungarian PSC ambassador told us November 20 that
several delegations, in corridor conversations, noted that
the U.S. and Kosovars should refrain from talking about UDI
and rather focus on Kosovo's implementation of the Ahtisaari
plan in coordination with the EU and U.S. (Comment: These
corridor discussions likely were fueled by Thaci's
post-election statements about declaring independence very
quickly after December 10; a Council Secretariat contact told
us that Thaci had assured Solana that he would coordinate
closely with the EU and the U.S. before declaring
independence.)

COMMENT
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9. (C/NF) Two of our contacts noted that this GAERC was
neither as productive as it could have been on Kosovo, nor as
bad as some might have feared. The very size of this massive
ministerial (81 ministers, including those covering defense
and development) made it hard to have substantive
discussions. On the plus side, there seems to be more
cautious optimism about the state of EU unity. The challenge
is that the troika process has given the member states the
sense of participation in the process, but without the
responsibility of having to make any difficult decisions. If
another extended discussion is indeed necessary to ensure EU
unity after Dec 10, logistics will be difficult, given the
packed agendas for the December 10 GAERC and the Dec 14 EU
Summit. Brussels' minds are clearly grappling with this
problem right now, but we haven't seen any answers, and we do
not exclude the possibility of pressure for slippage of the
January time frame (A number of Council and permrep contacts
have told us that Kosovars will need to have flexibility,
given that the EU may need time to keep the 27 together). We
also continue to hear much appreciation for the low public
profile of the US over the past weeks -- our contacts credit
this with helping to bring states in the region along. That
said, it may be useful to reach out to non-Quint member
states who share our views on Kosovo independence to help
focus their counterparts in the EU on a timeline for further
deliberations -- one that does not go beyond mid-January. We
should also use the presence of EU FMs at the Annapolis
meeting and at the NATO ministerial to underscore privately
that any further delays will only increase instability on the
ground and will not provide softer landings.

BRUSSELS 00003382 003 OF 003


GRAY
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