U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON W.BALKANS: CONCERN OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 003248

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON W.BALKANS: CONCERN OVER
BIH, MOVEMENT ON KOSOVO, ENGAGEMENT WITH SERBIA

REF: (A) BRUSSELS 3192 (B) BRUSSELS 3120

Classified By: POL Enlargement Unit Chief V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (B/
D).

SUMMARY
- - - -


1. (C) EU and member state officials told EUR/SCE Director
Chris Hoh, during the Oct. 24 U.S.-EU consultations on the W.
Balkans (COWEB) and in separate meetings in Brussels, that
they are reviewing the possible launch of an ESDP mission in
Kosovo before a UDI and that a "critical mass" of member
states will recognize Kosovo independence -- both of which
will be made easier for member states if the EU is consulted
closely on a timeline leading to a UDI. Several contacts
observed that Serbia may interrupt energy supplies to an
independent Kosovo and that Moscow and Belgrade will force
the closure of the OSCE mission there. EU interlocutors
expressed concern about Dodik's threats in BiH. While
stressing full support for HR Lajcak and the gradual
escalation of Bonn Power measures, a few interlocutors
questioned EU willingness to support very tough steps,
including ultimately removing Dodik. The Portuguese
Presidency confirmed that it will raise BiH during the
EU-Russia Summit Oct. 26. All stressed the need to
strengthen Serbia's European identity, predicted a quick
initialing of an SAA with Serbia absent a negative assessment
from Del Ponte following her upcoming Belgrade trip, and
pointed to visa facilitation as one of the EU's strongest
tools in strengthening EU-Serbia ties. Several contacts
expressed disappointment with the pace of reform in
Macedonia, with some characterizing the political class there
as "not mature." The Commission noted it would not recommend
a date in its Nov. 6 report for the beginning of formal
accession negotiations with Skopje. The EU views Montenegro
and Albania as success stories, although more needs to be
done in both countries on fighting corruption and organized
crime. Hoh also discussed Croatia, with the EU expecting a
heightened pace of reform after the elections; EU officials
also called for the continuation of the OSCE Mission in
Croatia. List of interlocutors in paras 22-23. END SUMMARY



KOSOVO
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2. (C) Council Secretariat Director for the W. Balkans
Stefan Lehne underscored EU support for the troika process
and for EU rep Ischinger's call to intensify the process.
According to Lehne, EU FMs have expressed four major goals
regarding Kosovo: (1) maintaining regional stability; (2)
strengthening EU engagement, including via an ESDP mission;
(3) resolving Kosovo while keeping Serbia on its European
track; and (4) maintaining EU unity. (He observed these
goals are not always easy to reconcile with each other.)
Lehne said there is little expectation that Kosovo Serbs will
participate in the November 17 elections. The EU has been
sending "clear messages" to Belgrade that any organization of
parallel elections by Kosovo Serbs would be a clear violation
of UNSCR 1244. Turning to the potential ESDP mission and the
ICO, Lehne noted that the EU had extended the mandates for
the preparatory teams for both through the end of March. The
EU, he emphasized, is "moving forward" on procurement and
force generation as part of "prudent planning," which does
not prejudge final status. While questions remain regarding
the legal basis, and the cooperation of the UNSYG will be
essential, there is a "strong will" in the EU to deploy the
missions.


3. (C) Portuguese Special Envoy for the W. Balkans Tanger,
however, told Hoh during a separate meeting that some EU
countries are "more hesitant" than a few months ago regarding
moving forward on Kosovo, largely because Kosovo will have
"huge consequences" for the region (Tanger specified Spain
"because of Basque calls for a referendum" and Hungary,
Romania, and Slovakia because of their large ethnic
minorities). Lehne stressed that the U.S. and the EU should
continue to pressure the Unity Team to remain united. Hoh
underscored U.S. support for the troika process, emphasized
the need for continued prudent planning, and noted the
December 10 deadline for the troika's report to the UNSYG.
Time, he noted, is not on the IC's side. Further delays
would lead to increased radicalization on both sides. Hoh
also stressed the need for the EU as an institution to meet
the challenge of Kosovo and help manage the situation on the
ground by solidifying and maintaining a resolute approach.


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4. (C) In a separate meeting, Lehne told us that the ESDP
Mission would "not be a problem," although much depends on
the UNSYG. The EU, he said, would be meeting in mid-November
with DPKO to discuss how best to proceed, including
identifying the legal basis for further action. According to
Lehne, UNSYG Ban had called Solana a few weeks earlier to
advise that his (Ban's) room for maneuver was narrowing.
Lehne said that, while the mission could "formally" report to
the UNSR, it could not operationally be under a UN chain of
command. The ICO, a "creature of the Ahtisaari concept,"
could be established, perhaps at the invitation of the UNSYG.
Lehne added that member state recognition of Kosovo would be
"more problematic." Hoh strongly advised that the EU find a
way to address these issues soon so that the IC can be ready
to provide the Kosovars a clear roadmap with "a light at the
end of the tunnel."


5. (C) Hoh reiterated U.S. support for the troika process in
an October 24 meeting with Portuguese PSC Ambassador Pais and
Slovenian PSC Ambassador Ipavic. Pais noted that EU troika
member Wolfgang Ischinger had briefed the PSC October 23.
According to Pais, Ischinger stressed that Kosovo, under
international administrative for almost 10 years following a
near genocide, is a unique case. Pais said the Portuguese
Presidency sees "a reason for optimism," and "a measure of
consensus" on the way forward, including the possible
launching of an ESDP mission before a UDI. The Presidency is
considering setting the stage for this at the November 19
GAERC, but could run into difficulties, given that the GAERC
comes before the troika report to the UNSYG. The EU
continues to review how 1244 could serve as the legal basis
for such a mission. Tanger asked for USG legal experts to
consult with the EU. Hoh indicated we are doing so with EU
members of the Contact Group and they should play the lead
role in consulting with the rest of the EU on these issues.
Pais said Portugal would try to send "strong signals" on
Kosovo via the "ESDP effort."


6. (C) Pais noted that a continued OSCE mission in Kosovo
could help support the rationale for "other organizations" to
establish missions there. In this regard, a "signal" from
the U.S. regarding the continuation of the OSCE Mission in
Kosovo would be helpful. Ipavic agreed that launching an
ESDP Mission before a UDI might be easier, but observed that
it might be misinterpreted by the region. Ipavic floated the
possibility of an ESDP Mission and "then, the Montenegro
scenario," whereby a referendum on independence would be held
"after a certain period." That said, she cautioned against
"falling into the trap" of continued calls from Serbia for
further delays. In any case, Slovenia is prepared to call a
special GAERC in January to discuss Kosovo and, presumably,
move forward on individual recognition. Hoh said that the
U.S. and EU should be prepared soon to provide the Kosovo
Albanians a clear roadmap and time-frame of anticipated
actions; he reiterated that the troika's report to the UNSYG
would conclude negotiations. Regarding OSCE, he agreed on
the mission's importance but noted that Russian signals were
not encouraging. We needed to be prepared that they and/or
Belgrade could force its shutdown, even though its presence
served to benefit Serb communities and in the past Milosevic
himself had not objected to a robust OSCE presence in Kosovo.


7. (C) Separately, Romanian PSC Ambassador Ardeleanu told
Hoh that the Serbs perceive that the dissolution of the
ex-Yugoslavia will not end with Kosovo, but will continue
with other parts of Serbia seeking independence, e.g.
Vojvodina and Sandzak. Ardeleanu said a "unilateral
solution" to Kosovo will not serve as a good example, even if
it is "not a precedent." (Carl Hallergard of Solana's
Private Office noted in a separate meeting that both Ukraine
and Georgia have expressed "complaints" to the EU regarding
how Russia will manipulate the Kosovo example. He added that
some non-permanent members of the UNSC also continue to have
reservations regarding Kosovo independence.) Ardeleanu
continued that "some sort of agreed solution" must be found.
In this vein, more pressure must be placed on the Kosovo
Albanians, he concluded. Hoh and the Italian and UK
representatives pushed back, noting that all are supporting
the troika process, but that chances of it resulting in a
negotiated solution remain slim. Hungarian PSC Ambassador
Kos stressed the need for incentives for Serbia, particularly
to help pro-democracy forces there offer the Serbian
population concrete and positive results of the Euro
integration process. Kos and the Italian representative
cautioned that the West could lose Serbia "for a number of
years" if the Radicals came to power as a result of Kosovo
independence. Kos also expressed concern about the potential
"disaster" of a refugee flow of Kosovo Serbs to Vojvodina
after final status.

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8. (C) During an October 24 meeting, ICR-designate Peter
Feith expressed concern over possible retaliatory measures
from Belgrade in light of final status, including power
supply cuts. Feith also noted the "build-up" of Serb parallel
structures in northern Kosovo. According to Feith, Ischinger
has suggested that UNMIK or the Contact Group should raise
this with Belgrade, given that it contradicts the spirit of
Belgrade's pledge not to engage in unhelpful rhetoric or
provocative actions during the troika process. Turning to
other concerns, Feith noted "some nervousness" among NATO
allies that some troop contributing countries will withdraw
forces from Kosovo. He also noted the possible closure of
the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (which Hallergard termed
"likely"),reasoning that even a several-month extension
would be better than immediate closure. Feith expressed
cautious optimism that the ESDP Mission would proceed and
that a critical mass of member states would recognize an
independent Kosovo, despite the fact that some countries,
"including Italy," are a bit shaky. Feith noted that more
discussion is needed with the UN over the ESDP Mission,
including the possible double and triple hatting of the EUSR.


SERBIA
- - -


9. (C) Tanger noted that Kostunica's continued manipulation
of the Kosovo issue for internal political reasons, as well
as news of ethnic clashes and disputes within the Serbian
Orthodox Church, are worrisome. Tanger urged that the IC
continue its contacts with Tadic and the armed forces, but
also increase its dialogue with Kostunica. Lehne stressed
that the EU is trying to keep Serbia's SAA process as
separate from the Kosovo issue as possible. Member states
would be as "forgiving as possible" regarding Serbian
behavior after final status, in the hope that Belgrade would
quickly emerge from its post-final status sulk. Separately,
Pais reported that Ischinger had told the PSC that "Serbia
wants to play the victim." Pais regretted that the EU has
few tools in addition to the SAA ("too little and too late"
in Pais' view) to help Serbia save face. Hoh agreed on the
need to keep Serbia's Euro-Atlantic vision in sight and urged
the EU to consider additional and creative ways to
demonstrate that a modern, multi-ethnic, and democratic
Serbia remains welcome in Europe, including the prospect of
fast-track membership along with clear redlines on matters of
principle like war crimes cooperation and regional stability.



10. (C) According to Mirel, if there is "good" cooperation
from Serbia with ICTY (still dependent, at least partially,
on an assessment from Del Ponte after her upcoming visit to
Belgrade),the Commission will initial an SAA with Belgrade
"within days." Slovenian MFA Director for the W. Balkans
Grobovsek strongly endorsed this approach to help "anchor"
Serbia to the West. The EU will then continue to discuss how
it will determine the parameters of "full cooperation" from
Serbia with ICTY, in the expectation of signing an SAA after
such cooperation has been achieved. A few member states,
such as Belgium and The Netherlands, reportedly continue to
insist that "full cooperation" means the arrest and transfer
of Mladic to The Hague. Hallergard observed that Belgium and
The Netherlands also want to demonstrate to their publics
that there are "no cheap tickets" regarding EU enlargement.
According to Mirel, most other member states support the
"Gotovina approach," whereby "full cooperation" translates
into actions that will lead to Mladic's arrest and transfer.



11. (C) During both the COWEB consultations and separate
meetings, EU officials pointed to visa facilitation beginning
in 2008 and the beginning of discussions on visa
liberalization as some of the EU's main tools in
demonstrating Brussels' commitment to Serbia's European
future. Hoh expressed concern over developments in Serbia
and stressed the need to continue to engage Belgrade,
including through strengthening civil society, public
outreach, and encouraging business ties and investment camp.
Hoh also noted Belgrade's unhelpful role in BiH, Montenegro,
and Macedonia. He stressed the need for Serbian cooperation
on suspected war criminals as well as U.S. support for the
EU's SAA process and urged the EU to review how it can
further tie Serbia to the West.

BiH
- -


12. (C) Hoh characterized Dodik's recent statements as

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serious and unprecedented challenges to the High Rep and his
use of Bonn Powers. The IC must stand firmly behind Dayton
implementation, including support for Lajcak, with
consequences for Dodik, Belgrade, and any other actors who
obstruct Dayton and jeopardize regional stability. Hoh asked
the Portuguese Presidency to raise the EU's deep concern on
these issues with Putin during the EU-Russia Summit October

26. Tanger said the Portuguese plan to do so. Mirel
acknowledged that, given the impasse over police reform (and
therefore the EU's inability to sign an SAA with Sarajevo),
the EU is "a bit lost" on how to influence BiH. All agreed
that the OHR should not be terminated next year if the
situation in BiH continues to deteriorate. Hoh did not
disagree but noted that such a decision need not be taken
until next year.


13. (C) Lehne noted that he had spoken with Lajcak just
before the COWEB began. Lajcak observed Dodik's Janus-faced
nature of Dodik -- reasonable in private yet confrontational
in public. Lajcak told Lehne that his October 28 meeting
with BiH political leaders might be an opportunity to deflate
the current crisis. Tanger stressed that the EU would
deliver a "strong message" on support for Dayton at the
October 30-31 PIC in Sarajevo. He cautioned that Lajcak may
face a "lose-lose" scenario if he imposes decisions which are
then unheeded on the ground. Speaking during a separate
meeting, Tanger voiced his opinion that the EU "won't go for
sanctions against democratically elected officials" in BiH.
Lehne, also in a private meeting, said he did not see an
alternative to Lajcak's strategy. The issue, Lehne stressed,
is escalation. He noted that it is "not totally clear" if
the IC is prepared to "go all the way" and remove Dodik as
well as Silajdzic. Hallergard, too, warned of the risk of
the IC's not being able to sustain announced actions. In any
case, Lehne added, the IC must help rebuild the authority of
the High Rep; otherwise, the situation in BiH will be even
worse later -- a sentiment echoed separately by Enlargement
Commissioner Rehn's advisor on BiH, Helene Holm-Pedersen.


MACEDONIA
- - - - -


14. (C) EU officials expressed disappointment with the pace
of reforms in Macedonia, with Hallergard characterizing
actions by various political actors in Macedonia as "a chain
of mistakes." Even the incoming Slovenian Presidency, which
called for "a conditional date for a date" to begin formal
accession negotiations with Skopje, lamented the "lack of a
political culture" there. That said, the Slovenes praised
Macedonia's role regarding Kosovo. Slovenian
head-of-delegation Grobovsek said Slovenia is encouraging
Skopje to be constructive, avoid provocations, and remain
attuned to Greek public opinion on the "name issue."


15. (C) Hoh noted that the pace of economic reform was well
ahead of that of political reform. Macedonia's weak efforts
to implement the May accord and its machinations over the
language law, minorities committee, and Judicial Council, as
well as the poor co-habitation between the president and the
prime minister, do not augur well. Hoh characterized U.S.-EU
cooperation on the ground as improved and suggested further
coordination, including on approaches to privatization.
Tanger observed that there is very little the EU can do
regarding Macedonia and ICTY. Separately, Ipavic admitted
that the EU "does not know how to push" Skopje forward, but
will continue to tell Macedonia that it must reach out to its
Albanian minority. Ipavic noted that Greece is indicating
that it may be "very difficult" and may block a NATO
invitation to Macedonia over the name issue. Hoh stressed
the need to keep the name issue on the Nimetz track and under
the radar screen, adding that no decision has yet been taken
on NATO invitations.

ALBANIA
- - - -


16. (C) Hoh highlighted Tirana's significant progress on
political and economic reforms as well as PM Berisha's
helpful role in the region, particularly on Kosovo.
Organized crime and corruption remain serious concerns, which
President Bush raised during his visit to Tirana earlier this
year. Mirel characterized Albania as "almost the only quiet"
country in the region. Mirel and the incoming Slovenian
presidency noted the "smooth" implementation of the December
2006 interim agreement and the positive presidential election
process. EU officials agreed that Tirana is playing s
helpful role in the region, particularly in urging Kosovo
officials to cooperate with the international community on

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final status. That said, Mirel observed that Tirana will need
to demonstrate a "track record," and continue to fight
corruption and organized crime. Likewise, Mirel added, it
will have to expand judicial reforms. The Slovenes called for
speedy ratification of by member states of the SAA, saying it
would serve as an incentive to the Albanians to implement
reforms fully.


MONTENEGRO
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17. (C) According to COWEB interlocutors, Montenegro, like
Albania, has made "very good" progress on reforms, allowing
the EU to sign an SAA with Tirana October 15. The broad
support in Montenegro, including support from minority and
opposition political parties, for the new constitution was a
further "positive sign" of its political maturity. Likewise,
its relationship with Serbia and its position on Kosovo are
welcome. As with Albania, Montenegro, too, has to expand its
anti-corruption and anti-crime measures. Grobovsek
characterized rumors that Montenegro wants to apply soon for
formal candidate status as reflecting too high expectations,
while Mirel termed the level of Russian investment in
Montenegro "worrying." Hoh agreed that Montenegro has made
tremendous strides and said that EU visa facilitation could
be one method of providing concrete rewards for political
maturity. He noted that the source of investment is not
worrisome in itself; rather, officials should concentrate on
ensuring that investment is clean and without political
conditions. Hoh added that Serbia's new dual citizenship law
was a source of concern and an issue to which the
international community should pay attention.

CROATIA
- - - -


18. (C) Hoh also consulted separately with EU, Portuguese,
and Slovenian officials on Croatia (as a candidate country
whose accession negotiations have begun, Croatia is not
included in COWEB). Commission Unit Head for Croatia David
Daly urged the U.S. to support the continuation of the OSCE
Mission there, largely to help monitor refugee returns and
restitution but also war crimes follow-up. He and others
argued that the Croats have fallen far short of their own
goals and continued international expertise and pressure are
necessary. This issue spills over into completing the
resettlement agenda in Bosnia and Serbia as well, Daly said.
Hoh noted the need for continued international implementation
throughout the country. Washington had concluded, however,
that continuing the full-fledged OSCE mission would be
overkill. Would not the EU accession process, he asked, be
the means to work this issue? Daly and others thought the EU
would not be able effectively to pursue the issue and argued
for some continued OSCE presence in Croatia. According to
the Slovenes, Croatia is playing a positive regional role,
although it still has "border issues" to resolve with its
four immediate neighbors. Our EU interlocutors noted that
they expected the pace of reform implementation in Croatia to
pick up after this year's elections.

OTHER ISSUES
- - - - - -


19. (SBU) Hoh raised with both Lehne and Mirel U.S.
objection to incorporation of former EUMM personnel into OHR
staff in Sarajevo. They indicated the numbers of affected
staff had been reduced and this arrangement was needed to
provide smaller EU governments with political reporting from
BiH. Hoh questioned why this task could not be addressed in
other ways. He noted that Washington had made clear its
concerns about the dual-hatting the EUSR and the High Rep and
the need to keep OHR staff focused on the immediate
priorities for Dayton implementation and BiH viability. With
PIC members paying the substantial support costs for EUSR
staff (and the U.S. paying close to one fourth of these
costs),OHR and the EU at least owed an explanation to the
PIC. (Hoh told Lehne privately that Lajcak had said he did
not request or want this staff, but Lehne said he had heard
the opposite from Lajcak.)


20. (C) Rehn advisor Holm-Pedersen, noting she was speaking
"informally," asked if the U.S. could provide the Commission
a briefing on our assessment of Serbia's cooperation with
ICTY. Hoh said we would consider this.


21. (U) In an aside, Pais noted the paucity of photographs
of the U.S.-EU-Russia Troika ambassadors all together. Such
photos, he said, are worth a thousand words in conveying the

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message of unity.

COWEB PARTICIPANTS
- - - - - - - - -


22. (U) The following participated in the U.S.-EU Troika
COWEB consultations in Brussels Oct. 24:

Portuguese Presidency:

Ambassador Antonio Tanger, Special Envoy for the W. Balkans
Jose Pedro Machado Vieira, Deputy Special Envoy for the W.
Balkans
Claudia Ribeiro, MFA
Alexandra Bilreiro, Portuguese Mission to the EU
Carolina Ramos da Costa, Portuguese Mission to the EU

Incoming Slovenian Presidency:

Ambassador Bojan Grobovsek, MFA Director for W. Balkans
Damijan Sedar, Slovenian Mission to the EU
Marko Makovec, Slovenian Mission to the EU

European Commission:

Pierre Mirel, DG Enlargement Director for the W. Balkans
Franz Cermak, DG Enlargement, Deputy Unit Chief for Policy
Coordination
Alenka Zajc Freudenstein, DG Relex, U.S. Desk

Council Secretariat:

Stefan Lehne, Director for W. Balkans
Johanna Stromquist, Serbia Desk Officer
Sabina Stadler, BiH Desk Officer
Anna-Maria Boura, Kosovo Desk Officer
Terkel Petersen, Albania and Macedonia Desk Officer
Lothar Jaschke, Kosovo Desk Officer

U.S.:

Christopher Hoh, EUR/SCE Director
Laurence Wohlers, USEU Polmincouns
Holly Schwendler, USEU PolMiloff
Vincent Carver, USEU Poloff

OTHER INTERLOCUTORS:
- - - - - - - - - -


23. (U) In addition to consulting with the EU Troika,
EUR/SCE Director Hoh had separate discussions with:

-- Stefan Lehne, Council Secretariat Director for W. Balkans

-- Carl Hallergard, Private Office of High Rep Solana

-- Pierre Mirel, Commission Director for W. Balkans

-- Helene Holm-Pedersen and Myrian Verger, Advisors to
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn

-- Portuguese PSC Ambassador Pais and Slovenian PSC
Ambassador Ipavic

-- Portuguese Special Envoy for the W. Balkans Tanger

-- Romanian PSC Ambassador Ardeleanu, Hungarian PSC
Ambassador Kos, Fabrizio Di Michele, Italian Mission, and
Lance Damm, UK Mission

-- Peter Feith, ICR-designate

-- Joao Pedro Antunes, Portuguese MFA Enlargement; Alenka
Jerak, Slovenian MFA European Affairs; Gabriele Scaramucci,
Council Secretariat Enlargement; and David Daly, Commission
Enlargement Unit Chief for Croatia


24. (U) EUR/SCE Director Hoh has cleared this message.
GRAY

.