THE EU AND CENTRAL ASIA: PREPARING FOR THE COEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003195

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, EUR/ERA, USAID FOR EE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: EAID EU PGOV PREL UZ XG ZK
SUBJECT: THE EU AND CENTRAL ASIA: PREPARING FOR THE COEST
TROIKA

REF: BRUSSELS 2402

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Classified By: Political Officer Marisa Plowden for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Since the EU formally adopted a new strategy
for Central Asia in June, it has been working to increase
Member State focus on the region and generate interest in the
implementation of the strategy. EU priorities in Central
Asia include energy, demarcation and respect for borders, and
promotion of democracy and human rights. According to our
contacts, the Central Asians place water management and
education on the top of their agenda with the EU. The
October 29 U.S.-EU COEST troika on Central Asia will provide
an opportunity for us to discuss these questions with an aim
of focusing the EU on our priorities in the region. End
Summary.

EU STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL ASIA
--------------


2. (U) The EU strategy for a new partnership with Central
Asia, adopted by the European Council in June, serves as an
overall framework for EU relations with Central Asia,
including in human rights, rule of law, good governance and
democracy, education, economic development, trade and
investment, energy and transport, environmental policies,
migration, and inter-cultural dialogue. While the strategy
defines the EU's priorities for its cooperation with the
region as a whole, implementation will be tailored to the
specific requirements and performance of each Central Asian
country. Since the strategy was adopted, EU institutions and
Member States have begun to identify priority areas for its
implementation. At the same time, senior EU officials have
been discussing the strategy with their Central Asian
counterparts, including during a visit by High Representative
Javier Solana to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan
October 8-10. (A link to the strategy can be found at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu.)

EU PRIORITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA
--------------


3. (C) When asked the EU's top five priorities for increasing
engagement in Central Asia, Council Secretariat contacts
named: energy; borders; environment; rule of law -- including
democratic standards and human rights; and economic
cooperation and good governance. (Note: while education is
an important area for the EU, contacts said there were
already a number of existing programs in education so it was
more a matter of utilizing those rather than increasing
activity, as they want to do in the five priority areas.)

WHAT THE CENTRAL ASIANS WANT FROM THE EU
--------------


4. (C) In EU discussions with Central Asian countries, the
Central Asians prioritized water management and education
above all else, according to Council Secretariat contacts.

REGIONAL LINKAGES
--------------


5. (C) The EU strategy for Central Asia states that a
regional approach is suitable for tackling common regional
challenges such as organized crime, human, drugs and arms
trafficking, terrorism and non-proliferation issues,
inter-cultural dialogue, energy, environmental pollution,
water management, migration as well as border management and
transport infrastructure. Council Secretariat contacts have
also told us that there is increasing awareness in the EU of
the importance of linkages between the five Central Asian
countries and Afghanistan. In fact, the Council Secretariat
uses Afghanistan as a way to convince Member States of the
importance of greater engagement in Central Asia, noting that
positive developments in Central Asia will help improve the
situation in Afghanistan.


6. (C) While the EU Strategy does not explicitly address
cooperation with third countries, it does state the EU's
intention to cooperate with international financial

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institutions and multilateral and regional organizations and
institutions. During our consultations on OSCE issues with
the EU in June 2007 (reftel) we had an unsatisfying
conversation with the EU regarding the OSCE role in the
region. The EU implied that it wished to keep more high
profile activities in Central Asia for itself, essentially
leaving the "crumbs" for the OSCE to pick up. .

WHERE THE USG FITS IN - MIXED VIEWS IN BRUSSELS
-------------- --


7. (C) EU Special Representative for Central Asia Pierre
Morel meets regularly with U.S. officials and appears
genuinely open to extensive cooperation with the United
States on Central Asia. Working-level Council Secretariat
contacts also see a variety of areas where the U.S. and the
EU could improve or increase cooperation in the region,
including border security and water management. In the
third-country vein, the Germans reportedly have already
discussed cooperation on water management with the Japanese
at senior levels. Contacts also see room for more
cooperation in the areas of education and economic
cooperation and good governance -- i.e. standards, practices,
regulations, administration, human rights, and fundamental
freedoms. A Council Secretariat source did not discount the
possibility of further cooperation on energy. (Note: this
COEST troika will not be the right forum for discussing
energy cooperation in depth, as the key EU players on that
issue will not likely be present at the meeting. We may,
however, want to consider increasing our focus on this topic
in future COEST troika sessions.)


8. (C) Based on conversations with several regional experts
in the European Commission's External Relations Directorate
General (RELEX),there are varying degrees of enthusiasm in
the Commission for cooperating with the United States in the
region. Some are skeptical and wary, while others see the
value of increased cooperation. The recent backtracking by
the European Commission on its initial support for
cooperating with us under the Asian Development Bank's CAREC
plus 3 initiative is illustrative of this ambivalence.


9. (C) Commission contacts directly involved in the CAREC
plus 3 discussions asked that the USG not interpret their
response to our proposed CAREC plus 3 joint demarche as a
signal that they did not want to cooperate, but rather that
they simply needed to discuss the matter internally further,
especially as it involved agreeing to a formal joint
demarche. However, the same contacts acknowledged that in
some areas the EU may generally be reluctant to cooperate
visibly with the U.S. due to their concern about how Russia
might respond to a perceived "western bloc" in the region.
They noted that the EU has worked hard to make the Russians
comfortable with the EU Central Asia strategy, and they want
to keep it that way. With this in mind, Commission contacts
suggested that in some areas, they might be more comfortable
with more informal, low-profile cooperation with the United
States, such as supporting events that one another organize
in the region and sharing demarche points on human rights.


10. (C) One Commission official not directly involved in the
CAREC plus 3 discussions noted that the Council Secretariat,
rather than the Commission, had been the main actor during
the lead-up to adoption of the Central Asian strategy. The
Germans -- in the EU presidency at the time -- had also
played an unusually large role, with a lot of the discussions
occurring in Berlin. Consequently, it was possible the
Commission had not yet gotten its own house in order.
Continuing internal deliberations over the new strategy were
making it difficult to move to a stage where the institution
could coordinate with third parties. The same contact, on
the other hand, warned that some in the EU may feel
competitive with the United States and want to safeguard its
own strategy. Finally, still other Commission contacts noted
that within RELEX, there continues to exist among some a
general anti-U.S. bias and a preference for going it alone.

GRAY
.