Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS3192
2007-10-19 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

EU AND W. BALKANS: CARROTS NOT ALWAYS EFFECTIVE;

Tags:  PREL EAID ZL EUN 
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VZCZCXRO4210
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3192/01 2921235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191235Z OCT 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003192 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

ALSO FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, EUR/ACE
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: EU AND W. BALKANS: CARROTS NOT ALWAYS EFFECTIVE;
STICKS LARGELY UNUSED

REF: BRUSSELS 3120

Classified By: Acting POL Chief Vincent Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d).

Summary
- - - - -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003192

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

ALSO FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, EUR/ACE
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: EU AND W. BALKANS: CARROTS NOT ALWAYS EFFECTIVE;
STICKS LARGELY UNUSED

REF: BRUSSELS 3120

Classified By: Acting POL Chief Vincent Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d).

Summary
- - - - -


1. (C/NF) The EU has repeatedly reaffirmed the "European
vocation" of the countries in the Western Balkans. It is
committed to membership for all countries in the region and
the Commission plans to contribute almost USD two billion
over 2007-09 to help prepare them for eventual membership.
While the W. Balkans will be one of the upcoming Slovenian
Presidency's priorities, we are not sanguine that it will
have great achievements in the region -- much like the
Austrian Presidency (2006),other than to secure an ESDP
mission in Kosovo. The EU has little strategy on containing
fallout from Kosovo final status in Serbia. On BiH, the EU
is realizing that it may have to play harder ball given that
the promise of a Stabilization and Association (SAA)
Agreement has not produced police reform there.
Decision-makers in London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin likely
will continue to have more influence over events in the
region than those in Lisbon and Ljubljana. Enlargement
Commissioner Rehn will continue strongly to support the
accession process for the region, with HR Solana helping
channel member state thinking on Serbia, BiH, and Kosovo.
(Reftel addressed the EU and Kosovo; EU relations with
Croatia are not handled by EU officials covering the W.
Balkans.) End Summary

Slovenian Mission: W. Balkans a Top Priority
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2. (C/NF) Both the Slovenian Mission's W. Balkans expert and
the Slovenian serving as BiH desk officer in the Council
Secretariat (who will serve as the Slovenian Presidency's

SIPDIS
coordinator with the Council Secretariat) told us recently
that the W. Balkans will be one of the top priorities of the
Slovenian Presidency. Given the pace of events, maintaining
EU unity over post-status Kosovo is of paramount importance,
both stressed. Launching an ESDP mission in Kosovo, even
without a new UNSCR (both said neither the U.S.-EU-Russia

Troika nor the UNSC would produce a last-minute negotiated
settlement) will be "messy" given some member states'
questions over legal interpretations of a mandate.
Nevertheless, a mission "almost certainly" will be launched,
in part because member states recognize that the EU's
credibility will be damaged absent such a mission.

A Priority, but Little Strategy
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3. (C/NF) Asked about Slovenia's and the EU's strategy for
strengthening Serbia's and BiH's ties to the EU, the
Slovenian Mission rep noted that the EU's leverage is not
terribly strong. The Commission will continue its plans to
support the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) in both
countries (contributing approximately USD 800 million in
Serbia and USD 316 million in BiH from 2007 to 09).
According to our contact, while Slovenia (reportedly
supported by Austria, Italy, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, and Greece) would like
the EU to take a more "flexible" approach on police reform in
BiH and on ICTY conditionality in Serbia in order to proceed
with the SAA processes in both countries, other member
states, particularly Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg, oppose any loosening of EU conditionality. The
UK and France, previously supporters of strict conditionality
are softening somewhat, our contact added. He stressed that
the Presidency, as honest broker, will have to try to find
common ground between the hard-line camp and those wanting to
ease the SAA process for Belgrade and Sarajevo.


4. (C/NF) The Slovenian Council Secretariat contact had a
different perspective. In her view, the EU has stressed
publicly and at length the links between police reform in BiH
and full Serbian cooperation with ICTY with signing an SAA.
For the EU to weaken these links now for an "immediate goal"
would undermine the EU's credibility with both countries over
the long term, she reasoned.

Serbia: How to contain Fallout from Kosovo
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5. (C/NF) While officially the accession process for Serbia
is not related to Kosovo, many contacts have privately
confirmed that several member states will block progress if

BRUSSELS 00003192 002 OF 003


Serbia acts "aggressively" on post-status Kosovo. All
predict that Belgrade will protest vociferously after status
is finalized. Our contacts are divided over what, if any,
concrete actions Belgrade will take.


6. (C/NF) A few predict that Belgrade will interrupt energy
supplies. Others note that the Serbian Radical Party and
hard-liners within the military will support paramilitary
activity in northern Kosovo. A plurality, however, believe
Serbia will neither take nor tolerate any such action, and
therefore the accession process can continue.


7. (C/NF) Asked how ICTY cooperation factors into the
equation, one contact noted that the Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia is ready to be
initialed and could even be signed in 2007 if Belgrade
demonstrated significant progress leading to the arrest of
Mladic. Even without this, however, the EU believes
Belgrade will continue to promulgate legislation and
implement reforms as outlined in the SAA, so as not to lose
too much time in the process and with the hope that Mladic
eventually will be seized and an SAA will be signed.

Bosnia-and-Herzegovina: How could they refuse Police Reform?
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8. (C/NF) Many EU and member state officials seemed actually
shocked that the Bosniak and Republika Srpska leadership
continued to block police reform despite HR/EUSR Lajcak's
last-ditch efforts in late September. One Council
Secretariat official working on BiH told us recently that the

SIPDIS
Commission and several member state officials believed the
BiH leaders would compromise at the last moment, given the
tremendous importance of signing an SAA with the EU. The
fact that this "carrot" did not bend the BiH leaders'
political will should serve as a wake-up call, particularly
to the Commission, on the tough nature of Balkan politicians
and their unwillingness to be kowtowed by EU bureaucrats.


9. (C/NF) All of our contacts noted that the Commission is
extremely hesitant to use its funding (consolidated in the
"Instrument for Pre-Accession" -- IPA, begun this year) for
strictly political ends. Rather, the IPA's raison d'etre is
to promote infrastructure projects, enhance a country's
administrative capacity through training and exchanges, and
support freer markets, not to pressure officials in the
region to accept EU political views. Asked about possible
visa restrictions on intransigent BiH officials, one Council
Secretariat contact told us that the EU has not yet

SIPDIS
considered this option, with some member states likely to
oppose its use based on "intransigence" rather than human
rights abuses or criminal activity. HR Solana, she noted,
has only in the last few weeks devoted attention to BiH. His
office reportedly has increased the demand for briefing
papers on BiH dramatically as a result.

Macedonia: Not Going Well
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10. (C/NF) The Slovenian Mission has told us that the
lackluster pace of reforms and continued problems in
genuinely integrating the ethnic Albanian parties into
collaborative decision-making on the national level combine
to make Macedonia a problem case for the EU -- officially it
is a candidate country, but without a date for accession
negotiations to begin. Several of our contacts told us
earlier this year that the EU might give Macedonia a date in
2008 to begin negotiations. Our contacts are less optimistic
lately. They do not rule out giving a date next year, but
stress that Macedonia must "get its act together" and
demonstrate greater political maturity to overcome resistance
from some member states. Macedonia's position on Kosovo has
helped in this regard, but, in the view of one Council
Secretariat official, Skopje's "provocations" of Greece are

SIPDIS
not helping its case. None of our contacts would reveal
where Greece is coming down on granting a date for accession
negotiations with Skopje, with all saying "officially" that
NATO deliberations over a potential membership invitation are
not affecting EU discussions.

Albania: Making slow but steady Progress
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11. (C/NF) The EU appears satisfied and even a bit surprised
that Albania's accession process is moving forward, albeit
slowly. The EU remains concerned about crime, corruption,
and administrative capacity in Albania, but sees recent
elections there as a sign that the country is slowly moving

BRUSSELS 00003192 003 OF 003


in the right direction.


Montenegro: A Relative Success Story
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12. (C/NF) Given its smaller size and relatively good
economic policies, Montenegro may advance more quickly in
implementing its SAA commitments, according to a Commission
contact. Its use of the Euro must be addressed (but one
contact predicted that the EU ultimately will not force
Montenegro to adopt a new currency),and as with Albania, the
EU has serious concerns about organized crime. Several
contacts voiced the hope that Montenegro's expected progress
with its SAA would "shame" BiH and Serbia to overcome its
problems and allow their respective SAAs to be signed.

The Broader EU Context
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13. (C/NF) The EU has a less than stellar record in
leveraging the "carrot" of membership to obtain concrete
political results in the region. Brussels generally remains
loathe to use "sticks" to promote immediate goals in the
region. Rather, the EU, particularly the Commission, views
the accession process as a necessarily multi-year endeavor in
building a strong foundation for these countries' "European
identity." Increased skepticism among the European public
regarding enlargement -- "enlargement fatigue" -- and the
general consensus in Brussels that Romania and Bulgaria were
not ready for accession in 2007, are contributing to a
stricter interpretation by the Commission of implementation
of SAA commitments. Two of Enlargement Commissioner Rehn's
advisors have told us that the EU wants to address problem
areas in candidate and aspirant countries earlier, rather
than later, to avoid having to take the largely political
decision to admit not-quite-ready candidates, as was the case
with Romania and Bulgaria.

Comment
- - - -


14. (C/NF) The last stage of the Portuguese Presidency and
the first few months of the Slovenian Presidency will be full
of challenges: maintaining EU unity on Kosovo while securing
agreement to launch the ESDP Mission, offering support to
HR/EUSR Lajcak in BiH while maintaining some level of "local
ownership" in BiH, containing damage to the EU's relationship
with Serbia in light of final status for Kosovo while keeping
the pressure on Belgrade to deliver Mladic to The Hague,
prodding the Macedonian leadership to make and implement
genuine political reforms, and maintaining credibility with
the European public for enlargement in general.


15. (C/NF) From what we have seen, the EU, the Portuguese
Presidency, and the incoming Slovenian Presidency have little
in the way of a coherent strategy to address these issues,
other than to reiterate the "European vocation" of the
countries of the region. Visa facilitation and IPA
assistance are not enough to ensure that the region continues
on its European path. The key to taking critical decisions
regarding the Western Balkans remains in key member state
capitals, not Brussels. Rehn will remain a strong champion
of membership for the countries in the region; Solana is the
official, however, who can help move member states on
critical issues, such as the ESDP mission in Kosovo and
confronting obstructionists in BiH. If the draft EU Reform
Treaty is ratified, the High Rep position will be even more
capable of moving the EU in the right direction in the
region, given the marriage of his responsibilities with
Commission financial resources.
GRAY
.