Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS3128
2007-10-12 12:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

DEA ADMINISTRATOR DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN DRUG

Tags:  KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8295
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #3128/01 2851233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121233Z OCT 07 ZDK
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 003128 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEA HQS FOR A, AD, OC, OE, SOD (MALTZ, CRAINE);
STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/PC, EUR/ERA, L/LEI;
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS,
DIR ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SUPPLY REDUCTION;
ROME FOR DEA (BENSEN);
KABUL FOR DCM, DEA (BALBO),POL, NAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017
TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU
SUBJECT: DEA ADMINISTRATOR DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN DRUG
SITUATION WITH EUROPEAN UNION OFFICIALS

Classified By: COUNSELOR FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS
IN SECTIONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 003128

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEA HQS FOR A, AD, OC, OE, SOD (MALTZ, CRAINE);
STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/PC, EUR/ERA, L/LEI;
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS,
DIR ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SUPPLY REDUCTION;
ROME FOR DEA (BENSEN);
KABUL FOR DCM, DEA (BALBO),POL, NAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2017
TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU
SUBJECT: DEA ADMINISTRATOR DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN DRUG
SITUATION WITH EUROPEAN UNION OFFICIALS

Classified By: COUNSELOR FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS
IN SECTIONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator
Karen Tandy discussed the drug situation in Afghanistan with
Commission, Council Secretariat, and Political and Security
Committee (PSC) Ambassadors during her September 30 to
October 2 visit to Brussels. She emphasized close links
between drug traffickers and insurgents and provided details
on USG efforts to promote Afghanistan capabilities in
investigating and prosecuting drug traffickers. She and her
U.S. colleagues encouraged EU policy makers to expand police
training and mentoring in Afghanistan, particularly in the
provinces. EU colleagues showed considerable interest in
these developments. The EU Police Training Advisor committed
to deploy qualified police trainers to provinces once
officials resolve "challenges" related to their basing and
support at Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) locations.
END SUMMARY.

PROGRESS ON COUNTER-DRUG INVESTIGATIONS
--------------


2. (C) At a breakfast meeting hosted by the Ambassador
October 2 in her honor, the DEA Administrator briefed EU
officials on DEA counter-drug efforts in Afghanistan. EU
officials included a broad mix of Commission and Council
$ecretariat policy makers and program officers involved with
drug issues, police training, and transatlantic relations.
Attendees from the Commission included Director for Asia
James Moran, Deputy Head of Unit for Drugs Coordination
Franciso Bataller Martin, Policy Officer Caroline Hager, and
Afghanistan International Relations Officer Paul Turner,
while participants from the Council Secretariat included Head

of Police Unit Stefan Feller, Principal Administrator for
Justice and Home Affairs Wouter van de Rijt, Administrator
for Transatlantic Relations Dr. Christiane Hoehn, and
Political Advisor Olivia Holdsworth. (Separately,
Administrator Tandy had met with PSC Ambassadors from six
Member States -- the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Romania,
Lithuania, and Estonia. Please see paragraph 19.) Tandy,
who had just returned from her fourth or fifth trip to
Afghanistan during her four-year tenure as Administrator,
said she sensed great progress in certain sectors, while, at
the same time, witnessing greater challenges. During the
past two years, Afghanistan had approved and signed into law
counter-drug legislation and established a counter-narcotics
tribunal. As recently as 2004, the country had no real
courts or jails, and suffered from thoroughly corrupt law
enforcement entities. The Central Narcotics Tribunal,
Criminal Justice Task Force, and associated judges,
prosecutors, and investigators, represented a real "enclave"
of justice practitioners in the country, with vetted
personnel who could issue search and arrest warrants and
remain shielded from retaliation by traffickers. That
Afghanistan could replicate a justice system in this
specialized sector in such a short span was "nothing short of
amazing." To date, officials had prosecuted over 1,700 drug
traffickers, achieving a conviction rate of 90 percent. The
Task Force had suffered no losses, which represented "no
small feat" as well.

DEA SERVING AS MENTORS AND "ENABLERS"
--------------


3. (C) The Administrator explained that the DEA presence had
grown from virtually no permanent presence in 2003 to some 25
personnel, including permanently-assigned and temporary-duty
personnel, today. DEA agents worked closely with Afghan
counterparts in National Interdiction Units (NIUs) as
on-the-job mentors and "enablers." DEA trained Afghan police
in two broad bands involving investigations and enforcement
operations. To date, some 40 operations have taken place.

BRUSSELS 00003128 002 OF 007


These extremely successful operations have witnessed, in
addition to seizures primarily of drugs, such as opium and
heroin, seizures of heavy munitions, sophisticated
surface-to-air missiles. rocket propelled grenades, other
types of weaponry, and even army uniforms, in addition to the
drugs. Through use of human intelligence sources throughout
the country and tribes, and signals intelligence, DEA
officials have become convinced that "no daylight" exists
between drug traffickers at the highest level and Taliban
insurgents. In many cases, they are the same persons. More
than ever, DEA has aligned its intelligence and coordinated
operations with International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
through the embedding of DEA agents with military units
around the country. Currently, the highest-value
traffickers, burgeoning opium crops, and the Taliban are
concentrated in the south. "They are together."

STRONG LINKS BETWEEN TRAFFICKERS AND INSURGENTS
-------------- --


4. (C) Tandy cited an instance in which an informant with a
hidden microphone recorded the conversations of nine Taliban
members and eleven drug traffickers during a meeting at a
bazaar in Nangarhar. According to the resulting transcript,
participants discussed "jihad," movement of insurgents to
Pakistan for training, military operations, and division of
their collective responsibilities for providing funds to
support "jihad" activities. They even discussed how much to
pay a corrupt employee at Jalilabad Air Base who reported on
movements of military helicopters. The meeting basically
involved a "fund-raising dinner." Various items seized
during drug raids provided further evidence of this
inter-connection between drug traffickers and insurgents.
After a British Task Force raided a drug lab, DEA agents
exploited materials found at the site, which included a
Taliban Training Manual. The manual contained crude diagrams
of military convoys and instructions on which parts of the
convoys to attack for maximum impact. It also contained tips
on how to build suicide bomber vests to take out more lives.



5. (C) Administrator Tandy suggested that the best way
forward in Afghanistan involved targeting the highest value
drug traffickers and their enterprises. After all, they are
the ones who promote the cultivation of opium poppy and
provide funding for Taliban activities. They are becoming
Taliban themselves and fomenting official corruption. Tandy
related that she had met recently with a district government
official in a village in Helmand that formerly was a ghost
town with empty market places. Now, the town has transformed
into a vibrant village with markets full of people. The
official advised that ridding the town of drug traffickers
would help the situation greatly. Many "fence sitters" in
town were still deciding whether to support legitimate
authorities or the insurgency. Those who saw traffickers
operating with impunity would more likely support the
Taliban. Tandy argued that taking out major drug traffickers
benefited the military. Indeed, on 19 different occasions,
intelligence stemming from counter-drug investigations led to
the thwarting of attacks using remotely-propelled grenades or
improvised explosive devices. Arresting corrupt officials
also removed individuals who posed problems to the military,
even though they did not constitute traditional military
targets. In one instance seven months ago, a visiting Afghan
NIU arrested two officials linked with the Taliban in Kunduz
Province and whisked them away to Kabul via MI-17 helicopter.
Notably, these corrupt officials remained in jail.
.
LESS PROGRESS IN PAKISTAN
--------------


6. (C) Tandy noted less progress in neighboring Pakistan,
which she had also visited during this most recent trip.
Pakistani police did not conduct counter-drug operations in
meaningful numbers, even though the DEA had worked to
establish vetted units there. DEA personnel had hoped that
frontier guards on both sides of the border would share

BRUSSELS 00003128 003 OF 007


intelligence, but they had seen little evidence of
constructive relationships. When she and Ambassador Gray had
visited the border region a year earlier, Tandy noted that
President Karzai had enthusiastically supported this
initiative on cross-border cooperation, but for different
reasons than U.S. officials; Karzai, she said, remained
convinced that the pilot project would demonstrate Pakistani
failure to cooperate.

INCENTIVES TO FARMERS
--------------


7. (C) Moran expressed appreciation for the briefing, which
demonstrated progress on interdiction and arrests of
traffickers in Afghanistan. He inquired whether incentives
for farmers to grow legitimate alternative crops appeared to
be working. According to the report recently released by the
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC),only one
out of ten farmers in the country cultivated opium poppy. He
asked how authorities were doing in "winning the hearts and
minds" of Afghan citizens? The Ambassador questioned whether
the UNODC figure applied specifically to farmers in Hemand,
who grew the bulk of the world's opium oppy. Assistant
Regional Director Balbo observed that statistics could be
used to support both sides of an argument. Nonetheless, he
suggested that the best way to win Afghan "hears and minds"
would be to conduct enforcement operations and promote the
rule of law. DEA personnel regularly participate in meetings
with colleagues directing assistance programs. He understood
that a recent agricultural fair in Helmand attracted some
3,000 persons, who appeared interested in growing legitimate
crops. That said, he predicted that promoting the rule of
law and central government involvement in local communities
would ultimately reduce the amount of opium poppy under
cultivation.

NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE INSTITUTIONS
--------------


8. (C) Feller noted his previous experience with police
training in Bosnia and Kosovo. While noting that it was
risky to compare experiences in different countries, he
suggested that establishing sustainable police and criminal
justice systems would be the key to success. He understood
that Afghan farmers consistently asked for enforcement
operations against drug traffickers and cultivators of
illicit crops. For such actions to succeed, institutions
needed to be credible. He inquired about President Karzai's
recent direct talks with the Taliban, reportedly to encourage
them to incorporate themselves into the political process.
Administrator Tandy cautioned about difficulties in achieving
progress in Helmand Province, which remained an enclave for
the Taliban. While she noted that Karzai, as President of a
sovereign country, had the right to initiate discussions with
the Taliban, he needed to exercise caution. U.S. officials
would be interested in being consulted about the content of
such discussions, but Karzai had revealed details only to his
closest circle of advisors. What was most disturbing was
that the Taliban representatives meeting with Karzai were the
same ones who fired weapons at allied forces and who used
proceeds from opium cultivation to construct a hospital to
treat wounded Taliban insurgents. DEA colleagues in Colombia
had witnessed a similar situation, when some of the AUC
members who negotiated with the Colombian Government and
received benefits from their supposed demobilization
continued to grow illicit drug crops and engage in violent
attacks.

INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER CRIMINAL GROUPS
--------------


9. (C) Turner observed that 80 to 90 percent of Afghan
citizens remained opposed to any return of the Taliban to
positions of authority. He inquired whether "ordinary"
criminal elements, in addition to the Taliban, remained
involved in drug trafficking activities. Balbo replied
affirmatively, noting their corrupting influence. Most
citizens wanted to engage in licit livelihoods and wanted

BRUSSELS 00003128 004 OF 007


those who broke the laws to be held accountable for their
actions. That said, most people also distrusted Afghan
police personnel, whom they perceived as corrupt,
particularly within the Ministry of Interior. Training of
young police recruits, including training provided by the EU,
would help to reverse this perception over time.
Unfortunately, most police in Afghanistan remained
out-gunned, out-manned, and ill-equipped. Village elders
often expressed appreciation for visits by NIU police and DEA
mentors to their areas and asked for them to return again to
arrest traffickers. The Good Performers Fund also can
benefit those who have refrained from cultivating drug crops.
Nonetheless, the central government often lacked the
ability to reach out to local officials and assist them. In
many jurisdictions, Afghans perceived the central government
as a "mirage."

ROLE OF COERCION IN CULTIVATION
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador noted the role of coercion, with drug
traffickers and the Taliban employing blackmail and threats
to family members of farmers. He had heard during his visit
last year to Afghanistan that "the Taliban leads people to
poppies" and not the other way around with poppies leading
people to the Taliban. Balbo observed that traffickers often
loaned money to farmers at the start of the growing season
and expected farmers to repay such loans with opium poppy.
The farmers used such loans to repair their houses, dig
wells, and grow poppies. The Ambassador added that the
Afghan police need to be at the "front lines" to prevent such
coercion. Feller agreed with the need to prevent the Taliban
from employing blackmail. He noted the need for a "joint
strategy" on police training, given the finite numbers of EU
police officers that can conduct such training in
Afghanistan. Their role is important to help provide
visibility as the "face of the criminal justice system." He
said the EU would deploy qualified police personnel outside
Kabul "as soon as we overcome challenges" to their use at PRT
locations. Moran agreed, noting that "rapid deployment" had
become the EU's mantra on such operations.

RATIONALIZING SALARIES OF JUDGES AND POLICE
--------------


11. (C) Moran inquired about the payment of police salaries.
He understood that payments had been made to some 60,000
individuals, not all of whom engaged in actual police work.
Tandy agreed that officials at the Ministry of Interior had
engaged in both ineptitude and corruption on payment of
salaries. She lamented that, in some instances, six months
elapsed before vetted police officers received their pay.
She asked rhetorically how such personnel could be expected
to remain honest without receiving their pay checks for six
months. Turner noted that both the U.S. and the EU had
contributed to the fund for paying the salaries of police.
As a complement to work that the Italian Government has done
with the judiciary, the EU wanted to examine pay and grading
of positions for judges and prosecutions, with incumbents
expected to re-apply for their positions based on merit.
Currently, judges received as little as the equivalent of 50
dollars monthly.

POPPY-FREE PROVINCES
--------------


12. Turner observed that the UNODC report described thirteen
provinces as free of poppy cultivation. Yet, the report also
noted the existence of other drug trafficking activities in
such provinces. Balbo acknowledged that there were "lots of
carrots but not enough sticks." He described the governors
as astute and aware of precisely what the provinces needed to
do to attract funding. That said, beneficiaries sometimes
abused these privileges.

ARRESTS OF HIGH-VALUE TRAFFICKERS
--------------
.

BRUSSELS 00003128 005 OF 007



13.(C) Bataller expressed appreciation for the briefing,
including specifics on the links between traffickers and
insurgents. He agree with the approach of arresting
high-value traffickers as part of the way forward in
Afghanistan. He inquired how many high value traffickers had
been included among the 1,700 individuals arrested. He
commended the presentation but noted that its optimism tended
to "fly in the face of" overall pessimism from the growth of
opium cultivation. Tandy responded that authorities had
arrested a number of high value traffickers but did not know
the precise number, which would represent a fraction of the
overall arrests. The U.S. Government had requested the
extradition or surrender of several high-value traffickers,
who subsequently underwent prosecution in the States. The
central Tribunal in Kabul handled additional high-value
traffickers as well, perhaps numbering a dozen overall.
Nonetheless, other high-value traffickers continued to
operate in Afghanistan, including the largest processor of
heroin who continues to function with impunity in a "safe
zone" in southern Helmand Province. Balbo noted that DEA
personnel were working with ISAF and PRT colleagues to
identify additional high-value traffickers to target as part
of the process of promoting stability in the regions.

ROOTING OUT CORRUPTION
--------------


14. (C) Balbo said authorities had arrested several corrupt
police chiefs involved in drug trafficking, with such arrests
designed to serve as deterrents to other officials. Tandy
cited the arrest of an assistant to the Deputy Minister of
Interior. This person remained under intense pressure to
reveal information about corrupt activities. To date, the
investigation continues. The Ambassador noted corruption as
a major problem in the Ministry of Interior. During his
visit to Afghanistan, one interlocutor had pointed out to him
several other officials in the same room that he knew to be
corrupt. Balbo emphasized the importance of using vetted
units to go after corruption and drug traffickers. To their
credit, members of such units have conducted many
investigations, including use of video and audio tapes, and
were attempting to make timely arrests. Feller reiterated
that the key involved "system change," During his time in
Kosovo, he had identified a senior police advisor as corrupt,
when he failed a polygraph examination. He had to sideline
this advisor to make room for younger, more honest recruits.
The international community needed to invest in the
development of young police investigators as part of their
focus on long-term results.

"MAINSTREAMING" COUNTER-DRUG WORK
--------------


15. (C) Noting liks by drug trafficking with other types of
serous crimes, Holdsworth inquired whether officials would
allow counter-narcotics police wor to become part of the
"mainstream" of police activities in Afghanistan. She also
asked what risk existed that personnel in the specialized
counter-drug units would become overburdened in their work.
Tandy responded that DEA did not have a time-table to
complete police training and permit autonomous operations.
Skills taught to the counter-drug police would be applicable
and useful for investigating other types of crimes as well.
DEA and Afghan colleagues continued to work hard in
developing counter-drug capabilities and in targeting drug
traffickers. They had not reached the saturation point, but
she would welcome when that day actually arrived. Balbo
added that the judiciary remained a critical piece as well.
Authorities needed to establish courts in the provinces and
to improve the pay of judges, who often received less than
army officers did. Dr. Hoehn inquired about the
applicability of investigative capabilities to other crimes.
Tandy replied that DEA trained the counter-drug police
initially in basic investigations, such a vehicle stops, and
gradually incorporated more advanced techniques, such as
developing sources, doing briefings, and conducting more
complex investigations. Balbo noted that such trained

BRUSSELS 00003128 006 OF 007


counter-drug police represented a "beach head" in the Afghan
police sector. Obviously, more trainers and training would
be needed. Tandy added that providing extensive mentoring
remained a critical component. She expressed hope that
counter-drug police would eventually deploy as satellite
units to the provinces. Specialized counter-drug training
would prove useful in investigating other serious crimes.
Police presence would be important, as ISAF officers
acknowledged that they could assert control over territory
but they could not maintain such control indefinitely. A
sustained presence was needed. Balbo noted the critical need
as well for establishment of a central database with
biometrics information on criminals, insurgents, and suspects
with outstanding warrants. Tandy noted the need as well for
a system to conduct vetting of personnel at regular intervals
after completion of the initial vetting.

UPCOMING DUBLIN GROUP VISIT TO PAKISTAN
--------------


16. (C) Bataller reiterated the key importance of the role of
Pakistan in the region. He inquired why greater success had
not occurred there. He noted that the Dublin Group, led by
Japan, planned an assessment mission to Pakistan within the
next month or so. This visit represented an opportunity to
encourage additional donors to play constructive roles. The
Administrator said several factors influenced the lack of
effective counter-drug work in Pakistan. Anti-drug forces
there had lost their policing side because they had become
internal intelligence collection agencies. In the process
they lost their counter-drug policing skills and objectives.
Even the Pakistani frontier corps did not seem effective. At
one border check-point across the way from Quetta, the
frontier police had access to a functioning biometrics system
but decided not to use it, reportedly because of objections
from Afghan citizens in the region who protested its planned
use. Yet, such a system would help to identify drug
traffickers and insurgents. Balbo noted that many precursor
chemicals crossed the Afghan-Pakistan border in mule
caravans. Basic testing equipment would help in detecting
such chemicals, without which traffickers could not transform
opium into heroin. Tandy welcomed the involvement of the
Dublin Group in an assessment mission.



MEMBER STATE REPRESENTATIVES RAISE THEIR CONCERNS
-------------- --------------


17. (C) Administrator Tandy met separately with PSC
Ambassadors and Deputies from the United Kingdom, France,
Spain, Lithuania, Romania, and Estonia. She provided a
similar overview to the one reported above on DEA activities
in Afghanistan and the region, after which Member State
representatives discussed their concerns and asked questions.
The Estonian Ambassador asked about the potential for
cooperation between the United States and the European Police
Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). Tandy stressed the need for
well-trained police in the provinces and suggested locating
satellite NIUs in some PRTs. Balbo added that, as more
police completed training, some of them could be put into
specialized entities, such as the counter-narcotics units.
He also emphasized the importance of continual vetting of
police to ensure that they did not become corrupt. The
Lithuanian Ambassador asked about the level of cooperation
DEA had received from Pakistan and Russia. Tandy said that
Russia has been a good partner, especially on the border with
Tajikistan. On Pakistan, she said the Interior Minister was
enthusiastic and DEA has attempted to encourage more action
by engaging with the Frontier Corps and providing them with
training. The Romanian Ambassador questioned whether
Uzbekistan was cooperating. Tandy noted that DEA had an
office in Tashkent and has tried to put a "security belt"
around Afghanistan, as precursor chemicals came from outside
Afghanistan. The Spanish Deputy Representative noted that
only strong rule of law and enforcement could help the
situation in Afghanistan and asked about the Afghan
Parliament's involvement and prospects for stronger laws.

BRUSSELS 00003128 007 OF 007


Tandy noted a new law directed at corruption was under
discussion and remarked that approval of this law would
represent a very positive development. Responding to a
final question about the possibility of specialized courts,
the Administrator said traditional criminal courts played
critical roles, but authorities might wish later to consider
establishing drug courts with rehabilitation components, as
long as they provided both "carrots and sticks."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) The DEA Administrator's meetings with EU officials in
Brussels provided an important opportunity to brief EU
colleagues on the drug situation in Afghanistan, particularly
to reinforce information by previous high-level visitors on
links between drug traffickers and insurgents. Her briefing
on progress on building capabilities to conduct drug
investigations and prosecutions also provided a welcome
contrast to overwhelmingly negative press accounts of drug
developments in Afghanistan. The meeting with Commission and
Council Secretariat officials also provided an occasion for
relevant EU policy makers and program officers to build a
wider network of contacts on Afghanistan issues. As Mission
INL Counselor and DEA Assistant Regional Director assisted
with introductions before the meeting, we were struck by the
number of EU officials who had not previously met, even
though they handled related issues within the same EU
institutions. END COMMENT.


19. (U) DEA Regional Director Russ Bensen cleared this
telegram.

GRAY
.