EU AND KOSOVO: MOVING TOWARD REALITY

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DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/SCE
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID EUN KV
SUBJECT: EU AND KOSOVO: MOVING TOWARD REALITY

Classified By: POL W. BALKANS/ENLARGEMENT UNIT CHIEF VINCENT CARVER FOR
REASONS 1.5 (B/D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) EU and member state officials are increasingly
recognizing the strong likelihood that Kosovo will become
independent without a UNSCR and that launching an ESDP
mission is vital to decreasing instability in the region.
Some EU contacts believe member states may still wobble if
Belgrade presents a last-minute conciliatory deal; they
report that the EU still has not decided whether to adopt the
ESDP mission ahead of, or after, the recognition of Kosovo's
independence by most member states. Meanwhile, the
Commission has budgeted 62 million Euros for assistance to
Kosovo for the coming year. Several contacts cautioned that
many European officials view the U.S. as railroading Kosovo
independence with the potential for increasing stability in
Serbia as the result. When rebuffed, they offered no
plausible alternative to Kosovo's independence. END SUMMARY

FACING REALITY: "ROLLING STONES" TOUR WILL NOT PRODUCE
COMPROMISE
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2. (C) Michael Giffoni, Council Secretariat Deputy Director
for the W. Balkans, told us recently that few EU and member
state officials believe the Troika approach will result in a
deal between Belgrade and Pristina. He stressed, however,
that the theater of "leaving no stone unturned" is critical
for some member state governments to deflect domestic
political attacks. This "Rolling Stones" approach will also
help the majority of member states push the approval of an
ESDP mission despite the strong reluctance of Cyprus, Greece,
and Romania to such a mission without the blessing of a UNSCR.


3. (C) Contacts from several member states agreed with
Giffoni's analysis -- the Troika approach has bought the EU
and member states both time and political cover, often to
address domestic critics. Most of our working level contacts
see a post-December 10 scenario that includes continued
deadlock at the UN because of Russian intransigence, a UDI by
Pristina, and subsequent recognition by most -- but not all
-- member states. While several contacts continue to call
for strengthened legal arguments for recognizing Kosovo
absent a UNSCR, they also acknowledge that if the political
authorities in capitals favor recognition, they will find an
acceptable legal formula.


BUT NO GUARANTEE OF EU ACTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER A UDI
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4. (C) While most of our contacts covering Kosovo are much
more optimistic than they were even a few months ago about EU
"unity" on implementing the nearly two years of "prudent
planning" with the actual establishment of the ICO and the
ESDP mission, none are staking their careers on such an
outcome in the immediate aftermath of a UDI. An Italian
Mission rep warned that some member states may wobble if
Belgrade produces a last-minute "reasonable" compromise. He
quickly noted, however, that Italy and other members of the
Quint must insist on respect for the December 10 deadline.
Many of our contacts, including the Portuguese Mission's
Chair of the COWEB working group, have stressed the
desirability of U.S. pressure on Kosovo to wait for "at least
a few weeks" after December 10 to allow for discussions in
New York before issuing a UDI. They assure us that the EU
could then proceed confidently with formalizing the ESDP
mission and most member states would recognize Kosovo's
independence.


5. (C) ESDP contacts appear more sanguine about prospects
for obtaining agreement -- or at a minimum, no outright
vetoes, on the mission, if only because EU paralysis after
December could strike a major blow against ESDP more broadly.
The 1,800-strong civilian mission will be by far the largest
ESDP undertaking to date and we are seeing growing
recognition here of the EU's responsibility to police its own
backyard, despite continued rumblings in some capitals about
the mission's legality. The Head of Mission-designate,
retired French General Yves de Kermabon, and EU planners here
and in Pristina, have told us they want to have the personnel
selected, hardware procured, and operational plans informally
in place by December in order to be ready to either launch
the mission as planned or be able to make any necessary
changes efficiently. Getting the necessary member state
approvals for these steps is pushing reluctant countries

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forward, albeit in increments. Those countries that have
remained holdouts (Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and to
a lesser extent lately, Hungary) likely will bargain for
something in return for their eventual "constructive
abstentions" on the ESDP mission. One contact noted that
such backroom deals likely would be brokered by FMs or even
PMs just weeks before December 10.

MEANWHILE, THE COMMISSION CONTINUES FUNDING
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6. (U) European Commission (EC) assistance to Kosovo has
been provided since 1998 under a variety of instruments,
including regular technical assistance, humanitarian aid,
exceptional financial support, and financing to Pillar IV of
UNMIK. Since 2000, the CARDS program has been the main
financial instrument for Kosovo, with programs mainly
implemented by the European Agency for Reconstruction. To
date, EU assistance, including from member states, amounts to
2.6 billion Euros. Of this amount, EC assistance accounts
for almost 1.6 billion Euros.


7. (U) Beginning soon, EC assistance for Kosovo will be
funded via the new Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and
will help pay for EU and EC support for final status as well
as for developing Kosovo's weak economy. The EU will devote
more resources for programs aimed at good governance,
reforms, and fiscal sustainability. The draft 2007
assistance program will be discussed by the EC and member
states at an October 22 meeting. Funding of 62 million Euros
has been proposed for assistance, with the lion's share
concentrated in: capacity-building for developing
EU-compatible legislation and policy (6 million Euros),rule
of law promotion (7 million Euros),developing an enabling
economic environment (11 million Euros),transportation
infrastructure (8 million Euros),and support for local
government and decentralization (12.4 million Euros).
Additional funding is expected for higher education and the
Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office. Kosovo will also
benefit from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human
Rights.


8. (SBU) The Commission's Multi-annual Indicative Planning
Document for Kosovo 2007-09 noted that 64.7 million Euros had
been budgeted for 2008. We understand that the Commission
has requested a doubling of that figure from the Council and
European Parliament for microfinance and other activities,
but no decisions have been made.

VIEWS ON EFFECTS ON SERBIA
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9. (C) While all of our working level contacts note that
Serbia's accession prospects are not formally linked to
Kosovo, most acknowledge that the EU and member states must
take Belgrade's actions regarding Kosovo into account when
deciding policy vis-a-vis Belgrade. Several contacts
continue to fret that a UDI will strengthen the RS in Serbia.
Many contacts see the initialing of an SAA with Serbia,
likely to take place in late October or early November, as
one way to try to soften the blow of an independent Kosovo
and recognition of it by most member states. Likewise,
contacts see visa facilitation as a method of trying to
strengthen the attraction of the EU to the Serb professional
and student classes. A few contacts have voiced concern more
about the possibility that Serb paramilitary forces could
cause trouble in northern Kosovo than about any formal Serb
reaction to Kosovo's independence. Brussels has assured us
it is seized with how to manage Serbia post-December 10, but
has offered few specifics on any damage control policy.

Still hoping for a miracle?
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10. (C/NF) Though our contacts speak with growing confidence
when they say the EU will be "ready" after Dec 10, there
remains plenty of unease with a process that many perceive as
beyond their control. At working levels, this manifests
itself in griping from a number of both EU and member state
officials that the U.S. has "railroaded" the final status
process. We have rebuffed such accusations -- noting that
President Ahtisaari is a committed EU champion and that both
we and the EU consulted with him closely on this process --
but this mindset is deep-seated in some parts of the EU. The
unease is also manifest in the universally high marks that
Ischinger has received here. Ischinger's frequent personal
appearances at the PSC and repeated references to his role as
the "EU's representative" have played very well here,
particularly with non-Quint member states. The good news,

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according to several contacts, is that Ischinger has
succeeded in making non-Quint member states feel more
included in, and therefore more committed to, the process.
(A Hungarian contact attributed his government's softening
stand directly to Ischinger's role.) The potential bad news
is that hopes for a last minute miracle solution have not
gone away. Indeed, a Quint member state contact worried to
us that Ishcinger's emphasis on "leaving no stone unturned"
may have inadvertently raised hopes in the member states that
a last-minute miracle solution may yet be possible.
Ambassador Wisner's and DAS DiCarlo's upcoming visit to
Brussels offers another opportunity to help solidify the EU's
resolve to support a realistic final status for Kosovo.
GRAY

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