Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS311
2007-01-30 14:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

EUROPEAN UNION OPERATIONS CENTER COMES ON LINE

Tags:  EUN MCAP PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2513
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0311/01 0301416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301416Z JAN 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000311 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, AND S/CRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: EUN MCAP PREL
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN UNION OPERATIONS CENTER COMES ON LINE

REF: A. 05 BRUSSELS 01197 B. 05 BRUSSELS 01164 C. 04

BRUSSELS 04937 D. 04 BRUSSELS 04686

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief, Jeremy Brenner, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, AND S/CRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: EUN MCAP PREL
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN UNION OPERATIONS CENTER COMES ON LINE

REF: A. 05 BRUSSELS 01197 B. 05 BRUSSELS 01164 C. 04

BRUSSELS 04937 D. 04 BRUSSELS 04686

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief, Jeremy Brenner, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. The European Union Operations Center was
declared operational January 1, 2007. It is designed to plan
and run an autonomous military operation of approximately
2000 personnel. In practice, the Ops Center will also be used
to run civilian and integrated crisis response missions. End
summary.


2. (C) Members of the USEU pol-mil team were invited to tour
the newly-completed EU Operations Center on January 11 in
conjunction with announcement of its full operational
capability. Lt. Colonel Patrick Geysen (protect),the head of
the small permanent staff of the operations center and Roland
Zinzius (protect),Deputy Director of the Civ-Mil Cell gave
details about the capabilities of the Ops Center and likely
next steps in developing European Union crisis response
planning.


3. (SBU) According to the terms of reference for the
Operations Center, it will be capable of planning and running
a military operation on the scale of the ARTEMIS operation in
Bunia, DRC in 2003. In practice, this means a mission of
approximately 2000 personnel, which, not coincidentally, is
the size of the EU Battlegroups also declared fully
operational on January 1 2007. Because the European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) takes a "holistic" view of crisis
response, the civ-mil cell, of which the Ops Center is a
component part, includes civilian experts in police, rule of
law, civil protection, civil administration, and
representatives from the European Commission which is
responsible for humanitarian assistance, and development aid.
EU doctrine is that the military capabilities under ESDP are
designed "to make the other instruments more effective."
Battlegroups are being advertised to the UN and others as a
"bridging force" designed to conduct the full range of
Petersberg peacekeeping tasks, then handing off to a larger
follow-on force. In the event of a deployment, a Battlegroup

is supposed to be capable of tasks ranging from providing
logistical support or a "safe and secure environment" for
civilian teams to separating warring factions by force.


4. (C/NF) According to Geysen, the European Union Operations
Center was declared fully operational on January 1. This
date is a full year behind the original schedule (refs A-D),
and there was very little public fanfare regarding its
completion. USEU was invited to tour the facility even
before Member State representatives on the Political and
Security Committee had seen it, highlighting the political
sensitivities that remain within the EU concerning the
purpose of the Ops Center, the circumstances under which it
might be employed, and U.S. attitudes towards the development
of EU crisis response capabilities.


5. (C) Geysen and other members of the EU Military Staff
have argued to us on many occasions that the construction of
the Operations Center facility was driven by a desire to
avoid duplication and waste within the EU. Geysen pointed
specifically to the 5 million Euro satellite communications
link constructed for the Ops Center, saying that such a link
would have to be duplicated at each of the current and
proposed National HQs made available for EU autonomous
operations. This satellite link will permit the Ops Center to
be in permanent contact with all of the ESDP missions -
civilian and military - now deployed. Geysen went on to say
that one of the lessons learned from the ESDP mission to the
DRC completed in November 2006 was that the training and
travel required to bring operational staff to the
Multinational HQ was both disruptive and expensive. The
German OHQ at Potsdam which planned and ran the DRC operation
was far from the political decisionmakers, and from those EU
Military Staff experts who created the initial Crisis
Management Concept and Initiating Military Directive. He also
said that the need to coordinate with civilian crisis
management elements who might already be on the ground argued
for an Ops Center in Brussels with civilian representation.

BRUSSELS 00000311 002 OF 002


There is currently discussion within the EU on establishing a
civilian "OHQ" which would need to be fully integrated with
any military OHQ.


6. (C) Geysen is a member of the "core staff" of the
Operations Center. This staff, consisting primarily of
"housekeepers" who maintain the communications and computer
equipment until the Ops Center is activated by a decision of
the European Council, is responsible for standing up the
center and bringing in the augmented staff from the EU
Military Staff and seconded national experts from capitals.
Geysen explained that there is now a database of trained
national experts who would be called upon in case of
activation of the Ops Center.


7. (SBU) The Ops Center and the augmentation system will be
exercised in June during MILEX 07 in Sweden. The scenario for
the exercise will postulate a request from the UNSC for the
deployment of an Integrated Police Unit and "bridging force"
to respond to an emerging crisis in Africa. One of the goals
of the exercise will be to ensure effective linkages with
civilian crisis management elements, either on the ground or
with planners in Brussels.


8. (C) The Ops Center itself consists of 64 work stations
with computer and communications links. A video wall will be
installed shortly. The Ops Center is designed to provide 24
hour watch capability as well as operational control over
deployed missions. Civilian missions are currently run by a
small staff within the Civilian Crisis Management directorate
in the Council Secretariat. Cell phones and email are the
primary means of communication. Within the Ops Center spaces
there are empty offices designated for augmentees from the
Military Staff and Member State capitals. Geysen suggested
that in the event of a Battlegroup deployment, the lead
nation would be given additional identified staff slots which
would otherwise be filled by EU Military Staff officers.


9. (C/NF) Comment: The civ-mil cell staff was clearly proud
of their newly-completed facility. That it exists at all is
seen as a major achievement given that it is the product of
the hard-fought political compromise that defused the 2003
Trevuren OHQ controversy. In the minds of the professionals
manning the Ops Center, it is only a matter of (short) time
before the political leadership will want to "take their new
Ferrari out of the garage." By NATO or US standards, it seems
more like a basic model Renault than a Ferrari, and there is
some question whether they will have the staff to run 24-hour
operations. Still, given the political necessity of
justifying the resources represented by both the Battlegroups
and the Ops Center, we anticipate they will be used. Such a
deployment, if channeled and orchestrated carefully, could
help refine an additional - if limited -- resource for rapid
international response to crises. To the extent that the Ops
Center can focus and run the disparate elements of EU crisis
intervention tools, thereby ensuring European engagement,
this new capability, could prove useful, especially in
theaters where no other international security actor is
readily able to intervene.

GRAY
.