Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS3039
2007-10-01 15:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:
CORRECTED COPY: DAS KRAMER, AMB STEWART AND THE EU
how-toVZCZCXRO3433 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBS #3039/01 2741520 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 011520Z OCT 07 FM USEU BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003039
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ECON ENRG OSCE EUN BO XH
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: DAS KRAMER, AMB STEWART AND THE EU
DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS ON BELARUS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 2984 (NOTAL)
B. BRUSSELS 1099
Classified By: Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurenc
e Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003039
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ECON ENRG OSCE EUN BO XH
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: DAS KRAMER, AMB STEWART AND THE EU
DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS ON BELARUS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 2984 (NOTAL)
B. BRUSSELS 1099
Classified By: Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurenc
e Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1.(C) EUR DAS David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador Karen Stewart
(Minsk) held back-to-back meetings on September 19 with the
Friends of Belarus informal contact group and the EU Troika
to review the current situation in Belarus and coordinate
policy responses. In both meetings, the sides broadly agreed
to maintain pressure through sanctions on the Lukashenka
regime and to increase the Belarusian people's exposure to
the West. The EU acknowledged the imperative of Transatlantic
unity and quick action in response to any major good (or bad)
moves by Lukashenka with respect to the political opposition.
The Portuguese EU Presidency complained that Russia was "too
much at ease" and that the West currently had no way to check
Russian influence in Belarus. EU officials and member states
differed on whether the prescription for this problem was
engagement with or isolation of the regime in Minsk. END
SUMMARY
2.(SBU) During a September 18-19 visit to Brussels, EUR
Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador
to Belarus Karen Stewart held intensive discussions with EU
institutions and member states on Belarus. These included a
Quad meeting at the US Mission to the EU on September 18
(reported REF A),a Friends of Belarus meeting hosted by the
Lithuanian Mission on September 19, and a U.S.-EU Eastern
Europe/Caucasus (COEST) Troika consultation on September 19
hosted by the EU. This cable contains a readout of the
Friends meeting and the COEST discussions on Belarus. Other
COEST topics, including Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the
Southern Caucasus will be reported septel.
--------------
U.S.-EU COEST TROIKA
--------------
New U.S. sanctions
--------------
3.(C) DAS Kramer provided the EU Troika with an overview of
new U.S. sanctions against Belarus, including expanded visa
bans and soon-to-be-announced asset freeze against
state-owned enterprises. The U.S. actions should have come
as no surprise to the GoB. Minsk had been warned in advance
that its failure to release all political prisoners would
trigger a commensurate negative reaction from the United
States. Ambassador Stewart reviewed recent negative domestic
economic and political developments in Belarus.
Privatizations and less-than-savory credit relationships with
rogue states, such as Iran and Venezuela, signaled deepening
economic strains in light of rising energy costs. Power
shifts in senior positions and crackdowns on dissidents
indicated tensions among Lukashenka loyalists and clans in
power around him.
A Transatlantic To-Do List
--------------
4.(C) DAS Kramer pointed out several areas in which the EU
and United States should focus coordination over the next few
months:
-- Media programming: Kramer proposed establishing a small
U.S.-EU expert working group to improve our efforts in this
sector.
-- Political Opposition: Kramer stressed the need for
U.S.-EU unity in response to any future good (or bad) moves
by the regime, particularly on October 2 when the national
parliament might consider prisoner amnesties. An autumn
visit to Washington and Brussels by Belarusian opposition
leaders should also be considered.
-- OSCE Diplomacy: Kramer urged that the EU and United
States block any future suggestion for and OSCE Vienna HOM
trip to Minsk, as it would serve the interests of the regime,
and not the OSCE.
-- Economic Reform: Kramer encouraged the EU to consider how
to use existing tools to promote long-term institutional
reform in Belarus, including perhaps through the EBRD, while
being mindful that such efforts could ease the pressure we
want to maintain on Lukashenka.
5.(C) Ambassador Stewart highlighted possible opportunities
for Lukashenka to improve relations with the West. In
particular, we hoped for the release of all political
prisoners through a general amnesty to be considered by
parliament on October 2. In the event that the regime
released some, but not all political prisoners, the United
States urged that the EU stick to its current hard line
policy on sanctions and contacts. The Belarusian security
BRUSSELS 00003039 002 OF 003
apparatus' handling of a political opposition protest (March
for Europe) on October 14 could also help us gauge the
regime's intentions toward relations with the West.
EU: How to Counter Russian Influence?
--------------
6.(C) Marcelo Curto, Portuguese Ambassador to Russia and
COEST Coordinator for the Portuguese Presidency expressed
concern that Russia was "too much at ease" and that the US
and EU "had no game to play" in Belarus. Although
Lukashenka's increasing unpopularity was all to the good, the
West currently had no way to check Russian influence in
Belarus. Curto acknowledged that pressure on the regime was
necessary, but preferred increased engagement and exposure to
the West rather than isolation.
7.(C) Curto, who is accredited to both Moscow and Minsk,
opined that the Russia-Belarus Union project was "really
dead" and that Russia had adjusted its strategy toward
Lukashenka accordingly. Specifically, Russia was using
energy as a weapon to exert greater control over Belarus and
provide for a "smooth anschluss." Russia's construction of
a new Baltic pipeline to divert oil to other countries (and
away from Belarus) demonstrated both a new bilateral policy
and an intention to exert strategic influence over the entire
region. Curto believed that Moscow saw no alternative to
Lukashenka for the moment and, perhaps would not/not wish to
seek one in any case. Moscow preferred a situation in which
Lukashenka was controllable and the opposition divided.
Russian officials enjoyed the fact that Lukashenka had,
unwittingly, turned dissident Alexander Kozulin into a
"political martyr."
Energy, exchanges, and assistance
--------------
8.(C) Madeleine Majorenko, European Commission Deputy Head of
Unit for Belarus, explained that the EU had postponed energy
talks with Belarus as a result of the latest wave of
political arrests there. The talks would likely be
rescheduled for December or January in Minsk. The Commission
currently had 5 million euro to allocate in CY 2007 money and
the same amount for 2008. Project funding priorities for
Brussels included energy efficiency, regulatory reform,
education (e.g., European Humanities University) and HIV/AIDS
prevention. Commission officials shared U.S. concerns about
privatization issues in Belarus. On the positive side,
Majorenko noted that the GoB had recently solicited World
Bank and IMF assistance to improve financial transparency in
public accounting and to assess the state of the banking
sector. The U.S. delegations agreed to look into this matter
with World Bank contacts as well.
9.(C) Ambassador Stewart outlined U.S. efforts to help Minsk
to improve its dismal physical security of nuclear
facilities. The Commission urged the U.S. and EU to monitor
Minsk's development of a long-term nuclear fuel purchase
strategy with a view toward avoiding possible attempts to
play western countries off of each other.
--------------
Friends of Belarus
--------------
10.(C) At the second Friends of Belarus meeting convened in
Brussels this year by the Lithuanian Permanent Mission, EU
officials and PSC Ambassadors compared notes with DAS Kramer
and Ambassador Stewart on policy and programming toward
Belarus. A tour de table revealed common concern over
creeping Russian influence in Belarus' strategic sectors.
However, there were shades of difference between EU member
states and institutions on how best to influence officials
below the very top layer of the Lukashenka regime.
Contact Policy
--------------
11.(C) As in the COEST meeting, DAS Kramer reviewed U.S.
coordination priorities on Belarus, including the rejection
of any future calls for an OSCE Ambassadors visit to Minsk.
Moreover, the United States was displeased by the Georgian
Interior Minister's recent visit to Minsk and talk of
"strategic partnership," and suggested discouraging Tbilisi
in this regard. The UK highlighted the importance of
maintaining vigilance in the EU's policy of limiting contacts
with senior Belarusian officials. In this regard, the UK rep
accused the European Commission of "crossing the line" by
inviting Belarusian DFM Voronetsky to speak at a high level
Commission event on the European Neighborhood Policy. Latvia
on the other hand, called Voronetsky's appearance a "success"
for EU policy, and said it was considering inviting him to a
November 23 Conference on the Baltics and ENP. The UK,
Poland, Germany, and France encouraged more careful thinking
about who the West could and should seek to positively
influence in the Bel
BRUSSELS 00003039 003 OF 003
arusian government. For this purpose, the UK advocated
increased information sharing between the U.S. and EU Heads
of Missions in Minsk.
A Wider EU Visa Bans?
--------------
12.(C) The Friends meeting stimulated positive EU discussion
of the current Belarus visa ban list. Lithuania and a
Council Secretariat Policy Unit official wondered aloud why
the EU could not expand the current visa ban list to include
family members. German and French PSC Ambassadors
tentatively offered support for further consideration of the
idea. The Polish Ambassador noted that while sanctions
tended to "underperform" they were essential to maintaining
EU credibility toward the regime. At the same time, the
evidentiary requirements for visa bans could become more
severe given the recent successful court challenges of EU
sanctions in a terrorism financing case.
More Support for Civil Society
--------------
13.(C) Many Friends (Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, France,
Lithuania, Germany, and EU Commission reps) advocated
increasing people to people exchanges between Belarus and the
West. With a view toward strengthening opposition unity, DAS
Kramer said that the United States was considering inviting a
group of Belarusian opposition leaders to Washington soon
after the October 14 Europe Day March in Minsk. EU
participants agreed to Kramer's suggestion to add a Brussels
stop on the same itinerary. As in the COEST Troika, Kramer
candidly noted that Western media broadcasting to Belarus was
an area ripe for improvement and suggested a working group to
address the issues. Sweden and Poland were also looking at
military-to-military contacts with Belarus.
EU Visa Facilitation
--------------
14.(C) The Swedish PSC Ambassador complained that increased
EU visa fees (60 euros up from 35 euros) in the Schengen zone
would make travel to the West more difficult for average
Belarusian citizens. He urged the Commission and Member
States' Ministries of Interior to find a "loophole" to allow
reduced fees. Hugues Mingarelli, the Commission Deputy
Director General for Eastern Europe retorted hat the
Commission had already notified membe states there it was up
to individual member states to take such action and that no
legal or political action at the community level was
required. France and Germany believed that differentiation
in EU visa issuance policy was needed, including adding names
to the visa ban list and providing easier access to the EU
for ordinary citizens. France underscored the importance of
sending "the right message at the right moment."
More on Energy
--------------
15.(C) Mingarelli noted that the Commission was interested in
continuing its dialogue and technical assistance in the
energy sector. The Commission was particularly concerned
about the impact on EU member states in the event of a
collapse of the Belarusian energy transport grid. Mingarelli
cautioned that any expansion of the EU visa ban not cut off
EU contact with such individuals. The EU was currently
trying to include the Belarusian consumer union as well as
energy officials in a dialogue on energy sector reform
issues. Poland noted that the Commission's current
"unbundling" proposals to address the Gazprom problem in the
EU's own internal energy market could complicate the EU's
energy agenda with Belarus. He added that it might be
necessary to wait until after Russian Presidential elections
to see what, if any, changes on the ground, might take place.
16. (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Kramer and
Ambassador Stewart.
GRAY
.
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ECON ENRG OSCE EUN BO XH
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: DAS KRAMER, AMB STEWART AND THE EU
DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS ON BELARUS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 2984 (NOTAL)
B. BRUSSELS 1099
Classified By: Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurenc
e Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1.(C) EUR DAS David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador Karen Stewart
(Minsk) held back-to-back meetings on September 19 with the
Friends of Belarus informal contact group and the EU Troika
to review the current situation in Belarus and coordinate
policy responses. In both meetings, the sides broadly agreed
to maintain pressure through sanctions on the Lukashenka
regime and to increase the Belarusian people's exposure to
the West. The EU acknowledged the imperative of Transatlantic
unity and quick action in response to any major good (or bad)
moves by Lukashenka with respect to the political opposition.
The Portuguese EU Presidency complained that Russia was "too
much at ease" and that the West currently had no way to check
Russian influence in Belarus. EU officials and member states
differed on whether the prescription for this problem was
engagement with or isolation of the regime in Minsk. END
SUMMARY
2.(SBU) During a September 18-19 visit to Brussels, EUR
Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador
to Belarus Karen Stewart held intensive discussions with EU
institutions and member states on Belarus. These included a
Quad meeting at the US Mission to the EU on September 18
(reported REF A),a Friends of Belarus meeting hosted by the
Lithuanian Mission on September 19, and a U.S.-EU Eastern
Europe/Caucasus (COEST) Troika consultation on September 19
hosted by the EU. This cable contains a readout of the
Friends meeting and the COEST discussions on Belarus. Other
COEST topics, including Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the
Southern Caucasus will be reported septel.
--------------
U.S.-EU COEST TROIKA
--------------
New U.S. sanctions
--------------
3.(C) DAS Kramer provided the EU Troika with an overview of
new U.S. sanctions against Belarus, including expanded visa
bans and soon-to-be-announced asset freeze against
state-owned enterprises. The U.S. actions should have come
as no surprise to the GoB. Minsk had been warned in advance
that its failure to release all political prisoners would
trigger a commensurate negative reaction from the United
States. Ambassador Stewart reviewed recent negative domestic
economic and political developments in Belarus.
Privatizations and less-than-savory credit relationships with
rogue states, such as Iran and Venezuela, signaled deepening
economic strains in light of rising energy costs. Power
shifts in senior positions and crackdowns on dissidents
indicated tensions among Lukashenka loyalists and clans in
power around him.
A Transatlantic To-Do List
--------------
4.(C) DAS Kramer pointed out several areas in which the EU
and United States should focus coordination over the next few
months:
-- Media programming: Kramer proposed establishing a small
U.S.-EU expert working group to improve our efforts in this
sector.
-- Political Opposition: Kramer stressed the need for
U.S.-EU unity in response to any future good (or bad) moves
by the regime, particularly on October 2 when the national
parliament might consider prisoner amnesties. An autumn
visit to Washington and Brussels by Belarusian opposition
leaders should also be considered.
-- OSCE Diplomacy: Kramer urged that the EU and United
States block any future suggestion for and OSCE Vienna HOM
trip to Minsk, as it would serve the interests of the regime,
and not the OSCE.
-- Economic Reform: Kramer encouraged the EU to consider how
to use existing tools to promote long-term institutional
reform in Belarus, including perhaps through the EBRD, while
being mindful that such efforts could ease the pressure we
want to maintain on Lukashenka.
5.(C) Ambassador Stewart highlighted possible opportunities
for Lukashenka to improve relations with the West. In
particular, we hoped for the release of all political
prisoners through a general amnesty to be considered by
parliament on October 2. In the event that the regime
released some, but not all political prisoners, the United
States urged that the EU stick to its current hard line
policy on sanctions and contacts. The Belarusian security
BRUSSELS 00003039 002 OF 003
apparatus' handling of a political opposition protest (March
for Europe) on October 14 could also help us gauge the
regime's intentions toward relations with the West.
EU: How to Counter Russian Influence?
--------------
6.(C) Marcelo Curto, Portuguese Ambassador to Russia and
COEST Coordinator for the Portuguese Presidency expressed
concern that Russia was "too much at ease" and that the US
and EU "had no game to play" in Belarus. Although
Lukashenka's increasing unpopularity was all to the good, the
West currently had no way to check Russian influence in
Belarus. Curto acknowledged that pressure on the regime was
necessary, but preferred increased engagement and exposure to
the West rather than isolation.
7.(C) Curto, who is accredited to both Moscow and Minsk,
opined that the Russia-Belarus Union project was "really
dead" and that Russia had adjusted its strategy toward
Lukashenka accordingly. Specifically, Russia was using
energy as a weapon to exert greater control over Belarus and
provide for a "smooth anschluss." Russia's construction of
a new Baltic pipeline to divert oil to other countries (and
away from Belarus) demonstrated both a new bilateral policy
and an intention to exert strategic influence over the entire
region. Curto believed that Moscow saw no alternative to
Lukashenka for the moment and, perhaps would not/not wish to
seek one in any case. Moscow preferred a situation in which
Lukashenka was controllable and the opposition divided.
Russian officials enjoyed the fact that Lukashenka had,
unwittingly, turned dissident Alexander Kozulin into a
"political martyr."
Energy, exchanges, and assistance
--------------
8.(C) Madeleine Majorenko, European Commission Deputy Head of
Unit for Belarus, explained that the EU had postponed energy
talks with Belarus as a result of the latest wave of
political arrests there. The talks would likely be
rescheduled for December or January in Minsk. The Commission
currently had 5 million euro to allocate in CY 2007 money and
the same amount for 2008. Project funding priorities for
Brussels included energy efficiency, regulatory reform,
education (e.g., European Humanities University) and HIV/AIDS
prevention. Commission officials shared U.S. concerns about
privatization issues in Belarus. On the positive side,
Majorenko noted that the GoB had recently solicited World
Bank and IMF assistance to improve financial transparency in
public accounting and to assess the state of the banking
sector. The U.S. delegations agreed to look into this matter
with World Bank contacts as well.
9.(C) Ambassador Stewart outlined U.S. efforts to help Minsk
to improve its dismal physical security of nuclear
facilities. The Commission urged the U.S. and EU to monitor
Minsk's development of a long-term nuclear fuel purchase
strategy with a view toward avoiding possible attempts to
play western countries off of each other.
--------------
Friends of Belarus
--------------
10.(C) At the second Friends of Belarus meeting convened in
Brussels this year by the Lithuanian Permanent Mission, EU
officials and PSC Ambassadors compared notes with DAS Kramer
and Ambassador Stewart on policy and programming toward
Belarus. A tour de table revealed common concern over
creeping Russian influence in Belarus' strategic sectors.
However, there were shades of difference between EU member
states and institutions on how best to influence officials
below the very top layer of the Lukashenka regime.
Contact Policy
--------------
11.(C) As in the COEST meeting, DAS Kramer reviewed U.S.
coordination priorities on Belarus, including the rejection
of any future calls for an OSCE Ambassadors visit to Minsk.
Moreover, the United States was displeased by the Georgian
Interior Minister's recent visit to Minsk and talk of
"strategic partnership," and suggested discouraging Tbilisi
in this regard. The UK highlighted the importance of
maintaining vigilance in the EU's policy of limiting contacts
with senior Belarusian officials. In this regard, the UK rep
accused the European Commission of "crossing the line" by
inviting Belarusian DFM Voronetsky to speak at a high level
Commission event on the European Neighborhood Policy. Latvia
on the other hand, called Voronetsky's appearance a "success"
for EU policy, and said it was considering inviting him to a
November 23 Conference on the Baltics and ENP. The UK,
Poland, Germany, and France encouraged more careful thinking
about who the West could and should seek to positively
influence in the Bel
BRUSSELS 00003039 003 OF 003
arusian government. For this purpose, the UK advocated
increased information sharing between the U.S. and EU Heads
of Missions in Minsk.
A Wider EU Visa Bans?
--------------
12.(C) The Friends meeting stimulated positive EU discussion
of the current Belarus visa ban list. Lithuania and a
Council Secretariat Policy Unit official wondered aloud why
the EU could not expand the current visa ban list to include
family members. German and French PSC Ambassadors
tentatively offered support for further consideration of the
idea. The Polish Ambassador noted that while sanctions
tended to "underperform" they were essential to maintaining
EU credibility toward the regime. At the same time, the
evidentiary requirements for visa bans could become more
severe given the recent successful court challenges of EU
sanctions in a terrorism financing case.
More Support for Civil Society
--------------
13.(C) Many Friends (Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, France,
Lithuania, Germany, and EU Commission reps) advocated
increasing people to people exchanges between Belarus and the
West. With a view toward strengthening opposition unity, DAS
Kramer said that the United States was considering inviting a
group of Belarusian opposition leaders to Washington soon
after the October 14 Europe Day March in Minsk. EU
participants agreed to Kramer's suggestion to add a Brussels
stop on the same itinerary. As in the COEST Troika, Kramer
candidly noted that Western media broadcasting to Belarus was
an area ripe for improvement and suggested a working group to
address the issues. Sweden and Poland were also looking at
military-to-military contacts with Belarus.
EU Visa Facilitation
--------------
14.(C) The Swedish PSC Ambassador complained that increased
EU visa fees (60 euros up from 35 euros) in the Schengen zone
would make travel to the West more difficult for average
Belarusian citizens. He urged the Commission and Member
States' Ministries of Interior to find a "loophole" to allow
reduced fees. Hugues Mingarelli, the Commission Deputy
Director General for Eastern Europe retorted hat the
Commission had already notified membe states there it was up
to individual member states to take such action and that no
legal or political action at the community level was
required. France and Germany believed that differentiation
in EU visa issuance policy was needed, including adding names
to the visa ban list and providing easier access to the EU
for ordinary citizens. France underscored the importance of
sending "the right message at the right moment."
More on Energy
--------------
15.(C) Mingarelli noted that the Commission was interested in
continuing its dialogue and technical assistance in the
energy sector. The Commission was particularly concerned
about the impact on EU member states in the event of a
collapse of the Belarusian energy transport grid. Mingarelli
cautioned that any expansion of the EU visa ban not cut off
EU contact with such individuals. The EU was currently
trying to include the Belarusian consumer union as well as
energy officials in a dialogue on energy sector reform
issues. Poland noted that the Commission's current
"unbundling" proposals to address the Gazprom problem in the
EU's own internal energy market could complicate the EU's
energy agenda with Belarus. He added that it might be
necessary to wait until after Russian Presidential elections
to see what, if any, changes on the ground, might take place.
16. (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Kramer and
Ambassador Stewart.
GRAY
.