SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 26, 2007

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000242

SIPDIS

NOFORN
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FROM AMBASSADOR KOROLOGOS FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2011
TAGS: PREL BE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 26, 2007
MEETING WITH BELGIAN FM DE GUCHT


Classified By: Ambassador Tom C. Korologos, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: We expect Belgian FM De Gucht to have three
major subjects on his mind when he meets the Secretary in
Brussels on January 26 -- Kosovo, Iran, and Russia. You will
have worked over Kosovo at the lunch, but you can usefully
reinforce next steps with the Belgians during your
discussion. De Gucht also may raise two narrow issues, a
request that the U.S. review its opposition to creation of a
formal mechanism in Congo through which the major external
players can convey a unified position to the new government,
and a suggestion that the U.S. and Belgium "swap" the month
they serve as Security Council president in New York. End
Summary

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Kosovo
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2. (C) Belgian FM De Gucht recently expressed very positive
support for UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's plans for concluding
the Kosovo process. De Gucht specifically excluded Belgium
from the category of countries that believe full independence
for Kosovo will have a negative internal domestic impact. De
Gucht noted it was difficult to comment fully without having
seen the proposal, but said "seminally we are going to be for
Ahtisaari's plans." That said, De Gucht told Congressman
Wexler during his January 15 visit to Brussels the OSCE does
not like "dictated borders," adding that Kosovo would
generate much consultation within the EU.


3. (C) Although De Gucht is the best gauge of Belgium's
position, we note his "Kosovo experts" are less strong in
their support. The MFA's Director for the Balkans recently
indicated that while Belgium "supports Ahtisaari's efforts,"
there is concern about "forcing" a specific timeline and
about what an independent Kosovo might do to regional
stability. He also thought Ahtisaari should wait "a
reasonable time" to present his proposal to the parties after
the installation of a Serb government, although he did
express strong support for KFOR.

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Iran
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4. (C) The Belgians have maintained a "no waffling" stance on
this issue, a point De Gucht made to Bob Kimmitt during a
long session on January 23. They have made clear to us, in
the EU, and directly to the Iranians that their sanctions
policy is tougher than the requirements of UNSC 1737. De
Gucht will want to reinforce this point with you, especially
as they are chair of the new UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee.
He will personally ensure that Belgium's complicated
government machinery works in unison on this issue. Apart
from any comments he makes during the transatlantic lunch, he
has a keen interest in where we see relations with Iran
developing over the next few months, particularly in the
Security Council. You should expect queries on how the
Chinese and Russians are approaching this issue. He also may
convey a sentiment he often expresses to us -- "you can count
on Belgium, but please keep us in the loop, particularly if
you are planning any sharp changes in policy."

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Russia
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5. (C) At the end of his year as Chairman in Office of the
OSCE, De Gucht let slip a sharply critical comment about how
the Russians had trifled with him and the OSCE during endless
rounds of discussions. We think this remark offered an
accurate picture of his sense of exasperation about Russian
behavior toward the west. In addition to the Russian
attitude toward such OSCE-type issues as Belarus, Moldova,
and Georgia, De Gucht also is very concerned about energy
security. The recent brief cutoff of petroleum supplies to
Belarus highlighted Belgium's high degree of vulnerability on
that score -- Belgium receives about one-third of its
petroleum through the pipeline from Russia. (The Belgians
are far less vulnerable on natural gas.)


6. (C) As with Iran, De Gucht will want to highlight his
personal determination to hold a tough line, even if Belgium
occasionally takes a tactically softer position to stay
within any EU consensus, or in keeping with the cautious line
pushed by some "make a deal at any cost" officials in the
MFA. It would be useful for you to mention your February
2005 conversation with him about the need for standing firm,

and to outline where you see our policy headed. We believe
he will work toward common goals during Belgium's tour in the
UNSC.

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Congo
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7. (C) This remains an issue of pre-eminent concern with the
Belgians. They are nervously watching post-election
developments, and are hypersensitive to any chance that
violence or disorder might derail some of the initiatives
they have planned for smoothing the way of the elected
government. (These actions include a possible visit to Congo
by the King and Queen.) One manifestation of Belgian
nervousness is their insistent suggestion that like-minded
ambassadors based in Kinshasa, and the local representatives
of the UN, World Bank, and IMF establish a formal mechanism
for consulting among themselves and for delivering messages
to President Kabila. Various USG representatives have tried
to deep six this idea, including most recently at a January
22 Great Lakes Contact Group meeting in The Hague, where
there reportedly was little support for the idea. Despite
this the MFA's Africa Department has told us that they have
asked De Gucht to raise the matter with you.

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UNSC Presidency Swap
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8. (U) We hear the Belgians may propose asking us to swap
their UNSC Presidency month with us, as their elections fall
at the same time as their presidency. If De Gucht raises it,
we suggest you say "The Council's rules of procedure set out
the order for serving as President; we note there has never
before been a deviation to the agreed order, and any change
would need Council consensus. If other members all agreed,
we would not oppose such an arrangement." Korologos
.