Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS2402
2007-07-30 08:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR FINLEY DISCUSSES OSCE AND COE WITH EU

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL MARR PARM OSCE EUN XH 
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VZCZCXRO5633
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #2402/01 2110827
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 300827Z JUL 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002402 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MARR PARM OSCE EUN XH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR FINLEY DISCUSSES OSCE AND COE WITH EU

Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002402

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MARR PARM OSCE EUN XH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR FINLEY DISCUSSES OSCE AND COE WITH EU

Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. On June 27, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe Julie Finley led the
U.S. delegation to the COSCE (the EU's OSCE working party)
troika. During the four hour consultations, the EU declared
its hope for reforms in Kazakhstan in light of its CiO bid
and agreement to downsize the OSCE mission in Croatia. The
United States and EU concurred on the utility of pursuing a
declaration for the November 2007 Madrid Ministerial as
well as separate statements on selected regional and
thematic issues. EU interlocutors expressed concerns about
the feasibility of an OSCE Mission training mission in
Afghanistan, preferring to focus on their own training
programs, and raised the possibility of adapting a regional
border management program. Discussions reaffirmed the
mutual desire to resolve the frozen conflicts in
Georgia and Moldova and the need to involve Russia in the
solution. Sequencing of
a political settlement and internationalization of a PKO
in Moldova remained a question of debate. As discussions
regarding Russia continued, the EU stressed its commitment
to the CFE and raised the question of Russia's true
intentions regarding the OSCE and ODIHR. Although the
United States and the EU differed in their tactical
approaches to issues as disparate as Afghanistan and
Croatia, the troika reaffirmed the overall complementarity
of U.S.-EU objectives in the OSCE. END SUMMARY

Participants
--------------

2. Ambassador Finley was joined by Gary Robbins, Director
of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs
and Samuel Laeuchli, USOSCE Political Counselor, and USEU
POLOFFs. German EU Presidency's Federal Foreign Office OSCE
Division Head Margit Hellwig- Btte led the EU Troika.

German MFA participants included CoE Division Head
Johann-Adolf Cohausz, and OSCE Division Desk Officer
Jan-Thede Domeyer. Representing the Council Secretariat
was the Director of the Policy Unit, Helga Schmid, and the
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Unit's OSCE and CoE Desk
Officer, Leo Schulte Nordholdt. OSCE and CoE Head of Unit
Gilbert Dubois and Desk Officers Bertrand Rochard and
Alenka Zajc were present from the European Commission's DG
RELEX. Representatives from the Portuguese Presidency Unit
were Incoming Chair of the COSCE Paulo Rufino and OSCE Desk
Officer Ana Coelho.


Madrid Ministerial Preparations
--------------

3. Ambassador Finley previewed U.S. objectives for the
November 2007 OSCE Ministerial in Madrid, including a
Ministerial Declaration that contained strong language on
fulfillment of Istanbul commitments and decisions on
possible assistance to Afghanistan, border security in
Central Asia, closure of the Croatia mission, selection of
a new Chair in Office (CiO) for 2009, and support for the
Kosovo final status settlement. In addition, Finley
highlighted our interest in separate resolutions in support
of human rights defenders, promotion of tolerance, and the
situations in Moldova and Georgia respectively. The
German EU Presidency agreed to aim for a ministerial
declaration, including, in particular, language on regional
conflicts.

Kazakhstan CiO Bid
--------------

4. On Kazakhstan's CiO bid, both sides reaffirmed their
support in principle for the Kazakh bid, but agreed that
the GOK had not demonstrated a commitment to certain
democratic reforms. The EU Troika expressed hope for signs
of reform, citing the country's August 18 elections as a
possible opportunity to give positive impetus for
progress. Paulo Rufino, the incoming Portuguese Chair of
the COSCE working group reiterated that there was no EU
common position on Kazakhstan's bid and noted that the
Spanish CiO was "open" to consultations on the issue.
Ambassador Finley also expressed her desire to see
Kazakhstan fulfill its commitments but questioned how long
we could wait to see action before a decision must be
made. She pointed out that the CiO must be able to
represent all three aspects of the OSCE- the
political-military, economic and environmental, and the
human dimension. EU officials conceded that the GOK had
not enacted any of the reforms that External Relations
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner had identified as important to
the CiO bid.


BRUSSELS 00002402 002 OF 004


Afghanistan
--------------

5. An exchange of views on the possibility of an OSCE
mission to Afghanistan was inconclusive. EU showed little
enthusiasm for exploring the concept of an OSCE mission in
Afghanistan. The German Presidency insisted on looking
into the conditions and a potential U.S. proposal before
committing to any possible action. Hellwig-Botte and
Rufino asserted that the EU could consider adjusting OSCE
border management programming in Central Asian countries
that would indirectly benefit Afghanistan, but that it was
not inclined to support projects in country. The Germans
expressed concern that a direct involvement would be too
security and cost intensive. Hellwig-Botte further argued
that the EU was already heavily involved in Afghanistan
with a police training mission and that to launch another
mission would possibly duplicate efforts and complicate
existing structures.


6. Ambassador Finley emphasized that the U.S. wanted to
determine the interest in the concept of OSCE involvement
before considering concrete action proposals. She pointed
out that 21 non-EU and non-NATO countries, including
Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors, had expressed
interest in seeing stability in Afghanistan through the
OSCE. The OSCE could provide a vehicle through which these
same countries could make a contribution and, in doing so,
create a multiplier - and not a duplicative -- effect for
EU and NATO efforts. Finley observed that the EU's new
police training mission would still leave critical gaps at
lower levels and left unanswered President Karzai's request
for OSCE assistance. An OSCE effort could add value by
filling that gap. The EU representatives reiterated
skepticism for the concept and alluded to policy fatigue,
noting that they are already involved in two projects
within the country and were reluctant to begin another.
Hellwig-Botte suggested that the Afghans needed to clarify
their request to the OSCE.

Russia - CFE
--------------

7. Council Secretariat Policy Planning Director Helga
Schmid, reaffirmed the EU's belief in the value of the CFE
and the need for an adapted CFE "in the light of global
security changes." She was reassured by the U.S.
commitment to an adapted CFE, but asked for clarification
of the USG's position on ratification of the treaty in
light of recent remarks by Senator Lugar that advice and
consent to the adapted treaty would be conditioned on
Russia fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments in Georgia
and Moldova. At the May 18 EU-Russia summit, EU leaders
pressed Putin on implementation issues. PSC Troika
Ambassadors had placed the issue on the agenda of their
June 27 meeting with Russian Permrep Chizov as well. Schmid
asked for U.S. views on the Russian threat of a moratorium,
prospects that Azerbaijan and Armenia would join it, and
whether the OSCE was the appropriate forum to discuss it.


8. Robbins affirmed U.S. commitment to the CFE
and said ratification of A/CFE remained linked to Russian
fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments, as noted by Sen.
Lugar. He confirmed that the U.S. would use
established channels for CFE discussions, but is also willing
to reach out to partners in other settings. U.S.
participation in the OSCE's Extraordinary Conference on CFE
showed our commitment to engage. Robbins informed Schmid
of our intent to seek clarification of the Russian
cancellation of three planned CFE inspections due to "force
majeure." The United States was, of course, opposed to a
Russian moratorium. On Istanbul commitments, there was
also the question of who decides when these criteria are
met. The countries involved (i.e., Georgia and Moldova)
should definitely be included in this determination.

OSCE Charter and Russian Reform Proposals
--------------

9. EU and U.S. delegations confirmed Transatlantic
opposition to the OSCE Charter, and agreed that it was
necessary to gain a clearer understanding of Russian
intentions for pursuing one. EU Policy Unit Director Schmid
stated that refusing flat-out to discuss the charter will
cause problems with Russia. Ambassador Finley suggested
that partners should consider whether and how we could
address other Russian interests in the OSCE in order to
hold the line against a charter. Hellwig-Botte (German
Presidency) agreed that it is a question of finding out
the Russian plan and what they really want. USOSCE
Polmincouns pointed out that Russian insistence on the
charter was perhaps part of a larger Russian effort to be
aggressive against the OSCE. Commission Russia Unit Deputy
Tibbels doubted that Russia had any overarching
strategy behind its rhetoric and actions other than to

BRUSSELS 00002402 003 OF 004


demonstrate that Russia was back on the world stage and
that nothing can be solved without their involvement.
Russian domestic succession politics informed the tactics
of Russian diplomats who were increasingly reluctant to
concede anything in international fora.

Parliamentary Assembly, Election monitoring & ODIHR
-------------- --------------

10. The German Presidency and the Commission assessed that
Russia would invite ODIHR to monitor the Duma elections in
December, but anticipated problems that could have broader
repercussions for the OSCE. Helwig-Botte expressed concern
that Russia might try to constrain ODIHRs operations in an
effort to create a precedent for future OSCE election
observation missions. Helwig-Botte repeatedly stressed
that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's quarrel with ODIHR
was interlinked with ODHIR monitoring in Russia. The
German EU Presidency urged careful preparation for the
likely discussion in Madrid on the Russian election
monitoring mission. Helwig-Botte urged like-minded
partners to caution MPs critical of ODIHR not to play into
the hands of Russia in its efforts to destroy ODHIR.
Finley added that we could undercut Russian's efforts by
quietly nudging ODIHR to use softer language in reports
without surrendering the principles.


Georgia and South Ossetia
--------------

11. EUR/RPM Director Robbins provided an overview of the
situation in South Ossetia, noting that the water dispute
threatened to impede summer reconstruction plans, including
the building of schools. The terms of the closure of the
Russian base at Gudauta was also a point of contention.
USDEL urged the EU to support expansion of the OSCE
monitors at the checkpoints. Schmid provided a more upbeat
picture based on her visit to Georgia in March to meet with
the JCC. She observed that CBMs as well as security, and
customs and border management measures had begun to be
implemented. Although the Russians were not particularly
enthusiastic about OSCE involvement in these measures,
these concerns were not big obstacles to progress. She
stressed the need to get the Russia on board with any new
measures. Schmid conceded that the Georgian-backed South
Ossetian leader Sanakoyev supported the OSCE's economic
rehabilitation program for the breakaway republic as well
as the initial confidence building measures, but rejected
the idea of EU meetings with Sanakoyev as it would
undermine EU credibility with all the parties. (NOTE:
During his June 26 visit to Brussels, Sanakoyev met with
Caucasus policy experts at the Commission, but not with
Council Secretariat officials. End Note.) Both the EU and
USDel agreed on the need for more CBMs between Georgians
and South Ossetians.

Transnistria
--------------

12. USDEL reviewed for EU counterparts the benefits of and
objectives for internationalizing the current peacekeeping
force in Moldova, noting that DAS Kramer had recently
circulated a proposal to NATO Allies. Robbins pointed out
that Moldova supported this effort, and that Russia could
contribute to such a force. The concept would allow Russia
to fulfill a key Istanbul commitment and open the way for the
ratification of the adapted CFE treaty. Robbins and EU
counterparts confirmed that the "5 2" negotiating format
was important in reaching a final political settlement. The
U.S. also supported the creation of an informal contact
group on Moldova at the OSCE, similar to one created to
discuss Georgia.


13. Schmid acknowledged that the unraveling of the
CFE could bring about new impetus for negotiations of a
multilateral PKF for Transnistria. However, in several of
its discussions on changing the PKO composition, the
Council's Political and Security Committee continued to
oppose such a move in the absence of a political settlement
first. That being said, Transnistria was perhaps the
easiest frozen conflict to solve. Russia has been sending
mixed signals regarding its cooperation. Moscow had not
pushed the Transnistrian side to participate in the 5 2
discussions, and at the same time had reduced financial
support to the breakaway region. Schmid further reported
that Ukrainian leaders believed that Russia would abandon
Smirnoff by the end of the year. In any case, she urged
that there be "no surprises" from the United States on the
issue. (Comment: Given the large format of the US -EU
Troika and the sensitivity of many member states to the
idea, we were not surprised that Schmid failed to mention
the Council Secretariat's interest in pursuing Transnistria
as a test case for EU ESDP cooperation with Russia.)


BRUSSELS 00002402 004 OF 004


Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------

14. The EU Troika asked for U.S. views on
Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. and EU delegations shared
concerns about the deterioration of media freedom in
Azerbaijan as well as the widening income gap between
Azeris in N-K and Azerbaijan. Ambassador Finley agreed with
the German EU Presidency that the situation deserves to be
closely watched.


Central Asia
--------------

15. Both sides agreed that Central Asia was perhaps the
most important region for OSCE work. EU Troika participants
believed that the OSCE could "add value" to the EU's new
Central Asia strategy, particularly in the area of border
management. The USDEL rebutted the EU's assertion that the
OSCE should adapt to the EU's strategy and not the other
way around. If the OSCE were only used as a secondary
player, it would become marginalized and ineffective when
it was most needed.

Croatia
--------------

16. The USDel and EU Troika agreed that Croatia had made
good progress on meeting commitments. While there was not
yet an EU position on the closure of the OSCE's Croatia
Mission, the U.S. was ready to take that step. If others
felt strongly otherwise, however, the U.S. could consider
closing the Mission and opening a small office in Zagreb or
Vienna as a penultimate step. The German EU Presidency
noted that most of the EU member states were in favor of
downsizing, but want to be sure that Croatia completely
fulfilled its commitments before closing the mission
completely. Commission representatives (who are the
fiercest opponents of Mission closure) noted outstanding
implementation and monitoring issues associated with war
crimes trials and the return of refugees. Commission
representatives remained largely silent during the
discussion, but the German Presidency was careful to
highlight their concerns which are related to Croatia's bid
for EU membership. The USOSCE Polmincouns reiterated that
we could consider a different and smaller type of OSCE
presence to address the remaining concerns, but not merely
downsizing the current mission. With regard to the budget
issue, Ambassador Finley stated the U.S. would bring no
money to the mission. Hellwig-Botte promised to look into
the issue with USOSCE in a future meeting in Vienna.


Kosovo
--------------

17. Robbins stated that the U.S. favors maintaining a
mission in Kosovo at its current level. After its final
status
is decided, it is very important to consolidate and focus
efforts on local reform, human rights, and the welfare of
immigrants and minorities.


Council of Europe
--------------

18. According to German MFA COE Director Cohausz, the main
outcome of the EU-Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg in
May 2007 was a political commitment to create more synergy
between the two institutions. Cohausz briefed on the
creation of the European Fundamental Rights Agency in March
2007, replacing the European Monitoring Center on
Xenophobia. It will help to improve cooperation on human
rights policy in Europe. They want to avoid the
possibility of developing different standards and are in
the process of creating a formal agreement due this
autumn. The EU highlighted its disappointment with
Russia's unwillingness to ratify Protocol 14. They felt
this was deplorable since Russia had helped to create it in
the first place. If it is not ratified by June 29, they
will have to use the old procedure to elect judges to the
court. This will have severe budgetary implications. The
CoE delegate felt that Russia is just trying to make it
clear that they will not accept rules above the sovereignty
of the Russian state.



20. This message has been cleared by U.S. Head of Delegation
Ambassador Finley and the Bureau of
European Affairs.
GRAY



.