THE U.S. - EU AGREEMENT ON SECURITY OF INFORMATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002263

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PINR EUN PREL
SUBJECT: THE U.S. - EU AGREEMENT ON SECURITY OF INFORMATION

REF: BRUSSELS 00119

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary. The US-EU Agreement on the Security of
Information, signed April 30, 2007, offers an important new
vehicle by which the US can inject its perspectives into the
internal EU policy-making process and shape European
strategic thinking. It can also be used to gain insights into
EU internal planning. End summary.


2. (SBU) At the April 30 Summit, the United States and the
European Union signed an Agreement on the Security of
Information. This agreement will permit the exchange and
sharing of classified information between the U.S. and the
EU. First proposed in 2003 as one of a series of agreements
sought by the European Union, it establishes equivalencies,
procedures, and requirements for the protection of any
information that is shared under this agreement. The EU has
conveyed a note verbale agreeing to specific security
arrangements and the agreement will take full effect upon US
agreement.

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Gaining Insight into EU Thinking
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3. (C/NF) This agreement provides for the exchange of
information up to the Top Secret level. The European Union
currently produces only about 200 documents a year that are
classified Confidential or above. There are a considerable
number of documents that are designated as EU "Restricted,"
to which the US has not previously had access. These include
inernal planning documents for missions under theEuropean
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and options papers for
consideration by the Political and Security Committee (PSC).
In many instances, Council Secretariat officials or Member
State representatives have expressed a desire to share these
documents with us, but they have been constrained by the
regulations prohibiting such a release to non-EU members. We
anticipate that this agreement will result in much greater
insight and visibility into the internal EU policy-making
process with increased opportunity for sharing the US
perspective at early stages of policy development.

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New Opportunities for Shaping European Strategic Thinking
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4. (C/NF) The agreement will also permit the strategic use of
information in order to shape EU thinking. The most striking
example of this was in 2005 when the EU appeared to be headed
for a lifting of the arms embargo on China. A special,
detailed, briefing by Washington analysts was provided to
several named senior individuals within the Council
Secretariat giving the US view of developments within the

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Chinese military and their implications. The result was a 180
degree turn in EU policy, with the embargo remaining in
effect and no serious efforts being made to revisit it.
Because the security agreement was not yet in place, this
briefing required an exhaustive clearance for a one-time
sharing of information. No papers could be exchanged. Under
the new agreement, such briefings will be possible on a wider
range of issues with considerably broader impact. Iran might
be one country-specific instance where greater targeted
information exchange could foster a common US-EU strategic
understanding and bolster cooperation that would further
important US policy goals.

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Reaching a Common Strategic Understanding
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5. (C) We anticipate that one of the first uses of this
agreement will be to exchange "watch lists" of countries at
risk of instability. The EU Joint Situation Center produces
such a list, analogous to the list maintained by the US
National Intelligence Council (NIC). In exchanging these
lists, the US and the EU could arrive at a common assessment
of the countries at greatest risk and begin a series of
follow-up consultations designed to address the factors of
instability and consider preventative measures or appropriate
responses.

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Making the Case for Greater European Engagement
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6. (C/NF) The targeted sharing of information will also help
to bolster the case within the EU apparatus for greater EU
engagement in a particular theater. As an illustrative
example, a visiting US team was told recently by EU police
training planners that the EU was unaware of any smuggling
activity across the Lebanese-Syrian border. They pointed out
that their assessment was based solely on open source
information. US evidence or analysis related to the border
situation would provide the police planners and civilian
crisis management directorate with hard facts upon which they
could build the political case for an EU border monitoring
mission. This principle could be applied to any number of
issues and areas, including the Middle East, the Balkans,
Africa, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean,
where the EU is active under its "European Neighborhood
Policy." There are individual issues such as an embargo on
arms sales to Venezuela, threat assessments for deployed EU
missions in Gaza and the West Bank, and developments in Iran
where we believe an exchange of detailed information could be
especially valuable in assuring that we and the EU are
operating on the basis of a shared strategic assessments,


7. (C/NF) Finally, beyond the internal policy documents, the
agreement can be used to gain greater access to the wide
range of analysis produced by the Situation Center. SITCEN
papers often form the basis for policy discussions, and can
be requested by Javier Solana as part of an initial
assessment process for determining the feasibility of EU
engagement in a particular crisis area.

Gray
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