U.S. AND EU-27 HOLD THIRD DIALOGUE ON VERIFICATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 002170

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM EUN IR KN KNNP
SUBJECT: U.S. AND EU-27 HOLD THIRD DIALOGUE ON VERIFICATION
AND COMPLIANCE, JUNE 4, 2007

Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY POLMINCOUNS VINCENT CARVER
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (SBU) Summary: Assistant Secretary (A/S) of the Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI) Paula
DeSutter met with EU members of the Conference on
Disarmament/UN and Non Proliferation Working Groups (CODUN
and CONOP) June 4, 2007. This third meeting followed a
successful U.S. and EU Summit April 30 that reaffirmed our
strategic partnership with the EU and highlighted in a joint
political progress report what has been achieved. The
participants focused on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) and The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) before reviewing
the 10th Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC),the Second Review Conference of the CWC in April 2008,
NPT prepcom and BWC Sixth Review Conference results,
U.S./Russia Post START, U.S. Space Policy, North Korea and
Iran. All parties agreed that the discussion on these issues
were fruitful and the expert discussion on the FMCT yielded a
better understanding of the U.S. view on whether the FMCT is
verifiable. End Summary.

Highlighting Key Issues
--------------


2. (U) German Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking opened the third
U.S.-EU Member State dialogue on Verification and Compliance
by thanking Assistant Secretary DeSutter for her engagement
with the EU on verification and compliance issues. Assistant
Secretary DeSutter stressed the U.S.-EU strategic

SIPDIS
partnership, Russia,s concerns relative to CFE and its
request for an extraordinary conference, and observed the
success of the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Review Conference (RevCon).


3. (C) A/S DeSutter highlighted Iranian and North Korean
noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the resultant negative impact on the regime. She posited
whether these developments provided "lessons learned" for the
international community. Russian threats to suspend
implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE) were very disturbing, she said, but she hoped
that Russia's objective in calling for an "Extraordinary
Conference" was to help ensure the future of the CFE regime.


4. (U) A/S DeSutter also emphasized opportunities, such as
the Second CWC Review Conference in April 2008, whereby,
States Parties will meet to review the effectiveness and
operation of the Convention. It is an opportunity, she said,
"to look forward to things well done."

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said FMCT compliance is critical
and highlighted enhanced detectability and action against
violators as crucial, especially in regard to Iran. The role
of the UN, as final arbiter, should be strengthened.
Reflecting on the CFE Extraordinary Conference, Luedeking
stated the EU was firmly in support of mutually reinforcing
agreements, which established a framework for long-term
security on the European continent.


6. (C) VCI Nuclear Affairs Office Director Dr. Stanley Fraley
previewed his remarks by stating that, as reported to the CD
in Geneva, the U.S. had conducted a study that concluded that
an FMCT would not be effectively verifiable. He focused on
key verification issues:

- Detection of clandestine sites (which would be
especially problematic under an FMCT because the nuclear
weapons states would have facilities and nuclear materials
that would not be subject to the agreement);

- Monitoring production at declared facilities;

- The allowed production of fissile material after
entry-into-force for non-proscribed military purposes (such
as for naval propulsion);

- Monitoring material declared after the cut-off date to
verify that material is not diverted;

- Lack of application of an FMCT to material produced
before the cut-off date; and

- Determining whether any material produced after the
cut-off date was for a permitted or proscribed purpose.


BRUSSELS 00002170 002 OF 005



7. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said the EU position is that
countries should enter an FMCT negotiation with no
preconditions. German Peace Research Institute FMCT
specialist Annette Schaper added that the world is insecure
because there exists a great deal of fissile material and its
whereabouts are unknown. She added that the U.S. is not a
country of concern unlike Pakistan and Russia. Russia
rebukes related questions with "it is national business."
International concern about fissile material should not be
disregarded.


8. (C) Schaper said that at the commencement of cut-off
discussions, there was a need for international compliance,
verified by the IAEA, for example. A recommencement of such
discussions would send a positive signal and be symbolic.
She responded to Dr. Fraley's points by stating that it is
clear there will be locations that are exempt. But, why not
treat sites outside the treaty as &Black Boxes,8 put
"fences around the black box" and just monitor what goes in
and out of the facility using a &Yes/No8 monitoring system
to protect sensitive information. We cannot accept that it is
hopeless, she said. Luedeking agreed that one hundred
percent verification is not possible, but measures that can
be instituted for possible violations should be considered.
Dr. Fraley pointed out that Black Boxes do not help because
fissile material not subject to the treaty would be entering
and leaving the facility. Items would not be stopped or
inspected even when the monitoring system gave a &Yes8
reading.


9. (C) A/S DeSutter noted that standards of verifiability
change depending on the covered item, and there is always
risk of cheating. Fundamental challenges include the date
the material was produced (i.e., before or after the cut-off
date). If the material was produced prior to the cut-off
date, it is not subject to the FMCT. We must be able to
determine the purpose for which the material was produced.
Verifiability depends on what one is attempting to monitor.


10. (C) Luedeking said that one of the purposes of the IAEA
is to insure non-diversion. If arguments against
verification are carried to the extreme, "then why bother
with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol," he questioned.
If we are so uncertain on the verifiability of FMCT, then why
have the NPT?


11. (C) Dr. Fraley emphasized that under the NPT safeguards
regime, inspectors are allowed to look for undeclared fissile
material, and its presence would be a violation. The
differences between the NPT and an FMCT are significant.

Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC)
--------------


12. (C) Speaking on behalf of the EU, Luedeking said HCoC is
"still in crisis." He opined that the Sixth Annual
Conference held on May 31 ) June 1, 2007 was an improvement
over last year,s meeting, but Russia was obstructive and
threatened a moratorium on pre-launch notifications. Russia
also criticized the U.S. for not submitting pre-launch
notifications. Luedeking reported that there has been an
improvement in annual declarations, but acknowledged this was
far from encouraging. Although the EU has been active in
demarching non-subscribing states, Luedeking noted that more
needs to be done. On May 30, 2007, the EU sponsored an HCoC
seminar that went well, although the U.S. was criticized for
not attending. Luedeking admonished the U.S. to comply with
requirements of pre-launch notifications; otherwise it could
serve as an excuse for Russia to leave the agreement.
Solana,s Personal Representative on Nonproliferation and
WMD, Annalisa Giannella, noted concern about the survival of
the agreement if there is no movement on this issue. German
representative, Luedeking was clear that something needed to
be done soon, and he added that the U.S. and EU have long
been "champions of compliance." A/S DeSutter indicated she
would discuss the issue with the appropriate officials in
Washington.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
--------------


13. (C) Discussions on CWC focused primarily on the Second
Review Conference (RevCon) scheduled for April 2008 and
ongoing activities celebrating the tenth anniversary of
entry-into-force of the CWC. On issues relative to the
Review Conference, Luedeking said the EU would soon adopt a
common position on the RevCon, and he provided some
preliminary thoughts on a few key areas the EU are likely to
strongly support. These include: the General Purpose

BRUSSELS 00002170 003 OF 005


Criterion (Article I),Article VII joint action plan on
National Implementation and the action plan on Universality.
He also indicated that the EU would focus closely on a review
of States Parties, destruction records and verification
systems and is hoping for a successful outcome of the
Conference. As part of States Parties efforts to commemorate
the 10th anniversary of the CWC, there are ongoing activities
being planned throughout the year.


14. (C) A/S DeSutter highlighted her recent participation in
a ceremony in The Hague for the unveiling of a Permanent
Memorial to all victims of Chemical Weapons as well as noted
the congratulatory message from U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice to the Director General of the OPCW, Rogelio
Pfirter, on such a significant milestone. The Italian
representative noted the success of an April international
conference to promote universality in the Mediterranean and
Middle East regions, and the British representative agreed
that universalization remains an important issue and there is
a need to address the issue of terrorism. He hoped the
upcoming Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism meeting
would present an opportunity to address these related issues.
The Polish representative indicated that they will sponsor
an event during the UN First Committee meeting on September
27 in New York.

NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
--------------


15. (C) Luedeking noted that the objective of a smooth start
during the May NPT PrepCom meeting was blocked due to Iran's
disruptive tactics. A/S DeSutter pointed out that
cooperation between the U.S. and EU delegation was excellent
and commended the EU and the German EU Presidency for
effectively coordinating EU positions to help counter Iran's
negative tactics. The Czech representative cited one positive
outcome of the PrepCom as the "clear signal" that Iran was
isolated. He said the Iranians "sounded desperate" in the
final minutes of the meeting when they realized they had lost
support of the non-aligned movement countries. He commended
the U.S. delegation for its "good actions" whereby U.S. views
were openly published and shared in advance and addressed
"the lowest common denominator."


16. (C) On Iranian compliance enforcement, A/S Desutter
called the debate within and among groups of countries
crucially important. Other countries are watching the
debate, she said, not just for nuclear weapons, but for
biological and chemical weapons. We must consider the
consequences down the road if we fail on Iranian compliance.
The Swedish representative said the international community
is closer than ever in opposition to Iranian nuclear behavior
and international pressure should continue. He asked whether
the time was optimal to begin discussing nuclear export
controls more comprehensively -- for instance, multi-nation
fuel supply in conjunction with UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 alongside sanctions regimes on the DPRK. He
suggested that IAEA, Missile Technology Control Regime and
Nuclear Supplier Group lists point to minimum standards for
export regimes.


17. (C) EU representative Giannella said it was a "big
mistake" that the world did not react quickly to Iraq's use
of chemical weapons on Iran years ago. Developing countries
must be convinced to cooperate with the west on weapons of
mass destruction because these countries characterize the
west as "obsessed" about the issue. She said the west should
emphasize it can offer technology, not only deny technology.
In discussions regarding Iran, she suggested the west not
emphasize "Iran has been isolated," but instead focus on the
positive aspect of continued dialogue.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
-------------- -


18. (SBU) As highlighted in A/S DeSutter opening remarks, she
noted the success of the BWC Review Conference which adopted
a new program of work for 2007-2010, and that work program
should provide a solid basis for enhancing implementation.
A/S DeSutter also raised the importance of timely and
accurate investigations into allegations of BW use and noted
the creation of a new BWC office under her Bureau which
focuses on BW use and its implications. She added that in
order for investigations to be effective, there should be
good baseline data on epidemiologic pattern of diseases to
understand when events have occurred and how to trace them.
That baseline should include a database of global isolates
and strains in order to trace agents used in a BW event to
specific regions of the world. The UK representative said

BRUSSELS 00002170 004 OF 005


the UK is developing a related code of conduct and involving
scientists in its preparation -- a critical effort.
Luedeking noted the success of the previous BTWC meeting and
said the EU would be putting forward working documents to be
prepared by a dedicated task force.

U.S. and Russia: Post-START
--------------


19. (C) A/S DeSutter said that the START Treaty is scheduled
to expire in December 2009, and the U.S. and Russia have
agreed that it is not appropriate to extend START and are
engaged in exchanges on a post-START arrangement that will be
characterized by transparency and confidence-building
measures. European interlocutors expressed concern about
Russian inter-continental ballistic missile tests and
accompanying, negative rhetoric and threats. Luedeking asked
if Russia was contemplating leaving the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.


20. (C) A/S DeSutter said that it is sometimes difficult to
convince countries to give up missile defense systems. She
added that the U.S. does not want Russia to feel threatened
and that she hoped additional dialogue would help.

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)
--------------


21. (C) A/S DeSutter indicated that the technical details of
the Six-Party Talks' February Agreement is an important first
step toward the complete, verifiable and irreversible
denucleariztion of North Korea have yet to be effected. In
contrast to the case of Libya, the DPRK had not yet made a
strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons.

Space Policy
--------------


22. (C) European representatives questioned why the U.S. was
opposed to an overall space policy and expressed confidence
that a code of conduct or "rules of the road" for operating
and exploring in space would be useful. Luedeking indicated
that Germany is sponsoring a related seminar in Berlin in
late June, entitled, "Challenges to Space Security." The
Italian representative said that space security concerns
conventional arms countries, not only nuclear weapons states.
There is increased interest in confidence building measures
and greater discipline in space operation/exploration.


23. (C) While acknowledging EU concerns, A/S DeSutter told
her counterparts the U.S. is very dependent on space,
especially for commercial uses (commercial global positioning
systems, telecommunications, etc.). She indicated a series
of dialogues had been held, including with NATO. There is a
need to reduce our collective vulnerabilities in an area of
significant global dependence.


24. (C) Luedeking countered that the U.S. perspective on
space policy is quite different than the EU's. The EU
believes the response to a vulnerability should include
enhanced cooperation, especially with partners, in order to
collectively address the vulnerabilities. He suggested the
U.S. investigate "arms control approaches" to which States
Parties' adhere for options. An outer space treaty could
serve as a "magna carter" that would enshrine basic norms
with potential review within a multilateral framework.
Luedeking recommended greater U.S.-EU in-depth discussions on
the risks of outer space.


25. (U) Participants

European Union
--------------
Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking, Deputy Commissioner of the
Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, Federal
Foreign Office, Berlin (German Presidency Chair)
Thomas Gobel, Deputy Head of Division, Nuclear Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin
Mark Kamperhoff, Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Division, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin
Joao Corte-Real, Head of Department, Security and Defence
Department, MFA, Lisbon
Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative of the High
Representative for Non-Proliferation of WMD
Andreas Strub, Team Coordinator, Office of the Personal
Representative of the High Representative for
Non-Proliferation of WMD
Zuzana Sutiakova, Office of the Personal Representative of
the High Representative for Non-Proliferation of WMD

BRUSSELS 00002170 005 OF 005


Representatives from 27 EU Member State Countries

United States
--------------
Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification, Compliance and Implementation
Dr. Stanley Fraley, VCI Nuclear Affairs Office Director
Johnathan Beckett, Foreign Affairs Officer and EU Coordinator
Margaret Diop, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to the EU

GRAY
.