Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS1483
2007-05-03 15:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN FM DE GUCHT'S MAY 11

Tags:  CG PGOV PREL US BE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #1483/01 1231538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031538Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5268
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0200
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001483 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR FOX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017
TAGS: CG PGOV PREL US BE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN FM DE GUCHT'S MAY 11
MEETING WITH SECRETARY RICE

Classified By: POLCOUNS TED ANDREWS. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001483

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR FOX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017
TAGS: CG PGOV PREL US BE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN FM DE GUCHT'S MAY 11
MEETING WITH SECRETARY RICE

Classified By: POLCOUNS TED ANDREWS. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Belgian FM De Gucht has three goals for his
May 11 meetings in the Department with the Secretary and
others -- raising USG consciousness on Great Lakes issues,
gaining a firsthand impression of USG goals on Russia, and
garnering favorable press as Belgium's June 10 federal
election approaches. The Minister also will want to discuss
next steps on the Kosovo resolution at the UNSC, and exchange
views on Iran. We should offer him a warm welcome, a frank
discussion, and listen seriously to his views on the DRC. He
is a friend in court who is certain to continue playing a
major role, whatever happens on June 10. End Summary.

--------------
Political Needs
--------------


2. (SBU) On May 10, Belgian FM De Gucht is taking time off
from the campaign trail to accompany King Albert to New York
for a May 14 special session of the UN Security Council.
Belgium's constitution mandates the presence of a minister
whenever the Sovereign travels abroad. Because of the
upcoming elections, where his party faces an uphill battle,
he will be traveling with a large press contingent. With De
Gucht's Flemish Liberal party doing poorly in the polls, it
is imperative for him (and the party) to show the public that
the Liberals are continuing to play an important part on the
world stage.

--------------
Africa
--------------


3. (C) De Gucht will want to intensify the level of
interchange with Washington on African issues. The Foreign
Ministry's leadership is baffled by the U.S. approach toward
the Great Lakes, where they believe we do not fully recognize
the fragility of the current situation in Congo and seem to
discount Belgium's contribution and their diplomats'
experience in the DRC. De Gucht's core message for us will
be "engage more actively," particularly in pushing the
feckless Congolese leadership to act more responsibly.


4. (C) In addition to pressing the Secretary personally on
the need to establish a consultative mechanism between the

international community and the Kabila government in
Kinshasa, De Gucht and his team want to engage directly with
the AF bureau and other influential players on AF issues. He
will highlight Belgian plans for a special session of the
UNSC focused on the protection of resources in the Congo, and
outline Belgian views on African peacekeeping too. (Comment:
While the GOB has been been busy sponsoring &sustainable
practices8 seminars and talking about rooting out corruption
and protecting DRC,s natural resources, the
Belgian-Congolese conglomerate headed by George Forrest, a
naturalized Belgian of New Zealand origin, has been fingered
by the UN and others as a contributor to &unjust
exploitation8 of DRC,s mineral wealth. Forrest,s
relationships with Belgian and DRC officials are murky at
best. Septel will provide an update on Belgium,s commercial
ties with DRC. End comment.)


5. (C) Having spent the first week of May in Sudan, De Gucht
and his team will be poised for detailed conversations on
Darfur, Somalia, and relations with the African Union. The
Belgians strongly support a more activist approach to Darfur,
but are wary about calls for them to expend more of their
resources. On Somalia, they generally have followed the
Italian-lead. They are skeptical about deeper engagement
with the African Union, but will be curious to learn more
about how we are attempting to bolster the organization's
capabilities.

--------------
Russia, Kosovo, and Iran
--------------


6. (C) Having launched his 2006 stint as Chairman in Office
of the OSCE with high hopes for striking pragmatic deals with
Moscow, De Gucht has developed a more realistic attitude. He
is a harsh critic of Moscow's role in perpetuating the frozen
conflicts, and has spoken out publicly with regard to
Russia's approach on issues like energy security. It will be
useful to probe for indications that electoral considerations
might cause him to turn down the volume of his comments about
Russia.


7. (C) Although we have not been able to broach the issue
with him directly, we do not doubt that he was appalled by

President Putin's recent statement about ratification of CFE.
The Secretary may wish to remind De Gucht that he is now
following the skeptical, pragmatic line that she urged him to
take during their first meeting in February 2005. For his
part, De Gucht will want to learn first-hand what we are
going to do next, particularly in the weeks leading up the
G-8 summit and the anticipated UNSC vote on Kosovo.


8. (C) Despite occasional signs that the MFA bureaucracy
favors a go-slow approach, De Gucht remains a firm supporter
of the US-EU strategy on Kosovo. We expect him to offer
frank assessments about how other EU members and Russia view
this strategy. As on other issues, he will want to know more
about our bottom line -- he does not want to be surprised by
any last minute compromise language on the UNSC resolution.


9. (C) On Iran, we expect De Gucht to offer two messages.
The first is one of continued strong support for a steady
toughening of sanctions. He will welcome any appreciate
comments the Secretary might offer about Belgium's leadership
of the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee. De Gucht also might
use the meeting to echo Solana's recent remarks about the
utility of a direct U.S. dialogue with Iran.

--------------
Our Goals
--------------


10. (C) Bolstering Karel De Gucht's image and standing should
be a primary USG objective. Despite occasional outbreaks of
foot-in-mouth disease early in his Foreign-ministership, he
repeatedly has proven himself to be a friend in court for the
U.S. and for U.S. interests. Whatever happens during the
elections, he will remain as Foreign Minister during what
could be a lengthy process of coalition formation. He is
moreover a strong candidate to serve as Belgium's next member
of the European Commission. We should show ourselves
engaging directly and frankly with the Belgians on their key
concerns in Africa and, insofar as possible, do all possible
to avoid springing any surprises on Kosovo or Iran.

FOX
.