GREEK CONCERNS ABOUT SEMNEBY'S METHODS SHOULD NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001307

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TAGS ORDER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017
TAGS: PREL EUN GG GR RS
SUBJECT: GREEK CONCERNS ABOUT SEMNEBY'S METHODS SHOULD NOT
PRECLUDE MOVING FORWARD ON SOME OF SEMNEBY'S RECOMMENDATIONS

REF: (A) BRUSSELS 822 (B) BRYZA-FRIED E-MAIL APRIL 17

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Classified By: Enlargement Unit Chief Vincent Carver for reasons 1.5 (B
/D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Greek Political and Security Committee (PSC)
Ambassador Lozos told DAS Bryza April 17 that Greece largely
shares U.S. views on Georgia and that Athens wants to
reinforce Tbilisi's territorial integrity and Euro-Atlantic
ties while remaining sensitive to Russian concerns. In this
context, Lozos supported a "step-by-step joint U.S.-EU
approach." He expressed consternation at EU Special
Representative (EUSR) Semneby's "missionary zeal," said his
stewardship had not met Greek expectations, and characterized
Semneby's recent trip to Washington and complaints about
Greek opposition to some of Semneby's proposals as "disloyal
behavior to the Union." Despite these misgivings, Greece
would support most of Semneby's recommendations if Tbilisi,
the UN, and the OSCE are fully on board. END SUMMARY

GREEK - SYSTEMATIZED SUPPORT FOR GEORGIA
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2. (C) DAS Matt Bryza and Greek PSC Ambassador Lozos met
April 17 to discuss Georgia and reports that Greece has been
obstructing two key proposals of EUSR Peter Semneby on
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, e.g.:

- Providing one EU policeman to complement UN police efforts
in Abkhazia and one EU policeman to complement OSCE
security/observer efforts in South Ossetia; and

- Extending the mandate of the EU's Border Security Team to
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Both Bryza and Lozos agreed on the utility of expanding the
EU's footprint in Georgia's conflict zones to help "unfreeze"
discussions on conflict resolution and on the need to help
Georgia move toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration.
Lozos, noting that Greece "and a number of other member
states" believe Russian concerns should be better taken into
account, observed the historic and cultural ties between
Greece and Georgia. Athens, he said, wants to help promote a
stable and democratic Georgia. The Georgians, however, often
have too high expectations and remain impatient and
emotional. A step-by-step joint EU-U.S. approach might help
calm down the Georgians and increase stability.


3. (C) Bryza stressed that Georgia will feel secure only
once it knows its path to membership in NATO and the EU will
be determined by Georgia's own behavior rather than by
political considerations within Europe (e.g., avoiding
tension with Russia). Georgia sees the Baltic States as an
example of what membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions can
do for a country's relations with Russia, as Moscow decreased
its pressure when it became clear there was no way to
obstruct the Baltic states' movement toward NATO. The U.S.
objective is to help Georgia enter the MAP process at the
next NATO Summit if Georgia sustains its military and
judicial reforms and its constructive approach toward
conflict resolution.

COPIOUS CRITICISM OF SEMNEBY
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4. (C) Lozos explained Greece's opposition to the recent
proposals of EUSR Peter Semneby as resulting largely from
procedural matters, Semneby's "missionary zeal," and
aggressive style aimed at obtaining immediate EU approval of
his proposals. Such attributes and actions have not won him
Greek admiration. Rather, Semneby's record "is not up to our
expectations." Lozos explained that, while the PSC approved
the overwhelming majority of Semneby's proposals, Athens
still had concerns about some of his ideas. Greece is not
convinced of the value added of the two proposed police
positions. According to Lozos, neither the UN nor the OSCE
had approached the EU about this proposal and the collocation
of EU police representatives in UN buildings. In fact,
Greece does not even know the Georgian Government's position
on the proposal. While others (apparently incoming EU
President Portugal and possibly other member states) have
similar and additional concerns, Greece would have no
objections to sending the two police officers if both the UN
and the OSCE accept the proposal.


5. (C) Lozos outlined Greek concerns about Semneby's
proposal to use the nine-person EU border monitoring team for
customs and rule-of-law missions. Lozos questioned the added
value of having the border monitoring team perform such

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functions that are outside its official mandate, and in the
difficult separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
He also cautioned that doing so could send the wrong signal
to both the Russian and Georgian authorities. Greece,
however, would support creating two EU communications centers
for border security cooperation in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, if these were acceptable to the Georgian Government.
Rather than supporting Semneby's "academic and NGO-like"
approach of making Georgia a test case for innovative ideas,
Greece favors moving forward with those of Semneby's
proposals that Athens has already supported.


6. (C) Not missing an opportunity to further criticize
Semneby, Lozos pointed to Semneby's draft report that
referred to trade promotion with northern Cyprus as a
maladroit effort that only alienated several member states,
especially Cyprus, but also including Greece, Spain, Hungary,
and Slovakia. Lozos also complained about both the U.S. and
Lithuanian demarches in Athens regarding Greece's opposition
to Semneby's latest proposals as unfairly characterizing the
Greek position as obstructionist. To top this off, Semneby
traveled to Washington rather than discussing how to resolve
the problems with either Lozos personally or with the MFA in
Athens. Such "whining to a third country," even a country
with which Greece wants to work closely on Georgia, could be
seen as "disloyal to the Union." Lozos added that he may
raise this within the EU. Getting back on a constructive
path, Lozos concluded that he may propose an informal trip
with three or four other PSC ambassadors to Georgia to see
how the EU can better help Tbilisi.

COMMENT
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7. (C) Despite Lozos' stream of criticism against Semneby,
including Semneby's trip to Washington (and the fact that
Semneby had not yet submitted a report on his trip),Lozos
agreed with Bryza's main points -- the need to strengthen
Georgia's confidence through greater Euro-Atlantic
integration and clear support for Georgia's territorial
integrity. He also stressed the need to move forward on the
Semneby recommendations that Athens has already supported.
Lozos did not object when Bryza emphasized the U.S. goal of
getting Georgia into MAP at the next NATO summit, despite his
professed sympathies for Russian sensitivities. Bryza
offered to ask informally the UN, the OSCE, and the Georgian
Government about Semneby's proposals with an eye to
addressing Athens' procedural concerns. It will be important
to press these issues forward to ensure they do not become
pretexts for what may be Amb. Lozos' localized efforts to
oppose Semneby's efforts on Georgia. Lozos claims he has
tried to discuss these matters with Georgia's ambassador in
Brussels. When Bryza conveyed this claim to the Georgian
ambassador, she howled in disbelief, lamenting that she has
tried for months to secure a meeting with Lozos, but with no
success.


8. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

GRAY
.