Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS1209
2007-04-11 09:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

EU AND US DISCUSS TURKEY, CROATIA AT COELA TROIKA

Tags:  BE CR CY EUN PREL TK TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1024
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1209/01 1010917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 110917Z APR 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001209

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: BE CR CY EUN PREL TK TU
SUBJECT: EU AND US DISCUSS TURKEY, CROATIA AT COELA TROIKA
AND OTHER MEETINGS

REF: USEU BRUSSELS 1130

Classified By: Institutional Affairs Unit Chief Courtney Nemroff for re
asons 1.4 @ap SUM


2. (SBU) The German My
on a variety of economic iQsues. Silliman told his European
counterparts to feel free to call on the USG for assistance
on any of these issues, drawing on our relationship with
Ankara.


3. (C) Turning to the PKK, Haber expressed concern over the
possibility of a Turkish incursion into Iraq to counter the
PKK threat. She asked whether Europe could have an impact
with the PKK. Silliman cautioned against EU member states'
tendency to connect PKK to Kurdish rights, which he said gave
the PKK a base for operating in Europe. He noted it may be
useful to increase cooperation between EU member states'
police and military services to counter PKK criminal
activity, financing, recruting and propoganda activities in
Europe. He also suggested that European leaders (perhaps
bilaterally) stress in conversations with governing Iraqi
Kurds that there will be implications if they do not push
back against the PKK.


4. (C) Portuguese Head of Enlargement and Western Balkans
Pedro Antunes said the EU would be extremely interested in
seeing how GOT authorities reacted to PKK actions. (Note: a
number of EU contacts raised in separate meetings with
Silliman their concerns that a GOT intervention in Iraq could
have a "devastating" effect on member state perceptions of
Turkey, as it would reinforce their argument that the
accession of state that bordered on Iraq would be dangerous
for European security. Senior Commission officials stressed
that Turkish intervention in Iraq could have grave
repercussions for the entire Turkish accession process.)


5. (SBU) In addition to the troika meeting, Silliman briefed
27 members of the COELA working group, the forum in which all
27 member states, the Council, and the Commission discuss
enlargement issues. During his briefing, an official from
the Dutch permanent representation noted his "shock" at
statements by Turkish academics and others at a recent Wilton

Park conference where they referred to the EU's December
Council decision on Turkey as the EU's "humiliation" of

BRUSSELS 00001209 002 OF 003


Turks. In response, Silliman noted the importance of
reaching out to Turkish civil society and described USG
efforts in this area, including our large student exchange
program.


6. (C) Silliman met separately with Commission and friendly
Permanent Representation officials, as well as with the
German presidency and incoming Portuguese presidency.
Commission contacts noted steady progress in screening and
opening Turkey's acquis chapters, with four chapters possibly
opening by the end of the German presidency (note: one of the
four, the chapter on enterprise and industrial policy, was
opened March 28.) They added that progress should continue
during the upcoming Portuguese presidency.


7. (C) However, the Commission officials acknowledged the
current sense of calm in negotiations would not last,
especially when it came time to discuss more controversial
political reforms in October or November 2007. They also
noted they would need to take stock of progress on the Cyprus
issue later this year. An official in Enlargement
Commissioner Olli Rehn's cabinet noted Ali Babacan had been
an active, regular visitor to Brussels and that his efforts
were playing well in Brussels. She added that politically
the EU wanted to renew cooperation with Turkey in the energy
sector. The Commission was planning a high level conference
in Istanbul on energy cooperation which Energy Commissioner
Piebalgs and Rehn would likely attend, along with Turkish
Foreign Minister Gul. German presidency officials noted they
remained hopeful they could achieve "something" on direct
trade with the Turkish Cypriots during their presidency,
although not likely as much as they had hoped.

8.. (C) A UK Permanent Representation official stressed that
the French election could play heavily into the dynamics of
negotiations, noting the danger that Sarkozy, if elected,
could be tempted to make a clear statement about Turkey at
the June European Council meeting within the context of
discussions over EU Constitutional reform and the future of
the Constitutional treaty. Our UK contact noted it would be
helpful for France to be able to show some "commercial wins"
from the negotiation process, for example on issues such as
the beef ban or IPR, to help get French buy in. Overall, our
source said "we probably have 18 months" before the EU
re-focuses its attention on Turkey's lack of implementation
of the Ankara Additional Protocol, around the beginning of
the French presidency, at which point Cyprus will start to
make noises again. That, he said, would be a good time for
Turkey to make more dramatic moves. He noted it might be
useful for GOT officials to go to France, meet the new French
President, and possibly announce some "France-friendly"
concessions, possibly in the form of some sort of trade-off
for Ankara given that the French will be assuming the
presidency.


9. (C) Our UK contact assessed that the more difficult acquis
chapters to open would be those that got into issues of
normalization and international organizations. He indicated
that Turkey would likely at a minimum need to cease blocking
Cyprus in Waasenaar in order to gain more member state
sympathy on some of these points. Regarding direct trade for
the Turkish Cypriots, the UK expert was pessimistic about the
presidency's chances for finding a successful formula, but
pointed to the fact of having direct trade "on the table"
could be useful for ensuring "good behavior" by the Greek
Cypriots.

Croatia
--------------


8. (SBU) European Commission Deputy Head of Unit for Croatia
Hendrik Bendixen briefed the troika on the status of
Croatia's accession negotiations and noted that the screening
process will be finished by mid-April. Commission
interlocutors reported that that Zagreb's institutional
capacity for negotiations is good, but not deep, and the
government has difficulty making some political decisions.
Despite relatively good progress, Bendixen said that
Croatia's 2009 accession target date is unrealistic, and
while the government's plans for reform appear promising, the
EU is waiting to see tangible results. The Commission has

BRUSSELS 00001209 003 OF 003


closed two chapters (Education and Culture and Science and
Research) and plans to open more by the end of the year.
Other chapters will likely remain unopened until 2008,
pending Croatian ability to meet key benchmarks. At the top
of the Commission's agenda are issues of judicial reform,
anti-corruption, and human rights. EU negotiators are
concerned about the backlog of court cases and the lack of
transparency in financial crimes and corruption cases.
Bendixen also noted Croatia's slow progress on refugee
returns. He said that shortcomings in all of these areas were
indicative of broader questions about the functioning of rule
of law in Croatia. He added that Zagreb had put forward a
promising plan for 2007, however, the EU side cautioned that
reform may slow later this year with the approach of the
November elections.


9. (SBU) Hoh noted that the U.S. viewed the accession process
in a positive way and said that the U.S. shared EU concerns
about the judicial system and refugee returns. Hoh observed
that much of the corruption is a result of the Communist
legacy; attention to economic reform will enhance prospects
for growth. Washington is optimistic that the EU accession
process will aid in this regard and the U.S. will be
supportive. He said that while the U.S. and EU held differing
views on closing the OSCE mission in Croatia, the potential
closure will mean that the two sides will need to redouble
cooperative efforts to ensure progress on refugee returns and
minority rights. (Note: In a separate meeting, Commission
Head of Unit for Croatia David Daly told Hoh that the EU
highly valued the OSCE mission, and believed that replacing
its countrywide monitoring function would be difficult, and
that closure would be premature.)


10. (SBU) Hoh also underscored the broader, regional
circumstances of Croatia's role as EU candidate, observing
that Croatia wanted to be a model for its neighbors by
offering help them to prepare, but the effect of its actions
was sometimes to leave them behind. In this context, he
inquired about general accession standards for the rest of
the region, and whether political considerations will come
into play as other countries negotiate their accession.
Bendixen argued that EU standards have probably become more
stringent now than during previous enlargements. The EU is
taking their lessons learned and applying them to current
candidates.


11. (U) EUR/SEA Doug Silliman and EUR/SCE Chris Hoh have
cleared this cable.

MCKINLEY

.