Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS119
2007-01-16 13:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON US -EU GENERAL

Tags:  EUN PGOV PINR PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8687
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0119/01 0161320
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161320Z JAN 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD PRIORITY
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
RXFPSH/SHAPE SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000119 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA (FAUCHER),L-LEI (PROPP),L-EUR
(OLSON),DS/SI/IS (MASCIANA)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: EUN PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON US -EU GENERAL
SECURITY OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT HELD IN BRUSSELS DECEMBER
4-7

REF: A. 03 USEU 00555 B. 04 USEU 00516 C. 04 STATE
034277 D. 05 USEU 02918

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000119

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA (FAUCHER),L-LEI (PROPP),L-EUR
(OLSON),DS/SI/IS (MASCIANA)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: EUN PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON US -EU GENERAL
SECURITY OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT HELD IN BRUSSELS DECEMBER
4-7

REF: A. 03 USEU 00555 B. 04 USEU 00516 C. 04 STATE
034277 D. 05 USEU 02918

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary. The first round of negotiations on a US-EU
General Security of Information Agreement took place in
Brussels the week of December 4, 2006. The agreement would
create a legal framework under which classified information
could be exchanged between the US and the European Union.
End summary.


--------------
First Round of Negotiations
--------------


2. (C) A U.S. delegation including representatives from
State, DoD and other agencies completed the first round of
discussions with the EU on a General Security of Information
Agreement (GSOIA),December 4-7 in Brussels. The
negotiations began with briefings by EU security officials
(Commission and Council Secretariat) on EU law and policy on
the protection of EU Classified Information. The respective
Council and Commission offices of security gave a detailed
briefing on the extensive regulations governing access to,
and protection of, EU classified information. State's DS/IS
made a similar presentation covering U.S. law and policy on
the protection and exchange of U.S. classified information.
The week-long session also involved inspections of several
Council Secretariat and Commission facilities and registries
where EU Classified information is handled, including the
Council Secretariat's Joint Situation center, an intelligence
fusion cell, where information provided by Member State
services is synthesized into finished intelligence analysis
for senior EU policymakers.

--------------
Limited EU Production of Classified Materials
--------------


3. (C) From the discussions, it became clear that as a
by-product of the NATO-EU Security Agreement, the EU has
imported whole cloth the NATO Classified Information regime.

This background informed all EU approaches during the
subsequent negotiations on the text. The EU's classification
system has four tiers: EU Restricted; Confidential; Secret;
and Top Secret. Other than "EU Restricted" information, the
EU actually produces very few pieces of its own classified
information (perhaps in the hundreds on an annual basis). In
addition, very few EU staff members actually handle the
information that is produced (approximately 200). There is a
strict system of access controls, need to know, vetting by
Member State agencies, and accountability in place. There is
no broadly available desktop classified LAN system such as we
have at State, although there are a number of similar systems
under development.


--------------
Remaining Areas for Resolution
--------------


4. (C/NF) Negotiations on the text of the agreement went
well and point to likely completion during the first quarter
of 2007, possibly in time to be signed prior to the
anticipated late-April U.S.-EU Summit in Washington.
Following is a summary of the few remaining areas to be
resolved:

-- Scope of the Agreement. There was some discussion during
the negotiations whether the agreement would apply to all
classified information exchanges between the U.S. and EU, as
the EU wishes to be the case. The current text does not say
"all"; it simply says that it shall apply to classified
information provided or exchanged between the Parties,
preserving U.S. flexibility on this point. Other Articles

BRUSSELS 00000119 002 OF 003


preserve existing arrangements between the Parties. The EU
thus understands that the scope of this Agreement is not
all-inclusive. The Agreement would be binding on the USG, the
Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Secretary
General/High Representative.

-- Equivalence. The EU has a category of classified
information called "restreint" (or "EU Restricted") which has
no U.S. equivalent but which, if provided to the U.S. under
this agreement "shall be protected(in a manner at least
equivalent to that afforded to it by the releasing Party."
"Restreint" means "restricted" and under U.S. law and
practice would be treated as foreign government confidential
information, albeit with modified handling. We must confirm
that the proposed text will not present unanticipated
problems.

-- Limitation on future agreements. The U.S. pressed the EU
to delete a clause stating that this agreement shall not
preclude the Parties from concluding other future Agreements
relating to the provision of classified information "provided
they do not conflict with the provisions of this Agreement".
This is standard EU verbiage, and they were surprised by our
request to delete. We pointed out that it was restrictive in
character, and future U.S. agreements with third countries
need not necessarily meet the baseline of a U.S.-EU
Agreement.

-- Technical arrangements. The U.S. agreed in principle to a
two-tier structure consisting of a binding international
agreement and a subsidiary set of security arrangements
governing some of the more detailed technical aspects. The
EU provided a draft of the latter only at the end of the
round which we have not yet reviewed or commented upon. The
EU claimed it needed the flexibility of this structure so
that the technical detail can be amended over time without
the need for iterative approval by the (inter-governmental)
EU Council. On the EU side the security arrangements would
be entered into by the EU Council and Commission Security
Offices. We deferred a decision on who the party to the
security arrangements would be for the U.S., and what the
relationship would be between that party and the party to the
international agreement itself. The EU does not regard the
implementing arrangement as binding as a matter of
international law.

-- Implementation. A key issue upon conclusion of the
agreement will be coordinating implementation. The EU has a
registry system in place at the Commission and Council
Secretariat to register and distribute all EU Classified

SIPDIS
information via a series of sub-registries to all those
determined to have a need to know. They seek a similar
arrangement with the U.S. The USG will have to decide which
Agency should have the lead, and whether we should institute
a registry system similar to the system DoD instituted for
the handling of NATO classified information. If the registry
is housed within State, it must be determined who will run
this system. In order to conclude this agreement, a decision
on our approach will need to be taken prior to the arrival of
the EU delegation to conduct its security site survey and
negotiate any outstanding questions. The EU has proposed
late January or early February for such a visit.

--------------
Background on the US-EU Security Agreement
--------------


5. (C/NF) As part of the development of the European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and a European Security
Strategy, the EU Council Secretariat was charged in 2003 with
negotiating a series of information-sharing agreements with
partners and potential partners. The proposal for an
agreement whereby the USG and the European Union could share
classified information was first made in a letter from EU
HR/SG Javier Solana in February 2003 (ref a). Then-Secretary
Powell responded that the EU should begin discussions with
USEU to consider such an agreement (ref c).


BRUSSELS 00000119 003 OF 003



6. (C/NF) The proposal gained momentum in 2004, with S/CRS
and the National Intelligence Council seeking to share
classified watch and warning lists as part of a consultative
process on emerging threats. The EU maintains its own
classified watch list and an agreement allowing the exchange
of such information was recognized as key to meaningful
discussion and policy coordination with respect to failed and
failing states and other threats (ref d).


7. (C/NF) Additional impetus came from the recognized
inability to inject US policy perspectives on particular
issues, most notably the China Arms Embargo. In the absence
of an agreement allowing access to classified information, it
proved very difficult to explain the US rationale for its
concerns over developments within the Chinese military. The
conclusion of this agreement will permit US views to be
injected into EU policy deliberations on a range of issues
such as arms sales to Venezuela, developments in DPRK, events
in the Middle East - including situational awareness in
regions where the EU has deployed personnel, Africa, and
others where we share a common policy goal with Europe. We
have often found ourselves at a serious disadvantage in
policy discussions due to the inability to share sensitive
information, and many within the Council Secretariat are
equally frustrated by their inability to share with us.


8. (C/NF) The proposed agreement will not pertain to the
exchange of operational military intelligence, which will
continue to be shared via existing NATO-EU channels. It is
not envisioned that raw intelligence data will be exchanged
through this channel, but rather "finished" analysis,
diplomatic reporting and policy papers. Under the proposed
agreement, there will be no/no obligation to share classified
information by either side. Access to internal EU planning
documents - currently not possible - will give US
policymakers greater insight into EU thinking, especially in
the area of stabilization and crisis management missions.

Gray
.