REFORMING ESDP CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001156

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: EUN MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: REFORMING ESDP CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

REF: BRUSSELS 00311

Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. Several distinct, but related, efforts are
underway within the EU to improve the effectiveness of crisis
response capabilities under the European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP) which after 7 years of operation and (shortly)
17 missions, is increasingly seen as having reached the
limits of operational capacity. There are discussions of the
need for improved planning, and better integration of the
civilian and military components of ESDP. We are assured that
no one envisions a replay of the 2003 Tervuren debate, but
there is gathering momentum for a more effective
civilian-military planning process within ESDP. End summary.

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Improving Effectiveness
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2. (SBU) The European Union is engaged in several
restructuring and reform processes designed to respond to
identified weaknesses and shortfalls in crisis management
response capabilities. These processes are separate, but
related. Some are aimed at general restructuring for
increased effectiveness, and others are driven by specific
mission requirements and lessons learned. There is a
pervasive sense within the security-related structures of the
EU that the expanding pace of ESDP engagements cannot be
maintained without meaningful improvements in efficiency and
effectiveness. Including the impending deployment of the
Kosovo post-status mission and the police
monitoring/mentoring mission in Afghanistan, ESDP will have
fielded 17 missions (four of which have been military) on
four continents since its inception in 1999.

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The Hampton Court Process
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3. (SBU) In December 2005, the EU Heads of State and
Government, meeting in an informal Summit outside of London,
concluded that there was a need to improve the effectiveness
of the EU's civilian crisis management "instruments." In a
subsequent paper on crisis management structures, Javier
Solana noted that the EU was "currently close to the limits
of our capacity." He concluded that further steps are needed
to increase efficiency, professionalism and capacity. In the
view of Solana and the Council Secretariat, the EU's "added
value" in crisis management is its ability to bring together
civilian and military assets. The 2005 papers called for
strengthening command and control of deployed missions,
clarifying chains of command and responsibility, and to
ensure access to "planned operational facilities in order to
deal with situations twenty-four hours/ seven days a week as
necessary." The declared full operational capability of the
EU Operations Center in January 2007 is one component of this
program. Other initiatives underway include dividing the
current directorate for civilian crisis management into two
components. One will constitute a Civilian Crisis Planning
Capability (CCPC) which will be dedicated to operational
planning and control of deployed missions, and the "rump"
directorate would do concept development and work with
international partners.


4. (C/NF) As part of this Hampton Court process,
newly-arrived Director General of the EU Military Staff, LTG
David Leakey, is taking steps to enhance and improve the
Military Staff's support to civilian planning and operations.
The Military Staff, currently numbering some 190 officers,
provides military expertise and support to the Military
Committee. It covers many of the expected staff roles
(personnel, intelligence, exercises, current operations,
logistics, and CIS) but does not have a standing planning
capability. There are planners within the EUMS, and
individual officers are assigned to work with the civilian
directorate on specific mission planning. A closer, more
systematic linkage and more effective support - within
existing resources -- are among Leakey's goals. A French
paper submitted to the PSC on March 27, drew a connection
between this process of improving EU crisis management
structures and the need for a permanent planning structure
within the EU Military Staff they identified as part of the

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DRC lessons rQrce
generation, infstics were also
notessed. The Secretariat paed shortum, Spain, SwedFrance, Portugal,
Geece and Germany) argued that there is a need fQr a limited
standing planning capability withQn the EU in order to
address the problems made evident by the EUFOR DRC mission.
The Ministes did not endorse the need for an EU OperatiQnal
Headquarters.

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PSC Qonsideration
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6. (C/NF) UQ comments on the original Secretariat paper
submitted to the PSC argued that the ability to stnd up the
existing Operations Center provides the EU with an additional
capability toplan and run operations in circumstances where
a joint civilian-military response is required and where no
national HQ has been identified. They call for a clearer role
for the Civ-Mil cell within the EUMS in strategic contingency
planning, and for the Operational Commander to establish
procedures in the OPLAN for in-theater coordination with
other actors.


7. (C/NF) In PSC discussions March 27, Spain, Greece, and
Portugal pressed for further consideration of internal
planning requirements, and France proposed ideas on EU
pre-planning in the phase before the identification of an
OHQ. Their non-paper proposed that "the EUMS should be
reinforced with a permanent planning capability for military
operations." Another paper urged that "consideration be given
to the provision of residual (EU and non-EU) capability in
the planning of future operations." The UK stressed that
the priorities facing ESDP were the successful launch of the
mission in Kosovo and Afghanistan and the implementation of
the Hampton Court Agenda. They accepted the conclusion that
there is scope for practical and technical improvements as a
result of a bottom-up lessons learned process, provided it
was not used as a means to re-open "hard-fought" agreements
on terms of reference for the Operations Center or the EUMS.

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State of Play
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8. (C/NF) We were assured by the German ESDP Counselor on
March 30 that in discussing planning needs for the EU, there
is no desire to reignite the "Tervuren" debate of 2003. He
maintained that Germany, both as EU Presidency and as a
matter of national policy, is determined to avoid any
controversy with the US over developments within ESDP. He
said that Germany had fallen away from the EU OHQ idea even
during the Schroeder administration, and that under the
current government, there is no support for such an approach.
He said that the French had retreated from their initial
proposals, and that there seemed to be a growing consensus
that what is needed is civilian-military planning, rather
than a solely military capability. A March 27 Secretariat
paper makes the case for moving in that direction. This is
seen as an area in which the EU can bring "added-value," and
as a capability that does not exist elsewhere. The need to
move toward an EU role in noncombatant evacuation operations
(NEO) is another common thread running through the various

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analyses.

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Comment
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9. (C/NF) These separate internal processes are easily
conflated, and there are those within the Council Secretariat
who tend to blur the distinctions in conversations with us.
It is clear that previous missions -both civilian and
military -- have been run on a shoestring and a prayer. They
have been spared disaster largely by their small scale and a
good dose of luck. The comparatively large scale - and the
risks -- of the upcoming missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan
have focused hearts and minds in Brussels as well as
influential Member State capitals. In our judgment, it is
virtually certain that the Operations Center will be
activated to oversee the Kosovo mission. We also judge that
some limited standing civilian-military planning capability
is probably an inevitable development, and that ESDP NEOs are
a likely future development. We are told that the UK views
the current tug-of-war with the French as one of scope rather
than philosophy. Unless the EU is prepared to abandon its
comprehensive approach to crisis management entirely (a
decision we see as unlikely),a critical mass among Member
States will continue to develop for a more effective command
and control system and better integration between the
civilian and military components of ESDP.

McKinley
.