U.S. DISENGAGEMENT IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000397

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR, F, PM
SOUTHCOM FOR J5/SA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS: ASEC MARR PGOV PINR PREL SNAR BB CU VE XL
SUBJECT: U.S. DISENGAGEMENT IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

REF: A. 06 BRIDGETOWN 471

B. BRIDGETOWN 214

C. BRIDGETOWN 228

Classified By: DCM Mary Ellen T. Gilroy for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Bridgetown would like to offer the
following assessment of the possible consequences of further
cuts in U.S. assistance to the Eastern Caribbean. The
economic realities--or more aptly--vulnerabilities of these
microstates are such that further reductions in U.S.
presence, especially security presence, will tie them more
closely to China and Venezuela. If the United States is to
protect its Third Border, it must shore up its image as a
reliable partner of the Caribbean through greater engagement.
End Summary.

Background
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2. (C) For decades, U.S. relations with the Eastern
Caribbean have rested on the strong foundation of shared
history, geographic proximity, and common commitment to
democratic and free market principles. In the last decade,
however, the region's countries have been buffeted by
globalization, high energy prices, natural disasters, and the
vulnerabilities of their tourism and agricultural sectors.
In this unsettled environment, the region initially looked to
the United States for assistance and leadership. However, as
our conversations with government and private sector
representatives make clear, the region perceives the United
States as increasingly disengaged and focused--in its
diplomatic and assistance efforts--on other parts of the
world (ref A).

Money Talks
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3. (C) Most of the struggling microstates have therefore
begun to look elsewhere for support. All continue to benefit
from Cuba's medical assistance and scholarship programs.
However, it is China and Venezuela that have become the
region's new--and very visible--patrons. Both have lavished
assistance and attention on the region in the form of new
infrastructure projects, cheap fuel, and high-level visits.
Grenada's national day celebrations, which included a heavy
Venezuelan military component, and Venezuelan President
Chavez's visit to the region in February provided only the
most recent examples of the region's growing ties with
Venezuela (ref B and C).


4. (C) While it would not be useful for the United States to
try to match Venezuela and Cuba's generosity dollar for
dollar, the United States should avoid undercutting its
position in the region even further. The proposed
elimination of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program
for the Eastern Caribbean in FY08 would be a severe blow to
our relations and security cooperation with the region.
While the Eastern Caribbean's allotment of approximately USD
6 million in FMF over the last three years may not seem like
much, it has been the glue that has literally kept the
region's coast guards together and afloat. The FMF cut would
spell the end of the Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT),
based in Puerto Rico. Without the TAFT assistance, the
smaller islands' maritime forces would face a likely demise.
The Eastern Caribbean's security posture would be further
weakened, possibly leaving the U.S. Third Border exposed or
providing an opening to Venezuela and/or China to fill the
void. (Note: Embassy Bridgetown will report septel on
TAFT's operations in the Eastern Caribbean. End Note.)

Comment
--------------


5. (C) Despite dwindling resources, Embassy Bridgetown has
made every effort to maintain a visible U.S. presence
throughout the Eastern Caribbean. However, further cuts,
especially the proposed elimination of FMF for the region,
may leave our relationship with the region permanently
damaged. We have been at least partially successful in
holding off China and Venezuela's encroachment in the
economic and political spheres with the proverbial smoke and
mirrors. However, such tactics are less likely to work in
the context of our security engagement with the Eastern
Caribbean. TAFT and other FMF programs have been a key
element of our support for the region's efforts against drug,
arms, and other smuggling. The region has relied on this
support, just as the United States has relied on the region
to help us protect our borders. The United States should
look for opportunities to strengthen this partnership, not
weaken it.
OURISMAN