SLOVAKIA: DEFENSE MINISTER KASICKY -- OUT OF STEP

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000616

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2017
TAGS: PREL NATO PARM LO RU
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA: DEFENSE MINISTER KASICKY -- OUT OF STEP
ON MISSILE DEFENSE

REF: BRATISLAVA 612 BRATISLAVA 578 BRATISLAVA 487

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (U) This is an Action Cable. See para 7.


2. (C) Summary. During a breakfast meeting with the
Ambassador on November 9, Minister of Defense Frantisek
Kasicky reviewed the state-of-play on preparations for new
Slovak contributions to ISAF and elaborated the Slovak
position on Missile Defense. (Due to the Minister's late
arrival, the Ambassador did not have an opportunity to raise
other topics.) Kasicky confirmed that preparations for
additional Slovak deployments in 2008 would proceed in line
with GOS discussions with the Dutch. Furthermore, Slovakia
would move forward according to its stated plans regardless
of the outcome of the Dutch parliamentary debate. On Missile
Defense, however, Kasicky repeated arguments that U.S.
negotiations with Czech Republic and Poland had had a
negative effect on the Alliance and had needlessly provoked
the Russians. The Slovak position, i.e., that the only
appropriate venues for discussion of Missile Defense in
Europe were in NATO and the EU, had been proven right. In
response to the Ambassador's offer to arrange a briefing for
the GOS on Iranian capabilities, Kasicky said "we don't doubt
the Iranian threat," but the important thing is what kind of
document (on MD) will be prepared for NATO Ministers. He
further suggested that another factor shaping the outcome on
MD in Bucharest could be U.S. willingness to "drop certain
positions." Kasicky twice stated that the Slovak position on
Missile Defense should not be viewed as an "attack on either
side," but rather as the "correct" stance from a country that
can "take its own positions." Per Ref A, FM Kubis assured
Ambassador on November 13 that Kasicky's comments are not
official GOS policy. End Summary.

Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Vallee expressed appreciation for the
government's decision to bolster its contribution to ISAF in
2008, noting the positive impact this contribution would have
on the upcoming Dutch parliamentary debate. Kasicky stated
that Slovak MOD representatives had met with counterparts in
The Hague on November 8 to review the details of the Slovak
deployment. Kasicky confirmed that surgical teams slated to
work in the Czech Field hospital in Kabul would be deployed
in March or April. The base security unit should deploy in
June, per the Dutch request. Reinforcements for PRTs will be
sent within a year. MOD Kasicky stated clearly that Slovak
deployments would not hinge on the outcome of the Dutch
parliamentary vote on ISAF. In addition to the planned
increase in Afghanistan, Kasicky confirmed that Slovakia
would send two helicopters, with associated support
personnel, to Kosovo in December. He predicted that both
increases would be approved by the Slovak parliament in its
upcoming session. As for post-2008 deployments, the
government had no plans to advance any proposals in the near
term. (Comment: In a recent conversation with DATT,
Kasicky's top advisor indicated that the MOD was considering
additional contributions in 2009 and 2010 in which the MOD
would recommend an increase of 50 personnel each year. End
Comment.)

Missile Defense
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Vallee noted the apparent disconnect
between DefMin Kasicky's Missile Defense intervention at the
Noordwijk Ministerial -- in which he claimed that bilateral
negotiations had undermined Alliance solidarity -- and the
current state of play on Missile Defense discussions within
NATO and with the Russian Federation. Ambassador Vallee
added that almost all Allies had expressed appreciation for
the level and frequency of U.S. consultations on the issue.
Kasicky said that it has always been the Slovak position that
any discussion about Missile Defense in Europe must take
place in NATO and the EU because it affects all European
countries. This stance had been proven "correct" and the
result, Kasicky said, is "exactly what we wanted." The NATO
report on MD due in February should be pragmatic and address
all legal, political, technical and financial aspects of
Missile Defense, according to Kasicky. Although he didn't
offer any insights into GOS thinking on what such a document
should look like, he did suggest that U.S. willingness to
"drop certain positions" could play a role in the NATO

decision-making process. When pressed by the Ambassador as
to whether Slovakia supported the notion that U.S.
negotiations with Poland or the Czech Republic should be
subject to NATO approval, Kasicky demurred, saying that was a
"hypothetical" question.

Independent...or Unwilling to Provoke the Bear?
-------------- --


5. (C) Recalling the "clear signals" President Putin sent
regarding missile defense at the February Wehrkunde
conference, Kasicky suggested that the U.S. had needlessly
provoked Russia by its insistence on bilateral negotiations
with the Czech Republic and Poland. Kasicky characterized
the Russian threat to redirect its nuclear capabilities
toward Europe as an "exaggerated reaction," but implicitly
laid the blame for tensions (with Russia, within the Czech
Republic) on the U.S. Kasicky stated that the bilateral
approach had not taken into account the security or views of
others in the region, nor sensitivities about the deployment
of foreign troops in Central Europe. Ambassador responded
that any troop presence in this case would be the result of
an invitation by sovereign governments and not imposed by
outsiders as with the Soviets. Echoing comments made by PM
Fico in a November 5 interview about Slovakia's "independence
and openness," Kasicky stated at the close of the meeting
that "Slovakia is a country that can take its own positions
and be articulate about them." These opinions aren't aimed
against any party, Kasicky added.


6. (C) Ref A reports FM Kubis's firm stance that Kasicky's
remarks to the NAC-D are not official GOS policy regarding
possible Czech and Polish deployments. That policy, Kubis
stressed, remained an issue for the governments of those
countries. We recounted Kasicky's remarks to President
Gasparovic's foreign affairs advisor, Jan Foltin, on November

15. Foltin, who will accompany Gasparovic to Bucharest, told
us that Gasparovic was willing to take a responsible position
at the NATO Summit in Riga despite Fico's views, and Foltin
was sure Gasparovic would be willing to play the same role at
Bucharest.


7. (C) Comment and Action Request: Under the guise of
"independence," Kasicky, like Fico, displays an overweening
concern for Russian sensitivities regarding Missile Defense.
In Kasicky's rendering, it is due mainly to Russian (and
Slovak) intervention that the issue finally is being
discussed in the proper venues. He offered no views --
positive or negative -- about U.S. initiatives to address a
range of Allied and Russian concerns. In fact, he did not
address the core issue, i.e., the nature of the threat and
the steps needed to address it, except to note that linking
existing and potential systems would be "complex." Perhaps
more troubling, however, was Kasicky's tendency to gloss over
the issue of the Iranian threat in favor of complaints about
the U.S. approach. Taken together with PM Fico's continued
public comments opposing Missile Defense, Post believes that
a high-level classified briefing on Iran and MD from Missile
Defense Agency officials is needed to shine the spotlight
where it belongs: on the threat. Such a briefing would help
bolster the position of those, such as FM Kubis and NATO
PermRep Slobodnik, who maintain that U.S. negotiations with
the Czechs and Poles are bilateral issues and who have begun
to speak in favorable terms about the possibility of linking
complementary NATO and U.S. systems. First-hand exposure to
convincing threat information and briefings on U.S. proposals
would also make it harder for Fico and Kasicky to oppose the
key MD goals Secretary Gates articulated in Noordwijk. Post
requests assistance from Washington agencies in securing an
MDA visit before the end of the year. End Comment and Action
Request.


VALLEE