Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRATISLAVA527
2007-09-18 15:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, MISSILE DEFENSE, CFE, AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS CVIS KOC YI RU LO 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0527/01 2611551
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181551Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1212
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0110
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0661
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0079
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0143
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000527 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CVIS KOC YI RU LO
SUBJECT: FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, MISSILE DEFENSE, CFE, AND
AFGHANISTAN


Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000527

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CVIS KOC YI RU LO
SUBJECT: FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, MISSILE DEFENSE, CFE, AND
AFGHANISTAN


Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. During a cordial one-hour meeting on
September 18, Ambassador Vallee and Foreign Minister Kubis
discussed Kosovo, CFE, Missile Defense, and Afghanistan. FM
Kubis noted that he had begun to advocate in EU circles the
idea of decoupling the results of the Troika process on
Kosovo from the issue of an EU ESDP mission. On missile
defense, Kubis stressed that the GOS position has not
changed, and that the Prime Minister,s recent critical
comments reflected only his personal views and that of his
party. Citing impressions from his recent visit to The
Hague, Kubis expressed serious concern about the ability of
Allies to sustain long-term commitments in Afghanistan in the
face of domestic political pressures. Kubis expressed
enthusiasm regarding the U.S. "parallel action" plan on CFE
and a willingness to play a leading role, within the Alliance
and with Russia, to promote the process. End Summary.

KOSOVO


2. (C) Ambassador underscored the U.S. commitment to the
Troika process, but urged Slovakia to begin prudent and
discreet planning with its EU partners on how to deal with
possible outcomes post December 10. Kubis said that there
is consensus within the EU on a number of points, including
the need to support the Troika and EU Representative
Ischinger. At the same time, the EU will make clear to the
parties that they will be judged on their performance, not
their "EU vocations." Kubis stressed that the EU would not
stake out a common position, e.g., on UDI, that could
prejudice the outcome, and urged that the U.S. follow a
similar line. Kubis emphasized that Slovakia is one of
several EU countries that would not recognize UDI. Slovakia
views the status quo as untenable, and it does not support an
open-ended process of negotiations. Thus, noted Kubis,
emphasis must be on the current talks; there is no other

option. After the Troika makes its report to the UNSYG in
December, the issue should return to the UNSC for
deliberation. Ambassador Vallee asked what the ramifications
of UDI would be for an ESDP Mission. Kubis replied that he
has begun to push the idea of decoupling, prior to the
December 10 deadline, the issue of an EU mission from the
results of the Troika process. In this way, Kubis explained,
the EU could begin to plan for action and "create the
reality," on the ground, rather than merely respond to it.
In response to further questioning, Kubis indicated that as
long as the proper legal foundation exists, there was no
reason to question Slovak participation in KFOR. That said,
if major EU partners withdrew because of concerns about the
legal underpinnings, Kubis could not predict what Slovakia
might do.

MISSILE DEFENSE


3. (C) The Ambassador characterized the September 14
declaration of Central European Social Democratic leaders
against missile defense as unhelpful and inaccurate. The
statement ignored the ongoing consultations between the U.S.
and its NATO Allies and with Russia, as well, and was
particularly at odds with Kubis, prior assertions that
missile defense was a bilateral affair. If the Slovak
position on missile defense has changed, due to the Prime
Minister,s domestic or regional political calculations (to
boost Czech Social Democrat Paroubek,s election prospects),
the U.S. needs to know. Kubis did not hide his distaste for
the statement, but he offered a rather stilted and anemic
response. According to the Slovak Constitution, he said, it
is the MFA that speaks for the government on such issues. It
is to Kubis we should listen on this question. Fico's
statements reflect his personal views, and those of his
party. Kubis stated unequivocally that there has been no
change to the GOS position on MD. This issue has not been
before the Coalition Council, which he believes would not
support the language of the Social Democrats (Note:
Ambassador queried parliamentary leader Milan Urbani on the
HZDS position on MD and Urbani unequivocally said HZDS
Chairman Meciar would support the U.S. on the MD issue.)

CFE


4. (C) Kubis enthusiastically supports the U.S. approach on
CFE, and offered to take an active role within the V4, V10

and the E.U. in promoting the "parallel actions" concept
within the Alliance and with Russia. Kubis thinks the plan
has promise, and is heartened that the Alliance has taken
back the initiative. Kubis said he would like to discuss the
Ukrainian proposal with A/S Fried during upcoming
consultations, noting that it would be good, if possible, to
have Ukrainian support on this issue.

Afghanistan


5. (C) FM Kubis confirmed that the GOS is considering a
package of requests from the Dutch for enhanced participation
in ISAF, including in a PRT. (Note: the Dutch Ambassador
briefed Ambassador on the package, which proposes a total of
over 100 Slovak soldiers in Afghanistan, PRT participation, a
medical unit, an on-base OMLT, and engineering in Orguzan
province integrated with the Dutch Units there.) Slovakia
would not be able to satisfy the entire request due to
inadequate resources. However, Kubis believes that the
question of additional Slovak contributions, while relatively
small-scale, has taken on a new urgency. Based on broad
consultations in The Hague last week, Kubis is quite
concerned that the Dutch may have a difficult time sustaining
a long-term commitment in the face of parliamentary and
public concerns. Other Allies may face similar domestic
pressure, and the danger is that ISAF could begin to unravel.
Therefore, Kubis has requested an urgent meeting with Prime
Minister Fico on September 19 to convey the "urgency" of the
situation. Kubis noted that the GOS would need to take a
decision on additional deployments before the end of the year
in order to deploy in a timely way, and was nervous that
hooking up with the Dutch could leave the Slovaks high and
dry if the Dutch were to draw down. (Comment: Kubis'
concerns about the ability of Allies to stay the course could
cut two ways. He will make the case to PM Fico, he said,
that the deployment of additional Slovaks has larger
consequences for the ability of NATO nations to sustain the
mission, and for the future of NATO itself. But, his
pessimism could play into Fico,s well-known reluctance to
deploy Slovak troops abroad. If stalwarts like the Dutch may
not be there for the long haul, why should the Slovaks?
Furthermore, as we understand it, the Dutch need firm
commitments from other Allies to augment operations in the
South. If the GOS decides to wait for the outcome of the
Dutch parliamentary debate to make its decision (which would
not be out of character),GON efforts to build domestic
support will be further complicated. End comment.)

VALLEE