Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRATISLAVA275
2007-05-10 15:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA, SERBIA, MISSILE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS ENRG CVIS KO YI RU LO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0069
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0275/01 1301525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101525Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0916
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0097
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0641
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0064
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0117
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000275 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ENRG CVIS KO YI RU LO
SUBJECT: FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA, SERBIA, MISSILE
DEFENSE, AND VISAS

REF: BRATISLAVA 269

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000275

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ENRG CVIS KO YI RU LO
SUBJECT: FM KUBIS ON KOSOVO, RUSSIA, SERBIA, MISSILE
DEFENSE, AND VISAS

REF: BRATISLAVA 269

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary/Introduction: In a frank, productive
90-minute conversation May 9, FM Jan Kubis told the
Ambassador that:
--Slovakia is still with the EU on voting for a Kosovo
resolution. Slovakia would like to finesse the language of
the UNSCR to avoid direct endorsement for the Ahtisaari plan,
but still guarantee the clear result outlined by Ahtisaari.
The decision on co-sponsorship would be made closer to a vote.
--The impasse in forming a new Serbian government could lead
to new elections and a greater victory by the Radicals.
--PM Fico met with a very self-assured and relaxed Putin in
Moscow. They discussed the Transpetrol buyback but did not
make any commitments.
--Fico's public comments on Missile Defense emphasize the
need for greater consultations with Europe and Russia, but
despite the PM's personal objections, Kubis has full
authority to decide the GOS position on the presence of
Missile Defense in the Czech Republic and Poland. Fico
recognizes the sovereign right of Poland and the Czech
Republic to decide.
--Since his return from Washington, Kubis' media message has
tried to explain the complexities of the Visa Waiver
legislative process and urge Slovaks not to overstay.
End summary.


2. (C) Kubis expressed gratitude for the excellent reception
and meetings he got in Washington and New York the week of
April 16. He described the meetings as useful, friendly,
open, and pragmatic. He was glad he had an opportunity to
"explain" to the Secretary and the NSC what some statements
from Slovakia and Prime Minister Robert Fico really mean, and
what they do not mean, on issues such as Kosovo and missile
defense.

Kosovo: Still In Line, with a few Minor Adjustments
-------------- --------------

3. (C) Kubis said it would be premature for Slovakia to

commit to co-sponsoring the UN Security Council Resolution on
Kosovo, and he urged that we give the Slovak delegation the
latest full draft text so Slovakia can have more input.
Kubis pointed out that if he agreed to sponsor the UNSCR two
months ahead of the vote, it would open a hornet's nest in
the Slovak parliament. He emphasized that voting with the EU
on the UNSCR would not be a problem for the GOS. In fact, he
was in Qatar May 7 making that very point. In terms of
co-sponsorship, however, the underlying message was that we
should work on finessing the language in the resolution, and
ask again closer to the vote.


4. (C) Kubis said Slovakia's only problem with the "13-points
paper" (elements of the resolution) was "endorsement" of the
Ahtisaari plan. He said the language needed to be finessed
to make the outcome clear, but to stop short of directly
endorsing the Ahtisaari plan. Slovakia was preparing
suggested alternate language, consistent with that in the
U.S.-EU Summit document and in PermRep Burian's statement.
He thanked the U.S. for the goodwill, understanding, and
flexibility in working out these details, acknowledging, "We
know we're causing headaches sometimes." The goal is to
provide support to the Ahtisaari plan indirectly, for example
endorsing UNSYG Ban's recommendation. He mentioned adding
preambular language that could refer to the recent UNSC
Mission and note that the international community was taking
into account the views of Belgrade and Pristina. MFA
Political Director Miroslav Lajcak paraphrased that Slovakia
can accept "Ahtisaari plus or Ahtisaari minus, but not
Ahtisaari period."


5. (C) Primarily, Kubis is interested in hearing more about
our thinking, saying the lanugage must be finely calibrated
to do what we want. He speculated about separating support
for the "Comprehensive Proposal for Settlement" from
Ahtisaari's "Report" recommending independence. Kubis
appreciated that we had flexibility to endorse the Settlement
but use lesser language for the Report. He said this might
help with the Russians, but he also wondered aloud whether
not coming to grips with the issue now would only prolong the
agony for several months.

Russia on Kosovo
--------------

6. (C) Fico did discuss Kosovo during his May 4 official
visit to Moscow, clarifying in private meetings that Slovakia
would vote with the EU on the UNSCR. Kubis said there is
definitely a way to bring Russia around. They are dancing on
thin ice. They will never endorse the Ahtisaari plan or
impose something on Serbia against Serbia's will, but they
are looking for a way out. Titov told Kubis this was not
about numbers, meaning the substance of the resolution
mattered much more in their internal decision-making than did
U.S.-EU unity. The Russians would rather not veto but were
willing to do so. Ivanov told Kubis, "We wish to agree with
our partners on Kosovo, but if we can't, we don't exclude a
veto." Kubis also got the impression from a conversation
with Lavrov during the Yetsin funeral that the Russians do
not believe Kosovo is the top priority issue for the Bush
Administration. It is certainly not as important as U.S.
cooperation with Russia on other issues like Iran. Lavrov
said Russia understood Serbia's future was in the EU and
NATO. On UNSCR 1244, Kubis speculated whether it was
possible to bring the Russians around through language that
did not explicitly abolish it so much as simply creating
another resolution to take us to the next stage.

Fico's Visit to Russia
--------------

7. (C) Kubis described President Vladimir Putin as very
composed, self-assured, relaxed, even laughing. His messages
were strong, but delivered in a calm, relaxed, even gracious
manner.


8. (C) There was no clarity on the fate of Slovakia's
Transpetrol oil pipeline. It was discussed but not decided.
Fico asked Putin to use his influence to clear up the legal
quagmire so that a sale could go forward. Russian company
Gazprom is a leading contender, and Kubis admitted that the
Russians have the most control over the outcome.
Nonetheless, he said Economy Minister Jahnatek raised
Slovakia's four conditions for a sale, like a mantra, at
meetings at every level.


9. (C) Kubis replayed a conversation he had with Igor Ivanov,
whom he has known for many years and with whom he has very
frank discussions. Ivanov lamented a real problem of
miscommunication with partners in the West. There are good
meetings at the top levels, but no channels for negotiation,
preparation, implementation. Non-political issues become
politicized. The channels are not working, neither with the
U.S. nor with the EU. Mistakes are being made on all sides.
Ivanov even admitted that Moscow went too far with its
threats about the CFE treaty, but now it has become Putin's
line, and it is too late to fix. Upcoming elections in both
the U.S. and Russia will box us in for another year or two,
Ivanov told Kubis.

Missile Defense
--------------

10. (C) Based on both Fico's comments in Moscow--that he
personally opposed U.S. plans for missile defense in the
Czech Republic and Poland, would never allow MD on Slovak
territory, and that Putin had threatened to aim Russian nukes
at U.S. missile defense facilities in Europe--and additional
headlines from Fico's May 9 Austria trip criticizing
insufficient consultation on MD, the Ambassador cautioned
Kubis that Fico's unhelpful comments were getting old. These
were gratuitous shots at the U.S., since we had never asked
Slovakia for anything. Kubis said he understood our concern,
but he defended Fico's line about insufficient consultation,
saying that it was a common refrain in Europe. Mainstream
Europeans are ambivalent. The perception of lack of greater
consultations "gave the Russians a chance to play with all of
us."


11. (C) Kubis pointed out that in all official meetings, Fico
emphasized that the GOS position on MD will respect
Slovakia's commitments as a NATO member, that Kubis was
representing the government's policy on this issue, and that
it was the sovereign right of the Czech Republic and Poland
to decide. Kubis said Fico could have cut him off any number
of times, but the PM only expressed support: "This is my
foreign minister, and he speaks for the GOS policy." Kubis
said that Fico is a politician, and his voters expect a
certain line, but he was really trying to control himself

within certain limits.


12. (C) In Fico's meeting, Putin laughed out loud when
talking about missile defense, asking rhetorically if the
Americans really thought the Russians were so naive. He said
it would be a dangerous game to bring nuclear weapons into
Central Europe, where currently there are none, and that MD
was part of a U.S. strategy to install an automized system of
nuclear weapons. He told Fico that the U.S. had offered to
test the system against Russian missiles, to make sure it
works. Then, with no humor at all, Putin calmly said, "So if
they (American MD facilities) come, we'll point our missiles
at them." Kubis said, "I'm not sure the Russians are
bluffing. So now it's coming back to Europe, two nuclear
states targeting us."

Serbia
--------------

13. (C) Kubis interprets the new head of parliament's
election as Kostunica's final warning shot to Tadic, "Give me
everything I want or I will go with the Radicals." However,
Tadic's own political supporters will never allow this. Kubis
and his team are worried that events in Serbia are leading to
new elections that will result in gains for the Radicals. On
the one hand, this will relieve Kostunica and Tadic of
responsibility for losing Kosovo, but it will not lead to a
brighter future for Serbs.

Visas
--------------

14. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Kubis about being too
optimistic about Visa Waiver legislation in the Homeland
Security Bill. Kubis said he well understood the legislative
complexities, and in his media appearances since his return
from the U.S. he had tried to explain the situation, in
addition to urging Slovaks not to overstay. As a result,
Slovaks had criticized him for not fighting hard enough for
visa-free travel, but Kubis would keep to his message.
VALLEE