Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRATISLAVA133
2007-03-02 15:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

FICO: I WILL NOT ALLOW MY GOVERNMENT TO BE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KOC YI LO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0133/01 0611530
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021530Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0733
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0073
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0625
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0092
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0043
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000133 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KOC YI LO
SUBJECT: FICO: I WILL NOT ALLOW MY GOVERNMENT TO BE
ISOLATED FROM THE EU ON KOSOVO


Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reason 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KOC YI LO
SUBJECT: FICO: I WILL NOT ALLOW MY GOVERNMENT TO BE
ISOLATED FROM THE EU ON KOSOVO


Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reason 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Fico told the Ambassador that
he will not allow his government to be isolated in Europe on
the issue of Kosovo, which is what he believes to be the aim
of opposition leader Mikulas Dzurinda. Fico expressed firm
support for FM Kubis, who in turn gave public remarks
expressing firm support for Ahtisaari and emphasizing the
importance of European unity on the issue of Kosovo. Given
the positive messages coming from the government and the
leading coalition party, we recommend that Slovakia be
brought into the UNSCR drafting process as soon as possible.
End summary.


2. (C) In a 1 1/2 hour long breakfast meeting March 2, Prime
Minister Robert Fico (Smer party) told the Ambassador that he
would not allow his government to be isolated in Europe on
the Kosovo issue. Fico theorized that opposition leader
(former PM) Mikulas Dzurinda was using Kosovo as a domestic
political issue because he has no other issue that resonates.
Fico believes Dzurinda wants to force the Fico government
into isolation from the rest of Europe. Fico seemed very
determined to make certain his government was respected in
European and transatlantic circles. Fico appreciated the
support the embassy and USG officials were giving to Foreign
Minister Jan Kubis, especially in emphasizing bluntly to
Dzurinda that Slovakia must not derail European consensus in
support of Ahtisaari's plan for final status.


3. (C) Fico's domestic strategy includes trying to ensure
that the Kosovo does not become an issue of debate in
Parliament. He said he planned to speak to coalition partner
Jan Slota of the Slovak National Party and ask that SNS
withdraw its draft parliamentary declaration on Kosovo,
saying that parliament is not the place to resolve the issue.
If, despite all attempts by the government and international
partners, a parliamentary resolution sponsored by SDKU or SNS
comes to the floor, Fico is certain that coalition parties
Smer and HZDS, plus opposition Hungarian Coalition Party

(SMK) will have the votes to block it.


4. (C) The Ambassador explained that U.S. embassy officers as
well as officials such as EUR DAS Rosemary diCarlo were
having private discussions with the entire range of Slovak
politicians. Fico encouraged the U.S. to continue these
activities and our support for Kubis. He said the Kosovo
status discussions were politically sensitive for the GOS,
although "among the population at the gas stations" there was
little concern about Kosovo other than the ten percent of
Slovaks that support SNS.


5. (C) Fico asked about the Russian position on Kosovo. The
Ambassador explained that although the Russians were not
happy, they had never told us they would block the final
resolution. EU unity, and an affirmative Slovak vote in New
York, were essential to send the right signal to Russia.
Fico said he would discuss Kosovo during his April 3-4 visit
to Moscow, and offered to de-brief the Ambassador afterwards.
Fico said he was suprised how well-informed the Chinese were
on the Kosovo issue during his recent visit to Beijing.

The Pro-Status Parties
--------------

6. (C) Fico's position, as expressed in private, seems to be
moving in the right direction. We got a foretaste of this
during EUR DAS Rosemary diCarlo's February 28 meeting with
other Smer party members, including Chair of the
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Boris Zala. Zala had
just returned from Berlin where he met with Martti Ahtisaari,
Javier Solana, and German FM Steinmeyer. He expressed
Slovakia's "emotional experience of history" and said it was
painful to accept a country being forced to be split. But
his bottom line was that Slovakia was realistic and
understood there was no other way. He made a plea for strong
language from EU and U.S. leaders, and perhaps even in the
draft resolution, that Kosovo must be understood as a unique
case and not a precendent.


7. (C) SMK leaders told DAS DiCarlo of their committment to:
--uphold EU unity;
--endorse a UNSCR;
--support Ahtisaari and the contact group;
--protect human and minority rights, as well as religious and
cultural monuments; and
--push for swift integration of Western Balkans countries to
the EU.

Hungarian party leaders resent the use of fictional Hungarian
demands for autonomy as an excuse for Slovak politicians to
support a position counter to the EU consensus. The
guarantees in the Ahtisaari plan to protect minority rights
of Serbs is more relevant to SMK than the prospect of
ethnically-based demands for independence.


8. (C) Vladimir Meciar's party, Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS),is saying the right things about European
unity and the need for Serbia to move forward toward European
integration.

The Parties Opposed to Independence
--------------

9. (C) The Slovak National Party has its own warped view of
history and will never be convinced to support independence
for Kosovo. An SNS MP told DiCarlo, "Serbia was never a
multi-ethnic state, it has always been a Serb Nation with
ethnic minorities," causing the SMK MP present to nearly fall
out of his chair. The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)
does not like the prospect of independence for Kosovo, but
has neither the political clout domestically nor the desire
to oppose its partners internationally to take a leading role
in the debate.


10. (C) The most worrisome opposition voice continues to be
that of Dzurinda's SDKU. It believes that Slovakia can move
the EU position and buy more time for Serbia and argues
unconvincingly that this might lead to some movement in the
Serb position toward compromise. SDKU insiders have told us
that they are determined to pursue their parliamentary
resolution, although they understand they don't have the
votes to pass it. (Comment: Since pursuing the resolution
will have no practical impact on the government, it is
clearly designed to embarrass the Fico government
domestically and internationally. We, and other contact
group embassies (especially German and UK) continue to
emphasize that the issue of Kosovo is too important to play
domestic political games. End comment)

Kubis is Consistent
--------------

11. (SBU) In remarks to the press after his March 2 meeting
with Ahtisaari in Vienna, FM Kubis said that SDKU's position
on Kosovo (that Slovakia would not accept independence for
Kosovo without the agreement of Serbia) had shocked partners
in the EU. Kubis stressed that such a position would isolate
Slovakia in the EU and NATO and could even lead to the
inability to adopt the necessary UNSCR. Kubis repeated that
Slovakia must take care to ensure that the resolution of
Kosovo's status will guarantee security and stability in the
region and a European perspective for Serbia and Kosovo.
European unity is essential, he said, and confirmed that on
the question of Kosovo, EU unity exists.

Comment:
--------------

12. (C) The Ambassador was somewhat encouraged after his
meeting with Fico by three specific points:
--Fico expressed clear support for FM Kubis.
--Fico does not want Slovakia to be the European outlier.
--Fico does not believe most Slovak voters are interested in
Kosovo's final status.
What Fico did not say was how Slovakia would vote on the
UNSCR. Nonetheless, Fico's message, combined with Kubis'
public statement, was positive enough that we recommend
Slovakia be brought into the UNSCR drafting process as soon
as possible. Allowing Slovakia to point to success (perhaps
including specific language important to Slovakia in the
UNSCR) will show domestically that the government is involved
in the process; this buy-in will make them more likely to
vote enthusiastically and affirmatively when the time comes.
VALLEE