Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRATISLAVA117
2007-02-26 17:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

KUBIS LOOKING FOR DOMESTIC AGREEMENT ON KOSOVO IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV YI KO LO 
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VZCZCXRO7968
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0117/01 0571702
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261702Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0715
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0071
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0041
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000117 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI KO LO
SUBJECT: KUBIS LOOKING FOR DOMESTIC AGREEMENT ON KOSOVO IN
THE FINE PRINT

REF: BRATISLAVA 115 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000117

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI KO LO
SUBJECT: KUBIS LOOKING FOR DOMESTIC AGREEMENT ON KOSOVO IN
THE FINE PRINT

REF: BRATISLAVA 115 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: FM Kubis told the Ambassador February 24 that
language in a Slovak parliamentary resolution referring to
regional peace and security could give the GOS a way to
support an eventual UNSCR on Kosovo, even without the
agreement of Serbia. Kubis and other MFA diplomats continue
to strategize on how to persuade Slovak politicians to go
along with international community consensus. Kubis
recommended that in addition to the Ambassador's meetings
with PM Fico and President Gasparovic the week of March 5,
NSC leadership should call Gasparovic slightly before
Ahtisaari submits his proposal at the UN, and that a similar
call from the Secretary to Fico in the same timeframe could
be important. The Ambassador stressed the importance of EU
unity to KDH Chairman Pavol Hrusovsky, who committed to work
within parliament's foreign affairs committee toward a
parliamentary resolution on Kosovo that left the government
some flexibility. Contact Group ambassadors in Bratislava
agreed February 26 to continue discussing the issue with
their own political party contacts and to jointly approach
Fico at a March 16 lunch. The U.K. embassy has proposed a
Blair-Dzurinda phone call, and we suggested a Merkel-Fico
pull aside at the European Council meeting, as well as
raising Kosovo with Gasparovic during his official visit to
Italy February 27-28. End summary.


2. (C) Foreign Minister Jan Kubis told the Ambassador
February 24 he is solidly behind the Ahtisaari plan. He
admitted he hates the issue and does not have a great deal of
personal sympathy for Kosovar Albanians but understands that
the Serbs must be forced to accept the plan: for peace and
stability of the region, there must be European unity on
Kosovo. Kubis said that if his government forces him to take
a position counter to that of the international community, he
will resign. He believes this is Europe,s big test. His
primary purpose for the meeting was to strategize on how to
keep his own government and parliament on board.



3. (C) Kubis was toying with whether to get Parliament to
consider the Kosovo issue before or after the Ahtisaari plan
is tabled at the UN. Since the tabling could be before
parliament resumes sessions on March 20, Kubis would have to
ask Speaker Pavol Paska (from PM Fico's Smer party) to bring
parliament back early. This move would only highlight the
issue, but it might give some cover if Ahtisaari makes some
pro-Serbian changes before tabling. He fears, however, that
a debate on a more anodyne option before tabling could be
followed by a second assault by opposition leader Mikulas
Dzurinda on the tabled UN motion after it is introduced.
Kubis said that Slovakia would only abstain at the UN if the
outcome would not be negatively affected by their vote, and
that if Slovakia was needed he would ensure they would be
there--if he managed his own government. His meeting with
Churkin suggested that the Russians were not necessarily dug
in on a veto, he felt "good vibes."

Peace and Security Can Be the Hook
--------------

4. (C) Kubis encouraged as much engagement as possible with
members of parliament and the government from all angles,
especially with Prime Minister Robert Fico and President Ivan
Gasporovic, but only at high levels for the leaders. Kubis
thinks (and Paska confirmed) that it is impossible to stop
the parliamentary debate. What Kubis is hoping for is a
resolution with softened language, that is not binding, and
contains a reference to regional peace and security, the hook
he believes he needs to support EU and Ahtisaari positions.
In a strange way, the parliamentary resolution could allow
both Fico and Kubis to back away from their "no deal without
Serb agreement" language. Kubis is traveling with the PM
February 26 in Ukraine. He said he would get together with
Fico, Paska, and Gasparovic next week to discuss strategy.
HZDS leader and coalition partner Vladimir Meciar has told
Kubis he is on board with Kubis.


5. (C) In order to give Kubis political cover domestically,
he seeks four things that he claims the Ahtisaari plan still
does not still have:
i) the Kosovars must offer to delay any UN membership request
until after progress with the elements of the plan are well
advanced;
ii) the new UN resolution should follow the framework of the
existing one;
iii) the resolution should contain more explicit language on
"no partition of Kosovo;"
iv) the resolution should contain explicit language in a "no

BRATISLAVA 00000117 002 OF 002


merger with Kosovo" provision.
Strategically, given Fico,s political aversion to military
casualties, Kubis is making the point that Slovakia,s 135
Kosovo peacekeepers would likely be sucked into the conflict
if violence erupts if the UN plan falls apart.


6. (C) On Dzurinda, Kubis said Dzurinda had specifically told
him that his discussions with Merkel were Dzurinda,s
initiative, counter to what Dzurinda told the Ambassador and
at odds with the common EPP strategy suggested by another
Dzurinda advisor (reftel). Nonetheless, Kubis did not
discount the idea that there is a split between Merkel and
the German Foreign Ministry on Kosovo. Kubis claimed Merkel
is playing coy with Fico and no bilateral meeting has been
scheduled in Germany. Kubis asked if we could be helpful in
suggesting a 20 minute pull-aside between Merkel and Fico at
the Council of Ministers to talk about Kosovo. In addition,
any German approach to Dzurinda would be important given how
Dzurinda, to the irritation of German diplomats in
Bratislava, is advertising around town his special
relationship with Merkel.

Top-Level Engagement
--------------

7. (C) Kubis recommended that the Ambassador meet the week of
March 5 with both Fico and Gasparovic next week. He said an
NSC (Hadley/Crouch) call to Gasporovic should occur slightly
before Ahtisaari places the proposal before the UN, but no
later. A similar call from the Secretary to Fico at the same
time could be important. He promised constant communication
in the run-up to the parliamentary discussion and appreciated
our efforts with the opposition parties. However, he is not
entirely confident he can deliver Fico in the end if Fico is
attacked by Dzurinda.

KDH: Caught Off-Guard by Dzurinda's About-Face
-------------- --------------

8. (C) In our continuing effort to persuade Slovak
politicians not to derail the Kosovo status process, the
Ambassador stressed the importance of EU unity to Christian
Democratic Movement (KDH) Chairman Pavol Hrusovsky February

26. Hrusovsky said that Dzurinda's position when he was PM
was completely different; Dzurinda never promoted any idea
that was against the position of the U.S. and the
international community. KDH had been much more cautious on
Kosovo. When Dzurinda spoke out against a Kosovo resolution
that didn't have Serbian agreement, KDH felt the need to make
similar statements. Hrusovsky listened carefully to the
Ambassador's arguments, and said that he would work within
Parliament's foreign affairs committee the week of March 12
to build consensus on a Kosovo-related resolution that would
give the government flexibility.

Contact Group Ambassadors Will Approach Fico March 16
-------------- --------------

9. (C) The ambassadors from Italy, Germany, UK, France, and
U.S. met informally February 26 to discuss how to influence
Slovakia's political decision on Kosovo. They reached a
consensus that joint approaches to the highest levels of
government would not be helpful. The MFA doesn't need to be
demarched, and an overly-aggressive approach to Fico could be
counter-productive. The ambassadors agreed to continue
talking to their individual contacts in government and
political parties, and that the EU contact group ambassadors
would pull Fico aside at a March 16 EU Presidency lunch
hosted by the German Embassy to discuss Kosovo. The U.K.
Charge also suggested PM Blair might reach out to Dzurinda.
We encouraged the Italians to raise the issue with Gasparovic
during his February 27-28 official visit to Italy, and urged
the Germans to have a Merkel-Fico pull-aside during the
European Council meeting, as requested by Kubis. The German
Ambassador thought a Merkel-Dzurinda phone call would be
difficult to arrange since Slovak isolation was Dzurinda's
primary political goal. The Ambassador suggested that
Dzurinda's potential isolation from his center-right contacts
in and out of government is an equally useful lever.




VALLEE