BRAZIL: U/S BURNS' MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000370

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: U/S BURNS' MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
AMORIM

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).


1. (C) Summary. Under Secretary for Political Affairs R.
Nicholas Burns, WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon, P
Special Assistant Heide Bronke, Ambassador Sobel and PolCouns
Dennis Hearne met on 7 February with Foreign Minister Celso
Amorim for a broad discussion of bilateral and regional
issues. The USG delegation visited Brasilia for a bilateral
strategic dialogue at the U/S level. Amorim was accompanied
by Foreign Ministry U/S for Political Affairs and designated
U.S. Ambassador Antonio Patriota, incoming U/S Everton
Vargas, and other senior officers. U/S Burns emphasized the
change in U.S. strategy away from a Euro-centric focus and
toward new alliances with major regional powers, and noted
Brazil is the focal point for this U.S. approach in South
America. Amorim and U/S Burns agreed on the desirability of
using cooperation on biofuels as the centerpiece of a broader
strategic relationship, drawing on the example of newly
dynamic relationship of the United States and India. Two
meetings in March between Presidents Bush and Lula offer
excellent opportunities for pursuing an agreement on
biofuels. On regional issues, Amorim affirmed Brazil's
long-term commitment to Haiti. He said that Brazil does not
admire Chavez's political path, but does not fear him. The
GOB has limited influence in ameliorating Chavez's behavior
and must remain engaged with him in light of Brazil's vital
interests. In Bolivia, Amorim and U/S Burns agreed on the
need to continue engagement with Evo Morales. The
conversation was substantive and frank, and is organized
topically below for clarity. End summary.

BILATERAL RELATIONS AND BIOFUELS


2. (C) U/S Burns outlined for FM Amorim the evolution of U.S.
global strategy away from the Cold War's Euro-centric
paradigm toward the current focus on building strategic
partnerships with key regional powers, including India,
China, South Africa and Brazil. The USG is eager to intensify
its dialogue with Brazil, and the prospect of two
presidential meetings in March -- in Sao Paulo and later in
the United States -- offer great opportunities to move in
that direction.


3. (C) U/S Burns offered as an example the new and dynamic
U.S. relationship with India, in which the bilateral
agreement on civil nuclear energy has served as the
"backbone" for improving political, commercial and cultural
links between India and the United States. Praising Brazil's
regional leadership (e.g., in Haiti) and its strong
commitment to democracy, U/S Burns indicated the USG's desire
to turn now toward deepening its strategic relationship with
Brazil. Noting the critical geopolitical, environmental and
energy consequences of over-reliance on oil, U/S Burns
stressed the USG's heightened interest in establishing
alternative energy options, and said this augured well for
building a partnership with Brazil with cooperation in
development of biofuels technologies and markets as the
centerpiece. U/S Burns indicated the USG will be working with
the GOB to conclude a biofuels agreement with Brazil -- based
on a draft MOU provided by Brazil -- with a view to making
the accord a deliverable for the March pr
esidential meetings.


4. (C) FM Amorim noted the generally positive state of
U.S.-Brazil relations and personal friendship between
Presidents Lula and Bush. He said U.S. enthusiasm for close
cooperation in biofuels has a resonant echo throughout the
GOB, starting with Lula himself, who is seized with the
potential of biofuel as a transformational agent not only in
energy but in effecting social change. Amorim said the GOB
is receptive to utilizing cooperation on biofuels as a

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central element for strengthening ties with the United
States, but also issued a caveat against "ethanolizing" the
entire bilateral relationship, which is more diverse and
complex than any single issue.


5. (C) Amorim and U/S Burns discussed the component of the
draft biofuels MOU which addresses U.S.-Brazil cooperation in
third country economic and social development projects, and
U/S Burns presented the USG preference for a multi-country
approach, including projects in South America. Amorim
reiterated Brazil's stated preference for commencing
U.S.-Brazil cooperation in third countries with pilot
projects in Central America or the Caribbean. Pressed by U/S
Burns as to Brazil's reasoning on this point, Amorim said
that GOB concerns include reactions within Mercosul to an
initial biofuel project in a South American country that
would certainly be outside of that regional group. In the
case of Colombia, the GOB would not rule out cooperation at
some point, but it would be necessary to create a clear line
between Brazilian efforts on biofuels and any connection to
Plan Colombia, which is controversial in Brazil. Moreover,
Amorim noted that the GOB has not attempted a broad
international effort of this complexity before, and is
concerned about "scattering its energy too widely." Brazil
prefers to focus initially on a single pilot project in a
relatively small country where there is good potential for a
transformative effect on a near-term horizon. Such a success
would establish a positive precedent for U.S.-Brazil
cooperation, and subsequent joint projects -- including in
South America and Africa -- would then become seen by all as
"routine," he said.

RECIPROCITY ISSUES


6. (SBU) Amorim again asked the USG to relax its current
restrictions on leasing or purchasing of properties for the
Brazilian bilateral and UN missions in the United States,
which the USG has linked to resolution of property and social
security problems the USG continues to confront with its
mission in Brazil. Amorim noted that the foreign ministry
has submitted an accord for congressional approval which will
resolve the U.S. problems in Brazil, but that in light of the
fact that congressional approval could take "perhaps the rest
of the year," a loosening of restrictions on Brazil would be
a good will gesture in the bilateral relationship. Amorim
implied that GOB receptivity to a USG request to base an
Embassy C-12 aircraft in Brasilia is now linked to a U.S.
show of flexibility. (Note: In a press interview on 2
February, Amorim complained that the USG is "retaliating"
against Brazil because of the U.S. Mission's problems in
Brazil. End note.)

HAITI


7. (C) Amorim affirmed that the GOB has assumed its role in
Haiti as "a long-term commitment." Amorim said the Haiti
experience has been a positive example of U.S.-Brazil
cooperation, even though the two governments have sometimes
differed on specific aspects of the mission. Haiti now has
an elected national government, and it is imperative for the
international community to avoid "the vicious circle" of not
donating resources to a government that is not perfect,
thereby ensuring that the government and country can never
improve to a point of deserving donations, Amorim said. In
addition, it continues to be crucial, in the GOB's view, that
the population perceive tangible improvements in their daily
lives in the near term. MINUSTAH can secure Bel Aire and
other crime-ridden areas, but the local populations will grow
disillusioned and restive if there is no follow-up in basic
services and social programs, Amorim said.


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8. (C) U/S Burns agreed that President Preval is mounting a
serious effort at governance and deserves support; the USG is
now sending resources for security and development in Cite
Soleil. Amorim and U/S Burns agreed that the USG and Brazil
should continue pressing the Chinese Government to support
the 12 month extension for MINUSTAH, and Amorim instructed
his staff to call the Chinese Ambassador in Brasilia in
immediately to receive a new demarche on the issue.
Beijing's Ambassador in Brasilia is a good channel to PRC on
the issue because he had served in East Timor and "had seen
first-hand what happens when the UN leaves too soon," Amorim
noted.

VENEZUELA AND BOLIVIA


9. (C) Amorim said Hugo Chavez's political path is not that
of Brazil, but Brazil "does not feel threatened" by Chavez.
Chavez's military build-up is part of a quest for prestige,
and his rhetorical excesses are primarily for internal
consumption in Venezuela -- "his bark is worse than his
bite," Amorim opined. Isolation is not a solution with
Chavez, since it would only serve to make him "more radical
and self-righteous," Amorim said. Brazil tries to be a
positive influence in ameliorating Chavez's behavior, and has
had some successes, but with his electoral victories and the
strength of oil prices consolidating Chavez's position,
"there is only so much we can do." Brazil has vital
interests with Venezuela -- infrastructure and energy
investments, for example -- and it has to be careful.


10. (C) U/S Burns said the USG has taken Lula's advice and
does not respond to Chavez's constant provocations. "We
don't want to isolate him, we want to talk to him, but he
won't deal with us," U/S Burns emphasized. Amorim replied
that the GOB had urged the Venezuelans to open a dialogue
with the United States, to no avail, and Amorim had also
intervened personally with Chavez in the Sumate human rights
case. Amorim also complained that the removal of former
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez was a bad thing.
He described Rodriguez as an intelligent and reliable
interlocutor. He complained that the current Foreign
Minister, Nicolas Maduro, seems "insecure." Amorim has tried
to persuade Maduro to come alone to Brasilia for discussions,
but he refuses to travel apart from Chavez "because he is
afraid of him." Amorim suggested that continued efforts be
made to engage Chavez in a broad dialogue on the region,
since focusing on Venezuela's internal situation is unlikely
to yield results. He also complained that the disunity and
in-fighting in the opposition had only helped Chavez, and
reiterated his standing complaint that Brazil's ability to
influence Chavez had been undercut by the U.S. decision to
block export of Embraer Super Tucano aircraft to Venezuela by
refusing export licensing of U.S. content in the planes.


11. (C) Amorim and U/S Burns touched briefly on Bolivia, and
agreed on the continuing need to reach out to Morales
wherever possible. Patience and perseverance are needed, "so
that he does not fall into Chavez's arms," Amorim said. The
GOB further doubts that the military ties Morales appears to
be establishing with Chavez will be fruitful for Bolivia, and
appear to be causing a significant political backlash. On
Colombia, Amorim noted that Lula and President Uribe enjoy a
good relationship, and that Brazil is watching with interest
the disarmament process with paramilitaries. U/S Burns and
Amorim agreed that the process must proceed with care and
rigor, as the experience with the paramilitaries will set the
standard for any future effort with the FARC.


12. (U) Participants

Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns

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Ambassador Clifford Sobel
Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Shannon
Political Counselor Dennis Hearne
Policy Planning Staff Officer William W. McIlhenny
Heide Bronke, Assistant to Under Secretary Burns

Brazil:
Minister Celso Amorim
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota
Ambassador Everton Vieira Vargas
Ambassador Goncalo Mourao
Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti
Counselor Joao Tabajara Jr.
Secretary Ricardo Ayrosa

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