Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA7946
2007-11-06 21:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

PARAS, FARC, AND CORRUPTION LOSE GROUND IN LOCAL

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREF PREL PTER VZ CO 
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VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #7946/01 3102142
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 062142Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9994
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7848
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9495
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5581
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0785
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6217
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4154
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007946 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF PREL PTER VZ CO
SUBJECT: PARAS, FARC, AND CORRUPTION LOSE GROUND IN LOCAL
ELECTIONS

REF: A. BOGOTA 7746

B. BOGOTA 6745

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer - Reasons 1.5 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007946

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF PREL PTER VZ CO
SUBJECT: PARAS, FARC, AND CORRUPTION LOSE GROUND IN LOCAL
ELECTIONS

REF: A. BOGOTA 7746

B. BOGOTA 6745

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer - Reasons 1.5 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. The results of October 28 local elections
saw ex-paramilitaries and their political associates lose
ground. The paramilitary demobilization created new
political space, with the press actively exposing candidates
with para ties. Still, some candidates linked to jailed
para-politicians won, most notably in Cordoba and Sucre.
Races were largely decided on local issues, but Uribista
coalition parties won a majority of governorships. The
leftist Polo Democratico won 1.2 million more votes than in
2003, but did not translate those votes into major wins
except in Bogota. Electoral officials saw few signs of
Chavista money or support. The GOC made gains in preventing
vote buying and traditional corruption, especially on the
north coast. End summary.

--------------
Para Regional Influence Battered
--------------

2. (U) In many regions where paramilitaries previously
dominated local politics, the influence of ex-paras was
severely weakened in the 2007 elections. In former para
redoubts such as Cesar, Santander, and Bolivar departments,
candidates with well-known ties to para-politicians lost. In
Cesar, Cristian Moreno, who was forced to withdraw as
gubernatorial candidate in 2003 under threats from paras,
beat a candidate supported by the local para-connected elite.
In Bolivar, reformist candidates took the governor's and
mayoral races respectively, defeating candidates linked to
para-politicians. Indicators of para-influence--including
large numbers of un-contested races, huge turnout and
lopsided votes in specific precincts, and large numbers of
unmarked ballots --all fell sharply compared with the 2003
elections.


3. (C) The media and human rights groups exploited the new
political space created by the paramilitary demobilization
and the jailing of former-para leaders to aggressively

investigate and expose candidates with para-ties. Semana
magazine political editor Alejandra Villamizar told us, "the
tide has turned, and the media is not afraid to expose those
people anymore." Two of the most vocal critics of the
para-politicians, Leon Valencia and Claudia Lopez publicly
said after the elections that the results represented a blow
to the former-paramilitary political structures.


4. (U) Candidates with para ties were not all defeated. In
Cordoba and Sucre, where the para movement began, candidates
won the governor's and key mayor's races with the support of
politicians jailed in the para-political scandal. Most
notable was the narrow victory of Jorge "Tuto" Barraza in the
Sucre governor's race, who won with the support of jailed
ex-senator Alvaro Garcia. There were widespread reports of
vote-buying and other irregularities in Sucre.


5. (U) Violence from armed groups as well as overall
violence was minimal on election day (Ref A),though there
were scattered protests that turned violent in the days after
the vote. Twelve Registrar's offices were attacked by
supporters of unhappy losers in rural areas of 12
departments--with one person killed in Cienega del Oro,
Cordoba.

--------------
Uribe Coalition Fared Well
--------------


6. (U) The elections revolved around local issues and
cross-party alliances, and the results did not represent a
"referendum" on President Uribe. Still, Uribista coalition
parties won half of the governor's races, and 558 mayoral
races out of a total of 1099 races countrywide. In
comparison, the opposition Liberal Party won 206 mayoral
races. The traditional Conservative Party saw the best
coalition result, with 240 mayoral candidates elected. The U
Party and Cambio Radical won 123 and 112 mayoral races,

respectively.

--------------
Left Consolidates--Little Chavez Influence
--------------

7. (C) Candidates of the leftist Polo Democratico Party won
at least 1.2 million more votes than in 2003, but did not see
those votes translate into significant additional wins; only
20 Polo mayoral candidates were elected. The two biggest
Polo victories were for Samuel Moreno in the Bogota mayoral
contest (the most important race in the elections),and
Antonio Navarro Wolff for governor of Narino. Polo, which
remains riven by internal rivalries over security and
relations with the armed left (Ref B),refused to form local
alliances which limited their ability to compete with
better-organized parties. Observers say Polo's relatively
poor results nationwide will hurt its ability to build a
national structure prior to the 2010 presidential elections.



8. (C) In the eastern Venezuela border region and in Valle de
Cauca and Cundinamarca, GOC coalition party officials claimed
prior to the elections that Venezuelan money and support had
entered local campaigns. Still, national and local elections
officials and members of Congress, who previously said they
were worried about possible Chavez interference, told us most
Polo campaigns were run on tight budgets and with no obvious
external support. They saw little Venezuelan interference
beyond "Chavista" rhetoric from some of the farthest-left
candidates.

--------------
"Traditional" Corruption Takes a Hit
--------------

9. (C) The GOC made major strides in combating traditional
vote buying and influence peddling. In Atlantico, where vote
buying was an open secret, former-senator and machine
politician Jose Name lost to Liberal Party candidate Eduardo
Verano. El Tiempo called the unexpected result the most
significant defeat for electoral fraud in memory. Registrar
Juan Carlos Galindo implemented several anti-fraud measures,
including refusing to provide census data to campaigns (used
to stuff ballots and buy votes),transferring local election
officials and replacing them with independent outsiders, and
personally monitoring the Atlantico elections. Senior
politicians predicted that stopping Name after 37 previous
triumphs would be "almost impossible." Commentators hailed
the result as an historic victory for transparency in
Colombia--and for Galindo.
Brownfield