GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER REVIEWS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007648

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF PREL PTER VZ CO
SUBJECT: GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER REVIEWS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
ON HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Defense Minister Santos voiced skepticism about the
efforts of President Chavez and Senator Cordoba to facilitate
a humanitarian exchange with the FARC, prompting a rebuke
from President Uribe. GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo told
us Uribe was chagrined with Santos' remarks, because at the
October 12 Uribe-Chavez meeting, Chavez and Cordoba agreed
not to speak publicly about their efforts or to involve
additional international actors. Santos' comments violated
both commitments. French diplomat Daniel Parfait told
Restrepo he thinks the USG would exchange "Simon" and "Sonia"
as part of an exchange. Restrepo said the GOC now believes a
Cordoba meeting with the Secretary would send the wrong
signal. The ELN process remains frozen. End Summary


2. (U) On October 18, the Presidential Palace issued a
statement reaffirming GOC support for the efforts of
Venezuelan President Chavez and Senator Cordoba to facilitate
a humanitarian accord with the FARC and urging "all GOC
officials to abstain from making public or private comments"
on the process. The statement was prompted by Defense
Minister Santos' statement at the Inter-American Dialogue in
Washington. D.C. earlier that day voicing skepticism about
Chavez' and Cordoba's roles. President Uribe also rejected
Santos' remarks, but called him a "great person" who would
remain in his job.


3. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told us
October 19 that President Uribe was chagrined by Santos'
comments because at the October 12 Uribe-Chavez summit in La
Guajira, Uribe had extracted promises from both Chavez and
Cordoba not to speak publicly on the humanitarian accord.
Uribe also received assurances that they would not continue
to try to involve other international actors. Santos'
comments in Washington violated both commitments.


4. (C) Restrepo said that at the summit, Uribe agreed not to
continue to insist that the GOC be present at a
Chavez/Cordoba meeting with the FARC. Chavez had claimed the
planned October 8 meeting with FARC was postponed, in part,
because of Restrepo's plan to be in Caracas at same time.
Restrepo said Chavez really seemed to believe he could
convince the FARC that, following his example, the way to
power is through the ballot box, not armed struggle. This is
what Chavez means when he says he wants to talk "geopolitics"
with FARC leader Marulanda.


5. (C) Restrepo said he doubts FARC Secretariat members Mono
Jojoy, Raul Reyes, or Ivan Marquez will meet with Chavez in
Caracas. Colombian intelligence indicates that media
speculation on who will attend for the FARC reflects FARC
infighting; FARC members who think Marquez is too close to
Chavez' Bolivarian Movement proposed Jojoy as a blocking
move. Restrepo speculated that the Secretariat would likely
send three lower-level officials (Antonio Losada, Fabian
Ramirez, and Felipe Rincon) to represent it in talks on a
humanitarian exchange. He said FARC participation below the
Secretariat level would be a blow to Chavez.

SIPDIS


6. (C) Restrepo said he reiterated to Venezuelan Foreign
Minister Nicolas Maduro on October 9 and 11 in Caracas that
the GOC would insist that the three Americans held by the
FARC be included in any humanitarian exchange. That
position, he added, did not imply that the USG would consider
a trade involving "Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia." Maduro told
Restrepo he had received a similar message from WHA A/S
Shannon.


7. (C) On October 6, French MFA Latin American Affairs
Director Daniel Parfait suggested to Restrepo that the USG
had changed its policy and would consider the release of

"Sonia" and "Simon" as part of a deal. Parfait attached
great importance to the Cordoba-Pelosi photo, arguing that
the humanitarian accord was becoming a political issue in the
United States. A photo of Cordoba with Secretary Rice would
be another sign that U.S. policy has changed, Parfait
claimed. Restrepo said Parfait's interpretation indicated
the FARC is gaining international traction with the French,
Venezuelans, and the USG. If this was the case, Restrepo
asked, why would the FARC agree to meet with the GOC? Based
on Parfait's comments, Restrepo told us the GOC no longer
thinks that a Cordoba-Rice meeting would be useful.


8. (C) Restrepo said the ELN process is frozen; the GOC has
heard nothing from the group in weeks. He understands the
ELN's Central Committee (COCE) will meet with Chavez in
Caracas after the October 28 local elections in Colombia to
discuss next steps. Still, he believes ELN leaders will not
take any decisions until they see how things play out with
the FARC and the humanitarian exchange. More radical
elements within ELN continue to push for a rapprochement with
the FARC rather than a deal with the GOC, he added.

Brownfield