COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q3'07

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007625

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MCAP OAS CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q3'07

REF: A. BOGOTA 297

B. BOGOTA 3096

C. BOGOTA 4995

D. BOGOTA 6668

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield -
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


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Summary
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1. (C) The following reflects the Country Team's quarterly
review of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
GOC activities. During the third quarter of 2007, the FARC
shifted forces to its core territories between Meta
Department and the Pacific coast -- evidently to hunker down,
protect key assets, and wait out President Uribe's term.
Some Colombian military (COLMIL) officers fear that force
strength, mobility, and GOC resources remain insufficient to
control all of the national territory. If the FARC moved
further east to escape COLMIL pressure, it would pose less of
a national security threat but could continue
narcotrafficking. To offset its military setbacks, the FARC
has tried to strengthen its political influence over local
governments through pre-election violence and intimidation.
The main combat areas remained the same as in prior quarters,
though with increased activity on the southern border. End
Summary.

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FARC Focus on the Meta-Valle Corridor
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2. (C) The FARC appears to have reinforced its fronts
between Meta and the Pacific coast to protect its historic
heartland in Meta, lines of communication and logistics in
Tolima and Huila, and transportation corridors for drugs and
supplies in Valle. After earlier reports that the FARC had
moved fighters to Meta from Antioquia, Joint Task Force Omega
(JTF-O) now detects movement of FARC forces from eastern
Meta/Vichada and Amazonas. Tolima, Huila, Cauca and Valle
del Cauca bore the brunt of attacks against police and
political candidates ahead of the October 28 local elections.
FARC presence has also grown in northern Tolima near Bogota,
as the FARC seeks to fill the vacuum left by the paramilitary
demobilization. On the Pacific coast, FARC forces have moved
northward from Narino and Cauca to the Cali-Buenaventura
corridor. These moves suggest the FARC may be protecting its
core coca-growing territories and drug exfiltration routes
while waiting for the end of President Uribe's term in 2010.

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Concern for Momentum
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3. (C) The GOC's sustained military offensives in the Omega
zone of Meta, Caqueta, and Guaviare Departments have weakened
the FARC but did not drive the group from its core
territories. The FARC's commitment to these areas reflects
its deep historic roots as well as its coca fields,
infrastructure (camps, arms caches, drug labs, makeshift
medical facilities, and materiel workshops),and access to
Bogota. The FARC has detailed knowledge of the terrain as
well as protective family ties and militia networks. Still
the military has challenged the FARC's dominion, expanding
troop levels along mountain corridors and penetrating Meta's
jungles. The COLMIL has weakened the FARC during the last
five years, but momentum has slowed due to logistical and
resource constraints. With limited air-mobility assets,
"mobile" brigades tend to become fixed and offensive
operations hard to sustain. Long-term success remains
contingent on following military force with civilian services
and development.


4. (C) If the COLMIL succeeds in keeping the pressure on the
key Meta-Valle corridor, it may push the FARC out of the
region and into more sparsely populated, remote departments
to the east and south. Displacement of the FARC to these
areas would relieve the vast majority of the population from
the FARC threat, a major achievement. The FARC would then
find it difficult to rebuild the human and physical
infrastructure lost in Omega. Still, given the lack of
facilities, shortage of airlift, and longer supply lines,
such a FARC shift would pose even greater logistical
challenges for the COLMIL. Strikes against high value
targets (HVTs) could help the military regain the initiative,
but it needs to develop the capacity to operate
simultaneously against multiple targets and to coordinate its
actions with law enforcement to dismantle FARC support
networks. Aerial eradication and interdiction also remain
key to keeping the pressure on the FARC in these areas.

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Election Violence: Seeking Local Control
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5. (C) Post expects few significant attacks during local
elections on October 28, but the FARC has engaged in violence
and intimidation leading up to the vote. In the 2002 and
2006 presidential and congressional elections, FARC threats
to disrupt polling did not materialize, in part due to GOC
security efforts. The COLMIL and police will deploy an
estimated 177,000 personnel for election security. Violence
against candidates continues, but at lower levels than in
recent campaign seasons (Ref A). Embassy contacts state that
the FARC has candidates in Florida and Pradera -- the Valle
municipalities the FARC wants "demilitarized" for a
humanitarian exchange. Control over local government remains
important to the FARC as it attempts to offset military
setbacks with political initiatives -- especially in the main
cities of its target corridor like Cali, Buenaventura, Neiva,
Ibague, Pereira, and Armenia. The OAS also warns of ongoing
FARC efforts to rebuild intelligence and militia networks in
ex-paramilitary areas (e.g. Cordoba's "Nudo de Paramillo,"
area, Uraba, south Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Tolima, and
Narino),as a base for future terrorist or military action.

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Main Conflict Areas
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6. (C) The FARC concentrated its attacks against
politicians, police, and the electrical infrastructure in
Colombia's southwest departments of Huila, Tolima, Cauca and
Valle del Cauca. Higher combat frequency in those areas
reflects more aggressive joint operations by the Third and
Fifth Divisions as well as the FARC's greater willingness to
engage. The three primary combat zones, similar to prior
quarters, consisted of Meta, Antioquia (on its southern
border with Caldas, on its northern border with Cordoba, and
in Uraba),and the Montes de Maria region (Sucre/Bolivar).
In the latter effort, the new Joint Decisive Action Force
(FUCAD) continues on the offensive, bolstered by the police
arrests of support militia and the surrender of FARC front
commander Rafael Velasquez (aka El Indio). Martin Caballero
remains the FUCAD's primary objective in the Montes region.


7. (C) Fighting continued in Catatumbo and Arauca/Casanare,
with the FARC and the Army of National Liberation (ELN)
issuing a joint communiqu of cooperation in the former while
fighting each other in the latter. FARC-ELN combat also
spilled into Venezuela. COLMIL/FARC hostilities abated in
the Sierra Nevada region (Cesar/La Guajira). Buenaventura
and Cali remained quiet, due to large, sustained police and
Marine deployments. A new mobile brigade in Narino destroyed
illegal arms caches and drug labs and drew the FARC into
combat. Brigades in Putumayo took the offensive against FARC
border fronts after a long lull, supported by drug
eradication efforts. Harassment of manual eradicators has
dropped, resulting in less casualties.

Brownfield