AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD'S SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006967

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV VZ CO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD'S SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING WITH
GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER LUIS CARLOS RESTREPO


Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo said that the GOC
finds it hard to control Senator Cordoba's and President
Chavez' efforts to facilitate a humanitarian exchange. The
FARC has little interested in an exchange, but wants to use
Chavez' role to gain international recognition, create
tensions between the GOC and USG, and gain space to help it
outlast Uribe's presidency. The GOC and USG must work closely
together to prevent the FARC from blaming them should the
initiative eventually collapse. Restrepo described the ELN
peace process as "exhausted," but said Chavez' role brings
new energy to the talks. He also commented that he would
consult with President Uribe on the usefulness of USG funding
of civil society in the process. Restrepo said Uribe needs
"judicial" proof of Don Berna's ongoing involvement in crime
to extradite him. End Summary

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THE FARC AND A HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE
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2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador and PolCouns on September
21, Restrepo said the GOC accepted Senator Cordoba's initial
proposal of direct GOC-FARC talks outside of Colombia with no
demilitarized zone (despeje),because it coincides with
President Uribe's position. The GOC hoped that by setting
the rules of the game--no despeje and no return of FARC
prisoners to FARC ranks--it could keep Cordoba and President
Chavez under control. This has proved difficult. Cordoba
has respected the GOC position of no despeje, but has ignored
GOC instructions not to involve other countries or
international actors in the process. She did not consult
with the GOC before launching her trip to the United States
to meet with "Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia," U.S. legislators,
and family members of the U.S. hostages. Similarly, Chavez
has supported the FARC's call for a despeje and continues to
push for a meeting with FARC leader Marulanda despite the GOC
position.


3. (C) Restrepo said the GOC needs to react each time Cordoba
or Chavez exceeds the limits set by the GOC. After Cordoba
met with Congressman McGovern, he called Ambassador Barco and
asked that President Uribe publicly support a meeting of U.S.
Congressmen with President Chavez. At the same time, Cordoba
called Uribe and urged him to publicly endorse a meeting of
the family members of the U.S. hostages with Chavez. Uribe
reacted sharply, telling Barco to inform McGovern he would
not insert himself into "U.S. domestic politics." Restrepo
said he told Cordoba and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas
Maduro they should not involve other international actors
without prior GOC approval. Maduro said Chavez understood,
but unilateral Chavez statements remain a problem.


4. (C) Restrepo judged that the FARC has no interested in a
humanitarian accord or broader peace process. It wants to
exploit Chavez' involvement to gain international
recognition, create tensions between the GOC and the USG, and
gain political space that will help it outlast Uribe's
presidency. The GOC and USG must manage the process in a way
that does not permit this or for the FARC to escape blame for
the process' eventual collapse. The USG statements
supporting the humanitarian initiative were positive, and
caught Chavez, Cordoba, and the FARC by surprise. Restrepo
continued that the USG should explain to Congressman McGovern
and other U.S. legislators that the FARC will try to
manipulate them and the hostages' families for political
advantage.


5. (C) He said the GOC plans to demand an immediate meeting
with the FARC if a FARC emissary meets with Chavez in
Caracas. Such a request would highlight that the GOC and
FARC do not need a despeje to hold talks on a humanitarian
accord, and would be resisted by the group. If the FARC
refuses to meet, the GOC will consider ending the process.
Restrepo said he had explained the GOC's stance to Cordoba
and Chavez. Cordoba assured him that the FARC will meet with
him in Caracas, but Restrepo remains skeptical.


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ELN
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6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query. Restrepo said
the ELN has no political agenda and manipulates the peace
process, particularly civil society groups' participation, to
play for time. The GOC tries to pressure by cutting off its
funding from the Swedes, Norwegians, and Swiss, and by
limiting its contacts with civil society. Chavez'
involvement injects some new energy into an "exhausted"
process, but it does not compensate for the ELN's lack of
political vision. Restrepo agreed that U.S. funding of a
civil society group--if focused on a specific purpose and for
a limited time period--might help move the process forward.
He would consult with President Uribe and get back to the
Ambassador on this issue.

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DON BERNA AND EXTRADITION
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7. (C) Restrepo said various officials inside and outside the
GOC believe that the DEA letter outlining the evidence of
Diego Fernando Murillo AKA Don Berna's on-going criminal
activity does not justify his extradition. Medellin Mayor
Sergio Fajardo told President Uribe that Don Berna continues
to meet his obligations under the paramilitary peace process,
Colombian National Police Director Oscar Naranjo said he has
no proof of his involvement in criminal activity after his
demobilization. Restrepo told the Ambassador that he,
himself, had recommended extradition based on current
evidence. Nevertheless, Uribe believes he needs "judicial"
proof, such as an identified witness, to extradite Berna.
Brownfield