COLOMBIA'S NEW CRIMINAL GROUPS: THE DRUG TRADE'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005882

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S NEW CRIMINAL GROUPS: THE DRUG TRADE'S
NEW GENERATION

REF: A. BOGOTA 1033

B. BOGOTA 1925

C. BOGOTA 3448

D. 06 BOGOTA 6262

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (SBU) New criminal groups active in areas of former
paramilitary influence are largely small drug mafias that
lack the United Self-Defense Forces' (AUC) political
pretensions. Most emerged to exploit the narcotrafficking
and criminal vacuum left by the AUC's demobilization; an
estimated 20% of their members are former-paras using their
old narcotics networks. To combat this threat, the GOC is
boosting police presence in rural areas, creating interagency
task forces targeting the groups, and hiking outreach to
vulnerable sectors. The profits from illegal drugs will
continue to fuel these groups, but the ex-paras' loss of
political and social acceptance--and expanded state
presence--should prevent them from recreating the AUC's
former national network. End Summary.

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Incipient, with Paramilitary Vestiges
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2. (SBU) Security forces, think tanks, human rights groups,
and multilateral organizations are concerned by the rise of
about 20 new criminal groups (ref A),with an estimated 3,000
members. The groups are much smaller than former AUC blocs,
and lack a unified structure. They are active in areas where
paramilitary blocs demobilized (the north coast, Antioquia /
Choco, the southwest, and eastern plains). The groups
include small numbers of former AUC members who did not
demobilize, including key mid-level commanders, and exploit
some former AUC drug processing and distribution networks.
Police estimate that 20 percent of new groups' members are
demobilized ex-paras. OAS observer mission coordinator Juan
Carlos Garzon says the structures are hard to verify since
they keep low profiles.

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Apolitical Drug Mafias ("It's the Coca, Stupid")
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3. (SBU) A May 2007 report by the International Crisis Group
(ICG) says, "The AUC had enjoyed a quasi-legitimate status in
some parts of the country.... The new groups have nothing
like this and are seen as a mafia." Groups' leaders are
clandestine, have dropped AUC political and counterinsurgency
rhetoric, and lack the social and political acceptance
enjoyed by the AUC in many regions. OAS/MAPP's Garzon said
the groups are increasingly "less paramilitaries and more
narcotraffickers." In many areas, new groups have forged
coca trading alliances with the FARC and ELN, the sworn
enemies of the ex-AUC (ref C). In others, groups fight with
the FARC for control of coca cultivation and trafficking
corridors.


4. (SBU) Security analyst Roman Ortiz (Universidad de los
Andes) described direct linkages among three narcotrafficking
groups spanning three decades of Colombia's cocaine trade.
First, the Medellin and Cali cartels of the 1980's; second,
the late 1990's AUC whose bosses were groomed in the cartels'
protection rackets; and third, today's new criminal groups,
many of whose leaders learned their trade in the AUC. Each
time the security forces defeat a drug empire, he said, it
prompts a scramble among smaller groups to take the
incumbent's place. MAPP/OAS analysts said the current mafia
violence reflects the struggle among new criminal groups, the
FARC, and other criminal gangs to fill the vacuum left by the
AUC demobilization.


5. (C) An exception to the apolitical nature of most new
criminal groups is Organizacion Nueva Generacion (ONG) in the
department of Narino . The ONG has 350-400 fighters and
derives its key leaders, chain of command, and structure from
the AUC's former Bloque de Libertadores del Sur (BLS)--many
of whom did not demobilize. The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) tells us ONG is enmeshed in the drug
trade but also behaves like an organized military force,
overtly patrolling areas under its control and engaging in
combat against the FARC and ELN--reportedly in collusion with
Colombian Army elements. ONG's "political leader" stresses
the group's counter-insurgency role, and refers frequently to
murdered AUC leader Carlos Castano. With GOC approval, the
ICRC opened official communications with ONG--the only new
criminal group with whom the ICRC maintains such contact.

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DDR is Not the Culprit
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6. (SBU) The ICG and OAS note the GOC's reintegration
program has been flawed, but think tank Fundacion Seguridad y
Democracia (FSD) believes the emergence of new groups is
independent of the reinsertion process. In the six main
regions of AUC demobilization, the Fundacion ranked GOC
programs on initial attention, education, psychological
counseling, and socioeconomic preparation for work. The FSD
determined that the quality of reintegration programs offered
had "no direct relation to criminality indicators." Instead,
recent violence was due to emergent gangs, narcotraffickers,
and guerrillas seeking to fill the gaps of power ceded by AUC
disarmament.

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GOC Response: Carabineros, Search Blocs, Proactive Outreach
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7. (SBU) The GOC believes law enforcement--rather than the
military--is the most effective tool to confront the new
groups. Rural police or "carabinero" units were given
responsibility for containing the emergence of new criminal
groups, and the carabineros set up 108 substations--with more
than 4000 personnel--in areas with large demobilized
populations (ref D). The Colombian National Police also
opened 15 posts in high-risk areas in 2006, and the Police
plan to add 30 more in 2007. The goal is to have 400 rural
substations by 2010. Carabineros coordinator Major Blanco
said the substations are manned by 40-45 officers and are
strategically located at critical areas (coca trafficking
corridors) to work with local Army units. Carabineros have
reached out to sectors vulnerable to extortion, like coffee
growers and agricultural federations, signing security
agreements to preempt the growth of illegal private
protection rackets.


8. (SBU) The GOC has also set up an interagency "search
bloc" (coordinating police, Army, and investigative /
judicial arms of the DAS, CTI, and Fiscalia) in Norte de
Santander in January with strong results, and the model is
being replicated nationally. Defense Minister Juan Manuel
Santos holds a monthly review of the interagency initiative,
and special attention is focused on the groups' 'money
trail.' Santos also meets regularly with MAPP/OAS head
Sergio Caramagna to review progress in combating new groups.
Since January, GOC security forces have captured 786 and
killed 282 members of new criminal groups.


9. (SBU) The military counts the new groups as enemy
targets, but defers to the Police and other law enforcement
agencies in operations. Recent military tallies of enemy
deaths in combat show the new groups ranked second after the
FARC, but action is skewed towards the northeast with few
casualties in the northwest and southwest. Most criminal
group casualties in the Uraba region, for example, were due
to internecine feuds. Police intelligence (DIPOL) unit chief
Major Juan Carlos Buitrago said the groups are not a military
problem, given their purely criminal nature, but agreed the
military could be more active. The UNHCHR, ICG, OAS, and FSD
cite reports of collusion, particularly in Narino, Meta, and
Antioquia, as a factor limiting military action against new
criminal groups.

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Outlook
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10. (SBU) The profits available from narcotrafficking will
continue to fuel the emergence of new criminal groups, but
important changes since the AUC era will likely limit their
expansion. Leon Valencia of the Arco Iris Foundation said
the AUC's' power came from three elements -- military,
political and economic (drugs and extortion) -- the first two

of which have been eliminated by demobilization and the
para-political scandal. Security analyst Gustavo Duncan said
the stronger state security presence--and revelations of para
atrocities--have eroded the political and social legitimacy
once enjoyed by the AUC in many regions. The continued
expansion of state authority, especially in rural areas, and
the growing societal rejection of such groups will make it
difficult for them to recreate the AUC's armed, national
network.

Nichols